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Preface 
 
I started my PhD project in June 2007 at the interdisciplinary research institute CAMeRA at 
the VU University Amsterdam. Before my PhD project I followed the master study cognitive 
science, and the bachelor studies artificial intelligence and (cognitive) psychology, also at the 
VU University in Amsterdam. 
After my master project, in which I worked on a computational model of emotion regulation, 
I was glad to be able to continue doing research as a PhD student. I could elaborate on the 
research done in my master project, and combine the emotion regulation model with other 
models and theories to develop Silicon Coppélia, a computational model of perception, affect 
generation and affect regulation. During my PhD project, I developed various applications in 
which virtual agents were equipped with Silicon Coppélia or its predecessors to exhibit forms 
of emotional intelligence. Virtual agents or robots capable of emotional intelligence while 
communicating can be applied to improve the well-being of humans in various ways. 
I am glad to know that I am given the possibility to work on these applications by 
continuing my career at the VU University Amsterdam as a postdoc at CAMeRA for the 
SELEMCA project. SELEMCA (Services for Electro-mechanical Care Agencies) will develop 
intelligent computer agents and ‘Caredroids’, humanoid care robots. We aim to develop three 
types of Caredroids, each providing a different service. The first type of Caredroids will serve 
as coaches and lifestyle advisors. They will establish a relationship with the patients, while 
being sensitive to their needs and care-indication profile. The second type will assist with 
tasks as filling in forms, and provide health-related entertainment. They can improve an 
otherwise boring process such as filling a form into an immersive and enjoyable media 
experience, for example in the form of an enjoyable quiz game. The third type of Caredroids 
will serve as a matchmaker between the patient, care professionals and volunteers. 
One important problem with developing such Caredroids is the psychological barrier for 
people to be coached and nursed by technology. Existing technological systems for human 
assistance often fail in the market due to a lack of focus on user needs and user experience. 
Therefore, in designing the Caredroids, we will focus on the effects they will have on the 
affect of the user. Based on user-experience research, our Caredroids will be equipped with 
features that go beyond state-of-the-art human-assistance systems. Using our studies into 
emotion psychology and audience perception, we will provide the Caredroids with capabilities 
such as user perception, evaluation of moral issues and aesthetics, affective decision-making 
(e.g., trading rational for affective choices), and emotion regulation. We will perform several 
user experience studies, and evaluate the Caredroids on user satisfaction rather than system 
performance. However, we still expect these Caredroids to keep the Medical Ethics Review 
Committee busy for a long time. 
This dissertation has led to the following publications. In all publications listed below except 
the ones marked with a *, equal authorship is handled, and therefore the authors are listed in 
alphabetical order. Additionally, Chapter 12 of this dissertation will be submitted to an ISI 
journal in the social sciences. 
 
Journal Papers 
Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2011). Coppélius' Concoction: Similarity and 
Complementarity Among Three Affect-related Agent Models. Cognitive Systems Research 
Journal, in press. 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., and Treur, J. (2010). A Computational Model based on Gross’ 
Emotion Regulation Theory. Cognitive Systems Research Journal, Vol. 11, 2010, pp. 211-
230. 
Hoorn, J.F., and Pontier, M.A. (2008). Robot communication – human contact with androids. 
Information Design Journal, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 236-241. 
 
 
10 
Conference Papers 
Bosse, T., Brenninckmeyer, J., Kallisch, R., Paret, C., and Pontier, M.A. (2011). Matching 
Skin Conductance Data to a Computational Model of Reappraisal., Proceedings of of the 
33th International Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci'11, to be 
published. 
*Pontier, M.A., Siddiqui, G.F., and Hoorn, J. (2010). Speed Dating with an Affective Virtual 
Agent - Developing a Testbed for Emotion Models In: J. Allbeck et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of 
the 10th International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA'10, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Vol. 6356, pp. 91-103. 
Bosse, T., Gratch, J., Hoorn, J.F.,Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2010). Comparing Three 
Computational Models of Affect. In: Y. Demazeau et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th 
International Conference on Practical Applications of Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 
PAAMS'10, Advances in Soft Computing, Vol. 70, pp. 175-184. 
Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2009). An Affective Agent Playing Tic-Tac-Toe as Part of a 
Healing Environment In: J.J. Yang et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International 
Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA'09, Lecture Notes in 
Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 5925, Springer Verlag, pp. 33-47. 
Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2009). Silicon Coppélia: Integrating three affect-related 
models for establishing richer agent interaction. In: Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM 
International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'09, pp. 194-202. 
Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2009). Affective agents perceiving each other’s actions. In: 
Otamendi, J., Bargiela, A., Montes, J.L., Pedrera, L.M.D. (eds.), Proceedings of the 23rd 
European Conference on Modelling and Simulation, ECMS'2009. European Council for 
Modelling and Simulation, pp. 194-202.  
Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2008). When the user is instrument to robot 
goals. In: Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on 
Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'08, 2008, pp. 296-301. 
Bosse, T., Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2008). A Robot’s Experience of 
Another Robot: Simulation. In: Sloutsky, V., Love, B.C., and McRae, K. (eds.), Proceedings 
of the 30th International Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci'08, 
pp. 2498-2503. 
Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2008). A virtual therapist that responds empathically to your 
answers In: Prendinger, H., Lester, J., and Ishizuka, M. (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th 
International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA’08, pp. 417-425.   
      
Pontier, M.A. (2008). Simulating the Effects of Therapies and Traumas on Emotion 
Regulation. In: Louca, L. S., Chrysanthou, Y., Oplatkova, Z., and Al-Begain, K. (eds.) 
Proceedings of the 22nd European Conference on Modeling and Simulation, ECMS'08, pp. 
104-110. 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., Siddiqui, G.F., and Treur, J. (2007). Incorporating Emotion 
Regulation into Virtual Stories. In: Pelachaud, C., Martin, J.C., Andre, E., Chollet, G., 
Karpouzis, K., and Pele, D. (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on 
Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA'07. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 4722. Springer 
Verlag, pp. 339-347. 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., and Treur, J. (2007). A Computational Model for Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation. In: Lin, T.Y., Bradshaw, J.M., Klusch, M., Zhang, C., Broder, A., and Ho, H. 
(eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent 
Agent Technology, IAT'07. IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 289-293. 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., and Treur, J. (2007). A. Dynamical System Modelling Approach to 
Gross’ Model of Emotion Regulation. In: Lewis, R.L., Polk, T.A., Laird, J.E. (eds.), 
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cognitive Modeling, ICCM'07. Taylor 
and Francis, pp. 187-192. 
 
 
 
11 
Posters 
Bosse, T., Brenninckmeyer, J., Kallisch, R., Paret, C., and Pontier, M.A. (2011). Matching 
Skin Conductance Data to a Computational Model of Reappraisal., The 33th International 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci’11 
*Pontier, M.A., Otte, M., and Hoorn, J.F. (2010). An Affective Virtual Agent for Natural 
Human-Agent Interaction. SNN Intelligent Machines Symposium 2010 
Bosse, T., Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2008). A Robot’s Experience of 
Another Robot: Simulation. The 30th International Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, CogSci'08 
 
(Extended) Abstracts 
*Pontier, M.A., Otte, M., and Hoorn, J.F. (2010). An Affective Virtual Agent for Natural 
Human-Agent Interaction. SNN Intelligent Machines Symposium 2010 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., Siddiqui, G.F., and Treur, J. (2007). Incorporating Emotion 
Regulation into Virtual Stories. Proceedings of the 19th Belgian-Dutch Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence, BNAIC’07. 
Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., and Treur, J. (2007). A. Dynamical System Modelling Approach to 
Gross’ Model of Emotion Regulation. Proceedings of the 19th Belgian-Dutch Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence, BNAIC’07.  
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
13 
Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
There is a growing interest in developing embodied conversational agents (ECAs) and robots. 
They can make games more interesting, accommodate those who are lonely, provide health 
advice, make online instructions livelier, and can be useful for coaching, counseling, and self-
help therapy. In extreme circumstances, robots can also be the better self of human operators 
in executing dangerous tasks. For example, NASA initiated the P2P- Human-Robot 
Interaction program to explore the possibility of robots and humans collaborating as 
teammates, while perceiving each other as peers (Fong & Nourbakhsh, 2004).  
Thus far, ECAs and social robots were mainly developed from a technical point of view 
(e.g., ELIZA Weizenbaum, 1966). Breazeal (2002) describes that the underlying model was 
almost lay theory, for example, showing that smiles express happiness and frowns sadness. 
Theories and models of human behavior were not extensively used. 
Designing ECAs or robots is not a technical matter alone. Apart from artificial intelligence 
and software engineering for multimedia hardware, theories and models of human behavior 
are as important to explain communication rules, social interaction and perception, or the 
appraisal of certain social situations. In mediated interpersonal communication and media 
psychology, emotions play a salient role and cover an important area of research. Modern 
technologies increasingly allow emotions to be communicated in sophisticated ways through 
electronic devices and screens, both between people being physically apart from each other 
(computer-mediated communication) and between people and computers (human-computer 
interaction) (Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008).  
The idea that human-computer interactions may improve by considering emotions is 
sustained by repeated findings that humans, even experienced computer users, are inclined 
to treat their computers as largely natural and social and that they interact in affective ways 
with computers (Brave & Nass, 2002; Reeves & Nass, 1996). For example, people can feel 
pleased by the flattery of a computer, even though the flatterer is just a piece of equipment. 
Furthermore, people are polite to computers, just as they are polite to humans. In contrast, 
people can also feel offended by an impolite computer, for example if a virtual human 
suddenly disappears from the screen without saying or waving goodbye.  
Robot designers face the challenge to create ECAs that can understand and simulate 
genuine affective behavior. Existing ECAs are often capable of generating meaningful 
responses in a conversational setting. For example, Welbo (Anabuki et al., 2000) assists 
humans in a mixed reality space with handling physical and virtual objects in real time. 
However, none of these applications incorporate emotional intelligence. Although we do not 
believe computers are emotionally intelligent themselves yet, we agree with the founder of the 
field of affective computing Picard (1997) that a computer can at least act emotionally 
intelligent. 
The idea of affective computing is that computers act as having emotions, and detect and 
understand user emotions to respond appropriately to the user. Virtual humans who show 
emotions may increase the user’s appreciation of a system. The positive effects of showing 
empathetic emotions are repeatedly demonstrated in human-human communication (e.g., 
Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008) and are even seen as one of the functions of emotional display. 
Such positive effects may also hold when communicating with a virtual human. Users may 
feel emotionally attached to virtual humans who portray emotions, and interacting with such 
“emotional” embodied computer systems may positively influence their perceptions of 
humanness, trustworthiness, and believability. A study by Brave et al. (2005) showed that 
virtual humans in a blackjack computer game who displayed empathic emotions were rated 
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more positively, received greater likeability and trustworthiness, and were perceived with 
greater caring and support capabilities than virtual humans not showing empathy. In addition, 
user frustration may be reduced if computers consider the user’s emotions (Konijn & Van 
Vugt, 2008). 
In this PhD project, I looked into models of human emotional behavior. Together with my 
co-researchers, I formalized these models, so computers can use them to compute their ‘own 
emotions’, and behave affectively like humans do. As described in the following sections, the 
existing models all point at important aspects of human affective behavior, but none of them 
cover it all. In this project, we looked where the existing theories add to each other, and how 
they can be integrated. Additionally, many detailed design choices had to be made to create a 
working computational system, a challenge the original theorists have never confronted. 
Adding precision and explicating hidden assumptions may count as a contribution to emotion 
theory. The newly created theory and formal model can be implemented in ECAs and robots 
to make them exhibit emotional intelligence. This can be useful in many kinds of applications, 
such as self-help therapy (see e.g., Chapter 5).  
 
1.2. Emotion models 
 
At the start of the project, we dived into various emotion theories to make a selection of the 
theories and models we wanted to use for computational modeling. Especially appraisal 
models of emotion seemed useful for this purpose. The following sections describe the 
models and theories we looked into, and the adjustments we made to fill theoretical omissions 
we encountered when formalizing them. Then follows a brief description of how we combined 
the adjusted versions into an integrated model of affect generation and regulation. 
 
1.2.1. Gross 
 
Historically, emotions were seen as neural activation states in the brain without a function. 
Recent research provides evidence that emotions are functional (e.g., Damasio, 2000). They 
have a facilitating function in decision-making, prepare a person for rapid motor responses, 
and provide information regarding the ongoing match between organisms and environments. 
Emotions also have a social function. They provide us information about others’ behavioral 
intentions, and script our social behavior (Gross, 1998).  
To be adaptive to the user in performing emotional behavior, ECAs should be able to 
regulate their emotions during a conversation. For example, if a virtual coach is angry at a 
user who has not performed his or her exercises, angry shouting may not be the most 
appropriate way to motivate people. 
In the past two decades, psychological research has started to focus more on emotion 
regulation (e.g., Davidson, Putnam, and Larson, 2000; Gross, 1998; 2001; Ochsner & Gross, 
2005; Thompson, 1994). Informally, emotion regulation can be described as the process 
humans undertake to increase, maintain or decrease their emotional responses. Recent 
neurological findings have changed the consensus that emotion regulation is a simple, top-
down controlled process: limbic centers that are responsible for generating emotions show 
bidirectional links with cortical centers that monitor and regulate those emotions (Gross, 
1998). 
To build emotion regulation into ECAs, Chapter 2 takes the informal theoretical model by 
Gross (1998) as its point of departure. This model describes five types of strategies humans 
use to adapt their emotion response levels: (1) situation selection, (2) situation modification, 
(3) attentional deployment, (4) cognitive change, and (5) response modulation. As can be 
seen in Figure 1.1, the first four emotion regulation strategies are applied before the emotion 
response tendencies actually have taken place. After this, the emotional response is 
generated, existing of an experiential, a behavioral, and a physiological component. The 
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behavioral component can be modified by the fifth emotion regulation strategy of response 
modulation (e.g., emotion suppression).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Emotion regulation model by Gross (2001). 
 
 
We refined Gross’ account by conceptualizing and formalizing his informally described theory, 
as described in Chapter 2, and named the resulting model CoMERG (Cognitive Model of 
Emotion Regulation based on Gross’ theory).  Simulation experiments were performed on 
agents in a virtual environment to test the internal validity of the model. Additionally, we 
incorporated CoMERG in a virtual storytelling application in Chapter 3, and performed 
additional simulation experiments. With these simulation experiments we made sure that the 
internal logic of the model was valid. By doing so, we also tested the internal consistency of 
Gross’ original theory. This in itself is a theoretical contribution because parameters and 
hidden assumptions had to be explicated. An example of this is that the increase in level of 
emotion is determined by the weighted sum of the emotional values of the elements 
corresponding to the emotion regulation strategies. Additionally, in Chapter 4, CoMERG was 
successfully validated against human skin conductance data, indicating that also from an 
empirical viewpoint it had its validity.  
Furthermore, inspired by CoMERG, we developed a pilot application in which a virtual 
therapist helped the user through a self-help questionnaire. This application is described in 
Chapter 5. A pilot experiment indicated that users found the ECA helpful in filling out the 
computer-based questionnaire, thus decreasing the number of potential treatment drop-outs. 
This finding can be used to improve Web-based self-help therapies. 
The emotion generation in this application was performed based on expert knowledge of 
clinical psychologists, which we translated into mathematical formulas, based on those 
developed for CoMERG. Although this method of emotion generation seemed sufficient for 
the virtual therapist application, we reasoned that it would not suffice in applications 
demanding more elaborate emotional behavior, for example, in making decisions based on 
rational as well as affective influences. 
Many existing applications show a lack of emotional intelligence, which may raise irritation 
and frustration in the user. For instance, Microsoft’s Clippit (the paperclip in Microsoft Office) 
always stays nice and polite, no matter how rude you treat it. If it keeps on providing you 
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unhelpful information and you type ‘GET LOST!!’ it will politely direct you to some help topics 
containing the words ‘get’ and ‘lost’. Another example is the Agneta & Frida system (Höok et 
al., 2000), which mostly gives rather negative, sarcastic responses but irrespective whether 
this is appropriate to the situation. In other words, many ECAs and robots fail conversation-
wise because they cannot apply the right emotional response to the right situation. 
There should be a balance between being nice and being negative and the robot should 
know when to express which emotion. To create complex personalities with humanlike 
properties (Shapiro et al., 2006), virtual characters should be capable of mixed responses to 
their human user (e.g., “Although you try your best, your work is insufficient”). 
Artificial intelligence and cognitive-emotional robotics have been concerned with modeling 
specific emotions (e.g., fear, happiness), situation-based emotional inferences, or 
neurological foundations of emotions (Bosse et al., 2007). The explanation of ambiguities in 
affective responses is new to artificial intelligence approaches. It also is an only-recently 
opened and still vague area in the cognitive sciences. To fill this gap, we looked into a model 
that explains affective processes, including emotional ambiguities, based on interpersonal 
and mediated communication. 
 
1.2.2. I-PEFiC 
 
Interactively Perceiving and Experiencing Fictional Characters (the I-PEFiC model) (Van Vugt 
et al., 2009) is an integrative and empirically validated account of how users respond to 
ECAs. The I-PEFiC model is shown in graphical format in Figure 1.2. This model stems from 
the field of human-computer interaction and media psychology and focuses on the way 
humans emotionally perceive and experience fictional characters, such as movie characters, 
media figures, or ECAs, and how this relates to the (intended) use of ECAs. I-PEFiC focuses 
on trade-offs between involvement and distance of the user with the ECA from a local feature 
level up to a global judgment of being satisfied or dissatisfied.  
This way, the ECA can recognize and mimic the experiential ambiguities that are typical for 
human affect and that transpire when, for instance, a user is perceived as beautiful but at the 
same time as unskilled. The ECA follows I-PEFiC as the affective structure to build up a 
relationship with its user, the results of which are fed into CoMERG. Whereas I-PEFiC 
provides the reasons for the elicitation of emotion, CoMERG controls the regulation of 
emotion. The simulation experiments in Chapter 6 showed that the model turned out to be 
adequate for simulating the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence 
on being satisfied with the outcome, and that it could replicate the sometimes counterintuitive 
findings found in previous empirical studies (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
In the encoding phase of the computational I-PEFiC model, the ECA assesses the Ethics 
of the user (being of good or bad intent), the Aesthetics (beautiful or ugly), and Realism. 
Moreover, the user is evaluated for the possibilities he or she offers (Affordances) for 
interaction with the ECA.  
In the comparison phase of the model, the ECA takes into account in how far it perceives 
its Similarity with the user. The perceived features are assessed for Relevance and Valence 
regarding the ECA’s goals (cf. Frijda, 1986). Here, Valence determines the direction of the 
impact on the emotions of the ECA (positive or negative), and Relevance determines the 
intensity of this impact.  
In the response phase, the ECA uses the perceptions described above to determine the 
intentions to interact with the user to achieve its own ECA goals (Use Intentions). 
Furthermore, the levels of Involvement with and Distance towards the user are determined. 
In Chapter 6, we describe how we refined the original, informally described I-PEFiC model 
by conceptualizing and formalizing the I-PEFiC model. By doing so, we added to the theory of 
human-computer interaction and media psychology. By implementing I-PEFiC as a behavioral 
model for ECAs, I-PEFiC serves for our ECAs to evaluate their users. This way, ECAs can be 
involved or at a distance dependent on the way they perceive the user’s behavior. By 
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performing simulation experiments, we tested the internal consistency of the computational I-
PEFiC model, as well as the original, informally described model. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The I-PEFiC model shown in graphical format (Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
 
 
As a next step, we extended the computational I-PEFiC model with goal-directed judgment 
formation (Hoorn et al., 2007) and overt actions, as described in Chapter 7. This way, the 
ECAs had the availability over goals to establish beliefs about how certain actions would 
sustain or obstruct them. This resulted in a model I-PEFiCADM that can explain Affective 
Decision Making in terms of emotional ambiguities (i.e., involvement-distance trade-offs). This 
is in fact a more elaborated way of the situation selection in CoMERG. Simulation 
experiments showed that this enabled agents to make decisions based on rational as well as 
affective influences. The explication of this mechanism is a contribution to the theory.  
However, the actions the agents took in the simulation experiments did not have any effect 
on their virtual interaction partners. Therefore, in Chapter 8, we extended the model of 
affective decision making such that the agents change their perceptions and beliefs about 
other agents if actions are taken. Furthermore, we managed that specific emotions can be 
simulated. In simulation experiments, the agents behaved intuitively compelling, and as would 
be expected from the theory (Van Vugt et al., 2009). This provides evidence that these 
extensions improve the existing theory. 
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1.2.3. EMA 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Computational instantiation of the cognitive-motivational-emotive system 
(Marsella & Gratch, 2009). 
 
 
Although the results described in paragraph 1.2.2. are nice, there still was something missing. 
The developed formulas to calculate specific emotions were largely based on lay theory. For 
the simulations in Chapter 8 this appeared to be sufficient. However, we reasoned that for 
applications in which ECAs simulate specific emotions while communicating with human 
users in real-time, a more elaborated way of simulating specific emotions was needed. 
Marsella & Gratch (2009) formalized the theory of Emotion and Adaptation of Smith and 
Lazarus (1990) into EMA. Virtual humans can use EMA to appraise the environment, leading 
to an affective state that can be coped with if it is too negative. In cognitive appraisal theories, 
appraisal and coping center on people’s interpretation of their relationship with the 
environment. Several empirical studies demonstrated EMA’s effectiveness in simulating 
realistic human emotional responses when compared with human behavior (e.g., Mao and 
Gratch, 2006). Figure 1.3 shows EMA in graphical format. The agent appraises the 
environment, in terms of various appraisal variables relating to goals, such as desirability, 
likelihood, and responsibility for reaching desired or undesired goal-states. EMA contains an 
elaborate method of how these appraisal variables lead to specific emotions; something that 
was lacking in I-PEFiCADM. The agent can cope with negative affect by performing a number 
of coping strategies, in which the agent changes its actions, plans and intentions in one way 
or the other. 
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1.2.4. Integration into Silicon Coppélia 
 
Chapter 9 looks into CoMERG, I-PEFiCADM and EMA from a broader perspective. All three 
approaches point at important aspects of human affective behavior, but each misses out on 
some aspect. Therefore, this chapter aligns and contrasts the different affect models as they 
were derived from the original emotion theories, and account for some conceptual decisions. 
By integration of the previous three, we created a new computational model, which we named 
Silicon Coppélia1. Simulation experiments showed that Silicon Coppélia expectedly exhibited 
richer affective behavior than CoMERG, I-PEFiCADM and EMA could do on their own (see 
Chapter 9). This indicates that integrating these three theories led to a new theory that 
provides a more complete picture. 
To confront the integrated model with real users and verify the empirical validity of its 
theoretical tenets, we created an application with an ECA that had Silicon Coppélia installed, 
as described in Chapter 10. This ECA played a tic-tac-toe game, while showing emotions by 
means of facial expression. Emotion expression related to, among others, the likelihood of 
winning or losing the game. Due to trade-offs between rational decision making for game play 
versus affective decision making for liking the user, when the ECA was very involved with the 
human opponent, it would let the opponent win, because it had friendly feelings for that 
person. The fact that Silicon Coppélia can be used to produce realistic behavior internally 
validates the model, as well as the original theories that were used for the integration. 
 
1.2.5. Empirical testing 
 
The simulation experiments of Chapter 10 showed that Silicon Coppélia generates realistic 
behavior, or at least behavior that is consistent with the theories the models are based on. 
Thus, the model is internally consistent, logically. But we also wondered whether it was valid, 
empirically. CoMERG proved to be successful in explaining physiological data as described in 
Chapter 4. However, we wanted to perform a more extensive empirical study to demonstrate 
that formalizing theories leads to sophistication and precision in test predictions. Moreover, 
we wanted to control the ecological validity of our new-born theory at the level of affective 
behavior. Therefore, as a final test in this PhD project, we had participants interact with our 
ECA to compare its affective performance with that of humans.  
Our aim was to have users diagnose the motives, emotions, and cognitive-affective 
structure of the ECA, which ideally should be similar to a real human. The emotionally laden 
situation of a speed date seemed to perfectly fit this purpose, because in this setting people 
naturally wonder what the other thinks of them – in our case, in terms of the variables of the 
Silicon Coppélia software. Chapter 11 describes an application in which the affective ECA 
performs a speed date with the human user. After a successful pilot study, we used this 
application for the ecological validation of Silicon Coppélia in Chapter 12. Apart from being 
controlled by our software, in a second condition, the ECA was controlled by a human 
confederate as in a Wizard of Oz study (Landauer, 1987) to test for possible differences in 
affective behavior between a human-operated and a software-operated ECA. 
In both conditions, the participants were told they were interacting with an artificial agent. 
After the speed-date, we asked the participants how they thought the ECA perceived them. 
Results showed that in emotion expression and affective decision making, software-controlled 
behavior equaled human-operated behavior of ECAs. What differed, although not completely, 
was the cognitive-affective structure responsible for those effects as perceived by the 
participants. In other words, our theories and simulations of those theories are confirmed for 
the overt affective behaviors but only partially, and weakly for the inner workings of affect. 
Some further work is needed here. 
                                                           
1 In the story Der Sandmann by E.T.A. Hoffmann (1815), Coppélia is a mechanical dancing doll that is so 
realistic that a boy named Franz falls in love with her. 
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This indicates Silicon Coppélia is useful for developing applications in make ECAs or robots 
behave emotionally human-like when they interact with humans, for example in self-help 
therapy, virtual storytelling, serious games, or entertainment. However, we cannot claim yet 
that the cognitive structure behind this emotional behavior fully matches human cognitive 
structure. The newly created theory, which is more detailed than the original theories, may 
closely approach human cognitive structure, but not completely yet. Moreover, stronger 
evidence is required. 
 
1.3. In hindsight: verification and validation  
 
To create ECAs and robots that act emotionally intelligent, boundaries had to be crossed not 
only within, but also across disciplines (i.e., computer science, media, psychology, 
communication). We experienced that this brought about misapprehension and non-
acceptance of the scientific tradition that the reader is unfamiliar with. The combination of 
diverse theories from various disciplines inevitably forces to reconsider the theoretical 
framework and methods one is used to. Authorities suddenly have to admit that they oversee 
but a part of the bigger picture (like us). 
Theories of social sciences and psychology are usually well-founded on empirical data, but 
often lack internal consistency. There usually is a focus on the effects of a system on the 
user, with which the ecological validity is tested. What has to be changed within the system to 
modify these effects is often left out of consideration (Hoorn & Pontier, 2008).  
Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, usually focuses on the way a system is built and 
looks whether the system behaves as would be expected using simulation experiments, to 
verify internal consistency. Mostly, the effects the system has on the user are only marginally 
treated (Hoorn & Pontier, 2008). 
In this dissertation, I studied existing theories and informally described models from the 
social sciences and psychology to create computational models and then test them 
empirically. When creating a computational model, we started with a conceptualization phase 
in which we determined the main aspects and their relations. After finishing the 
conceptualization, we followed with a formalization phase, in which the detailed model was 
specified. When the model was finished, we performed simulation experiments and evaluated 
whether the model behaved as expected from the theory. If evaluation revealed the model 
was not correct, we restarted the process to improve the model. 
Computational models are able to imitate the development of cognitive processes over 
time. This process is called simulation, and models that can be used to simulate behavior 
over time are called dynamic models. The result of a simulation is a sequence of states of the 
model at subsequent time points and experiments with these models can be used to assure 
internal consistency. When the simulation experiments show that the model generates the 
expected behavior, ecological validation is performed. In this dissertation, we performed 
ecological validation in two forms: (1) by comparing the simulation to empirical data, (e.g., see 
Chapter 4). (2) Incorporating the model in an ECA that is visualized in a graphical 
environment and confront it with human users (e.g., see Chapter 12). 
If the underlying models and theories are correct and well elaborated, an ECA should be able 
to use computational emotion models to simulate emotional intelligence. If the agent behaves 
according to these models and theories, a more natural emotion component will be introduced 
into the communication of these agents with humans, and with each other. Testing models 
both ways (i.e., verification and validation) is unusual in the social sciences and in computer 
science, but should become common practice – at least in ECA development. 
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1.4. Outline of the dissertation 
 
In Part 2 of this dissertation I describe the development, verification and validation of the 
emotion regulation model CoMERG based on Gross’ theory (Gross, 1998). In Chapter 2, I 
describe the conceptualization and formalization of this model, with which we refined Gross’ 
theory. We performed simulation experiments to test the internal validity of the model, and 
thereby also the original theory of Gross. In Chapter 3, we equipped virtual characters with 
CoMERG in a virtual storytelling context and performed additional simulation experiments. 
After these simulation experiments assured the internal validity of the model, the emotion 
regulation model was successfully validated against human skin conductance data in Chapter 
4. Moreover, comparing the adaptive model to a baseline variant of the model without 
adaptation showed the adaptive model was better able to fit the empirical data. In Chapter 5, I 
describe a pilot application in which a virtual therapist helps the user through a questionnaire 
in an empathetic way. 
We reasoned that the affect generation, based on expert knowledge combined with the 
formulas from CoMERG, would not suffice in applications that demand more elaborate 
affective behavior. Therefore, Part 3 of this dissertation focuses on I-PEFiCADM, a model of 
affect generation based on perceptions, and making decisions based on rational as well as 
affective influences. In Chapter 6, I describe the formalization and verification of I-PEFiC (Van 
Vugt et al., 2009). In Chapter 7, we extend the computational I-PEFiC model with an affective 
decision making module, and verify whether the resulting model of affective decision making 
I-PEFiCADM is consistent with the theory. In Chapter 8, we develop and verify an extension of 
I-PEFiCADM that enables changes in perceptions based on the actions of interaction partners, 
and simulation of specific emotions. Although the simulations produced realistic results, we 
reasoned that applications in which ECAs communicate with humans require more elaborate 
simulation of specific emotions. 
We decided to base the generation of specific emotions on EMA (Marsella & Gratch, 
2009). However, the loose pieces we created needed to be integrated first. In Part 4 of this 
dissertation, I describe the integration of the models into one system, which we called Silicon 
Coppélia, as well as the verification and ecological validation of this system. In Chapter 9 I 
describe the conceptualization, formalization and logical verification of Silicon Coppélia. In 
Chapter 10, we apply Silicon Coppélia to an agent playing tic-tac-toe, which enables it to 
simulate the duality of certain affective behaviors. Chapter 11 describes the development of a 
speed-dating application, in which an ECA equipped with Silicon Coppélia perceives the user 
during a speed date. In Chapter 12, we performed an experiment showing the effects of the 
ECA on (real) humans in a laboratory experiment to test the ecological validity. This is the 
final chapter in this dissertation and the most elaborated empirical test of the integrated model 
thus far.  
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Part 2: CoMERG 
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Chapter 2: A computational model based on 
Gross’ emotion regulation theory2 
 
Abstract 
 
Emotion regulation describes how a subject can use certain strategies to affect emotion 
response levels. Usually, models for emotion regulation assume mechanisms based on 
feedback loops that indicate how to change certain aspects of behavior or cognitive 
functioning in order to get a more satisfactory emotion response level. Adaptation of such 
feedback loops is usually left out of consideration. This paper introduces an adaptive 
computational model for emotion regulation by formalizing the model informally described by 
Gross (1998). The model has been constructed using a high-level modeling language, and 
integrates both quantitative aspects (such as levels of emotional response) and qualitative 
aspects (such as decisions to regulate one’s emotion). This model includes mechanisms for 
adaptivity of the degree of flexibility of the emotion regulation process. Also, the effects of 
events like traumas or therapies on emotion regulation can be simulated. Based on this 
computational model, a number of simulation experiments have been performed and 
evaluated. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Historically, there has been much debate about the function of emotions. For example, Hebb 
saw emotions as neural activation states without a function (Hebb, 1949). However, recent 
research provides evidence that emotions are functional (e.g., Damasio, 2000). Emotions 
have a facilitating function in decision making (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987), prepare a 
person for rapid motor responses (Frijda, 1986), and provide information regarding the 
ongoing match between organism and environment (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Emotions 
also have a social function. They provide us information about others’ behavioral intentions, 
and script our social behavior (Gross, 1998). In the past two decades, psychological research 
has started to focus more on emotion regulation (e.g., Gross, 1998, 2001; Ochsner and 
Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1994). In brief, emotion regulation is the process humans undertake 
in order to affect their emotional response. Recent neurological findings (such as bidirectional 
links between limbic centers, which generate emotion, and cortical centers, which regulate 
emotion) have changed the consensus that emotion regulation is a simple, top-down 
controlled process (Gross, 1998). 
This article introduces a computational model to simulate emotion regulation, based on the 
process model described informally by Gross (1998, 2001). Note that Gross’ definition of 
emotion is very much related to the well known notion of coping (see, e.g., Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 1984), but with some subtle differences. In particular, coping mainly 
focuses on decreasing negative emotion experience, whereas emotion regulation addresses 
increasing and decreasing both positive and negative emotions (Gross, 1998). 
Computational models for emotion regulation, like the one described in this paper, can be 
used for different purposes (see (Wehrle, 1998) for an overview). In the first place, a model 
                                                           
2 This paper has been published as Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., and Treur, J. (2010). A Computational 
Model based on Gross’ Emotion Regulation Theory. Cognitive Systems Research Journal, Vol. 11, 2010, 
pp. 211-230. Parts of this paper are based on work presented at the 2007 International Conference on 
Cognitive Modeling (ICCM’07) (Bosse, Pontier, and Treur, 2007c), the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International 
Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT’07) (Bosse, Pontier, and Treur, 2007b), and the 2008 
European Conference on Modeling and Simulation (ECMS'08) (Pontier, 2008). 
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for emotion regulation can be used in the field of Artificial Intelligence; see e.g., (Bates, 1994; 
Hudlicka, 2008). For example, in the domain of virtual reality it can be used to let virtual 
agents show human-like behavior regarding emotion regulation. There are also various 
applications one could think of for which the model could be incorporated into robots, to make 
them show human-like emotion regulation behavior (Neal Reilly, 1996). Similarly, in the 
gaming industry, there is much interest in manners to let game characters emotionally behave 
like humans. Finally, computational models for emotion regulation may play a role within the 
field of Ambient Intelligence (Aarts, Harwig, and Schuurmans, 2001). For instance, in settings 
where humans have to interact intensively with automated systems, it is useful if the system 
maintains a model of the emotional state of the user. This can enable the system to adapt the 
type of interaction to the user’s needs; see e.g., (Klein, Moon, and Picard, 2002). 
In addition, from a Cognitive Science perspective, such a model can provide insight in the 
process of emotion regulation; see e.g., (Sloman, 2003). An advanced model could also be 
helpful to make predictions about emotions, about behavior that is a consequence of 
emotions and about how to influence certain behaviors with, e.g., an anger management 
therapy. This may be useful for the purpose of developing therapies for persons that have 
difficulties in regulating their emotions (Burns et al., 2003; Towl and Crighton, 1996), for 
example, in work with forensic inpatients. 
The perspective taken in this paper is mainly the Artificial Intelligence perspective. Thus, we 
aim to model the process of emotion regulation in such a way that it can be incorporated into 
intelligent entities (e.g., intelligent virtual agents, or Ambient Intelligence systems). Therefore, 
a main requirement of the model is that it is relatively lightweight (i.e., easy to plug in to an 
existing applications), while nevertheless complying with the existing literature on emotion 
regulation3. 
Often, models for emotion regulation are conceptualized as dynamical systems based on 
feedback loops that indicate how to change certain aspects of behavior or cognitive 
functioning to get a more satisfactory emotion response level. Such feedback loops have 
certain characteristics, for example, concerning sensitivity and flexibility of the adjustments 
made. Too sensitive feedback loops may result in stressful and energy-consuming behavior 
involving frequent adjustments, whereas feedback loops that are not sensitive enough may 
result in long periods of less desirable emotions. To obtain a balanced form of emotion 
regulation, either certain more or less ideal characteristics of the feedback loops in the 
emotion regulation system should be set at forehand, or an adaptation mechanism should be 
available that allows for tuning them on the fly to the required form of sensitivity. As it does 
not seem very plausible to have one set of ‘ideal’, innate characteristics applicable in various 
contexts (Wehrle, 1998, p. 5), this paper takes the latter assumption as a point of departure: 
adaptive emotion regulation. This adaptivity includes mechanisms to assess and adapt the 
degrees of flexibility of the emotion regulation process over longer periods; i.e., the subject 
changes its willingness to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, regarding the 
success of its emotion regulation in the past. 
This willingness to change behavior can be changed by certain events. For instance, if 
someone has a very low tendency to change his/her behavior in order to regulate his 
emotions, a therapy could help that person to change this tendency, and help him/her learn to 
adapt this regulation of emotions in a more flexible manner. Previous research suggests that 
therapies can help people to regulate their emotions. For instance, Beck and Fernandez 
describe, based on 50 studies, that people who were treated with a cognitive behavioral 
therapy as an approach for anger management were better off than 76% of untreated 
subjects, in terms of anger reduction (Beck and Fernandez, 1998). In addition, an article by 
Burns et al. suggests that a structured anger management training program is useful for 
                                                           
3 However, while developing our model, we always keep the Cognitive Science perspective ‘in mind’. 
That is, if the modeling process itself provides us new insights into emotion regulation, we will not 
hesitate to explore these insights in more detail. 
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forensic inpatients with learning disability (Burns, Bird, Leach, and Higgins, 2003). Finally, 
Deschner and McNeil describe an experiment, in which families that experienced violence, 
followed anger control training. After the training, 85% of the families were free of further 
violence and remained so, according to an independent survey completed 6-8 months later 
(Deschner and McNeal, 1986). On the other hand, an event like a trauma could decrease the 
tendency to change one’s behavior in order to regulate his emotions significantly. Schore 
describes that an early trauma can cause impaired affect regulation (Schore, 2001). 
An important choice to be made in modeling is the grain size by which the model 
represents reality. This choice is strongly related to the goals and may have a decisive effect 
on the feasibility and success of a modeling enterprise. On the one hand a model that has a 
too fine grain-size may become unmanageable both conceptually and computationally. On 
the other hand a model with a too coarse grain size may miss patterns in reality that may be 
essential to fulfill the goals of the modeling enterprise. As indicated above, the goals of the 
work presented here are in the area of building relatively lightweight artificial, virtual agents 
which have a certain level of believability. Therefore a rather coarse-grained approach has 
been chosen, where a number of aspects have been addressed in an abstracted manner, 
such as the detailed processes underlying emotion elicitation and appraisal. 
In Section 2.2, the process model of emotion regulation by Gross is explained. The model 
describes a number of strategies humans use to adapt their emotion response levels, varying 
from situation selection to cognitive change and response modulation. This model is used as 
a basis for the computational model of emotion regulation. In Section 2.3, a high-level 
overview of the model is provided, and the dynamical system style modeling approach is 
briefly introduced. In Section 2.4, the computational model is described in detail. Section 2.5 
illustrates the model by a number of simulation experiments for different scenarios, both for 
ideal cases and for cases of over- and under-regulation. Also, simulation experiments have 
been performed to test whether events with a positive effect on the personal tendency to 
change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, like therapies, facilitate emotion regulation, 
and events with a negative effect on the tendency to change behavior, like traumas, impair 
emotion regulation. Section 2.6 addresses verification of global properties of the model, and 
Section 2.7 concludes the paper with a discussion. 
 
2.2. Gross’ model for emotion regulation 
 
Gross (2001) describes a process model of emotion regulation using the following definition: 
 
‘Emotion regulation includes all of the conscious and nonconscious strategies we use to 
increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an emotional response’. (Gross, 
2001). 
 
Increasing components of an emotional response is called up-regulation of an emotion, and 
decreasing these components is called down-regulation of an emotion. The components he 
considers are (1) the experiential component, (the subjective feeling of the emotion), (2) the 
behavioral component (behavioral responses), and (3) the physiological component 
(responses such as heart rate and respiration). Humans use strategies to affect their level of 
emotional response for a given type of emotion, for example, to prevent a person from having 
a too high emotional or too low emotional response level. He differentiates between 
antecedent-focused strategies and response-focused strategies. Antecedent-focused 
strategies are applied to the process preparing for response tendencies before they are fully 
activated. Response-focused strategies are applied to the activation of the actual emotional 
response, when an emotion is already underway. 
In his model, Gross distinguishes four different types of antecedent-focused emotion 
regulation strategies, which can be applied at different points in the process of emotion 
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generation: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment and cognitive 
change. A fifth strategy, response modulation, is a response-focused strategy. Figure 2.1 
shows an overview of these strategies. 
The first antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy in the model is situation selection: 
a person chooses to be in a situation that matches the emotional response level the person 
wants to have for a certain emotion. For example, a person can stay home instead of going to 
a party, because he is in conflict with someone who is going to that party. This is an example 
of down-regulating one’s emotion (anger in this case). An example of situation selection to up-
regulate one’s emotion (excitement in this case) is taking a roller-coaster ride. 
The second antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy in the model is situation 
modification. When this strategy is applied, a person modifies an existing situation so as to 
obtain a different level of emotion. For instance, when watching an irritating television 
program, one may zap to another channel. 
The third antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy is attentional deployment. This 
strategy refers to shifting your attention to a certain aspect. For example, one may close his 
eyes when watching an exciting penalty shoot-out.  The fourth antecedent-focused emotion 
regulation strategy is cognitive change: selecting a cognitive meaning to an event. A specific 
type of cognitive change, which is aimed at down-regulating emotion, is reappraisal: 
 
‘Reappraisal means that the individual reappraises or cognitively re-evaluates a potentially 
emotion-eliciting situation in terms that decrease its emotional impact’ (Gross, 2001). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Emotion Regulation Model by Gross (1998). 
 
 
An example of reappraisal is a case when a person loses a tennis match and blames the 
weather circumstances, instead of his own capacities. However, note that cognitive change 
could also be aimed at up-regulating emotion. 
The fifth emotion regulation strategy, response modulation, a response-focused strategy, is 
applied after the emotion response tendencies have been generated: a person tries to affect 
the process of response tendencies becoming a behavioral response. A specific type of 
response modulation, again aimed at down-regulating, is suppression:  
 
‘Suppression means that an individual inhibits ongoing expressive behavior.’ (Gross, 2001). 
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An example of suppression is a person that hides being nervous when giving a presentation.  
In his article, Gross predicts that early emotion regulation strategies are more effective then 
strategies that are applied at a later time point in the process (Gross, 2001). He describes an 
experiment of which the results support this prediction. In this experiment, participants are 
shown a short film of a disgusting arm amputation in three different conditions: the reappraisal 
condition, the suppression condition, and the neutral condition. In the reappraisal condition, 
participants were asked to think about the film in such a way that they would not respond 
emotionally (for instance as if it were a medical teaching film). In the suppression condition, 
participants were asked to hide their emotional reactions to the film. In the natural condition, 
participants were given no specific instruction. 
The results showed that reappraisal decreased emotion experience and expressive behavior, 
and did not have an effect on memory, or the physiological response. Suppression decreased 
expressive behavior, but had no effect on the emotion experience. Moreover, it impaired 
memory, and increased the physiological response.In this paper, our focus is on antecedent-
focused strategies (i.e., situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment and 
cognitive change). Thus, the consequent-focused strategy response modulation is not 
considered. The main reason for this is that, according to Gross’, this strategy is not very 
effective: it does influence behavioral and physiological responses, but does not affect 
experiential responses (Gross, 2001, p.216). Nevertheless, it would not be difficult to 
incorporate this strategy in the computational model, by treating it in a similar manner as the 
antecedent-focused strategies. 
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies have the purpose to facilitate beneficial use of emotion 
regulation strategies. They focus on cognitive aspects, as well as behavioral aspects. The 
behavioral part focuses on replacing counterproductive emotional driven behaviors with 
alternatives. This has a facilitating effect on beneficial use of situation selection, situation 
modification, and attentional deployment. The cognitive part focuses on substituting irrational 
negative appraisals for evidence-based appraisals. This has a facilitating effect on beneficial 
use of cognitive change (Campbell-Sills and Barlow 2006). 
 
2.3. Global overview of the model 
 
This section provides a global overview of our emotion regulation model. Section 2.3.1 
introduces the basic concepts used, and the relations between them. Section 2.3.2 introduces 
the modeling environment that was used to formalize these concepts and relations. 
 
2.3.1. Basic concepts and relations 
 
Gross has described his process model for emotion regulation informally (i.e., in natural 
language, and not in a computational or mathematical notation). In order to convert this 
informal model to a computational model, a number of (iterative) steps have been performed, 
according to standard modeling and simulation methodologies (Banks and Carson, 1984; 
Shannon, 1975). First, Gross’ theory was carefully analyzed in order to extract the relevant 
concepts. Second, the relations between these concepts were identified (i.e., how do the 
different concepts depend on each other?). Third, the concepts and their relationships were 
formalized (in this case, in terms of mathematical concepts: variables with real numbered 
values and differential equations). Fourth, the resulting model was used to perform simulation. 
And fifth, the results of the simulation were verified. Below the results of the different steps 
are described in more detail. 
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As a first step, for any given type of emotion a number of variables have been introduced. For 
convenience, the model concentrates on one specific type of emotion. In principle, this can be 
any emotion, e.g., sadness, happiness, or anger. 
     In order to describe the regulation of such an emotion, the model takes into account a 
number of emotion regulation strategies that can be chosen. In the variant of the model as 
described in this paper, the four antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies discussed 
by Gross are used (i.e., situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, and 
cognitive change). For the moment, response modulation is not considered. However, the 
model is generic in the sense that this set of strategies considered can easily be adapted. 
Based on the four strategies mentioned, in the formalization four corresponding elements k 
are introduced, denoting the objects that are influenced by the particular strategies (see Table 
2.1). 
 
 
Table 2.1: Strategies and elements addressed in the model. 
Strategy Corresponding Element 
situation selection situation 
situation modification sub_situation 
attentional deployment aspect 
cognitive change meaning 
 
 
In the model it is assumed that at each point in time, for each element k a certain choice is in 
effect, and this choice has a certain emotional value vk attached. This emotional value 
contributes to the emotion response level ERL via an element-specific weight factor wk, 
thereby taking into account a persistency factor β indicating the degree of persistence or 
slowness of adjusting of the emotion response level when new emotional values are  
obtained. Someone whose emotions can change rapidly (e.g., who stops being angry in a few 
minutes after a fight) will have a low β. 
Humans are always searching for a certain level of emotion4. The location of this optimum 
varies per person and through time. For instance, there are people who love excitement and 
enjoy extreme sports or roller coasters, while others prefer a more quiet kind of recreation. 
However, the people who do like roller coasters generally do not want to sit in a roller coaster 
all the time, but after a period of excitement they usually switch to a calmer activity. This point 
of view is similar to theories of emotion that are based on the idea of homeostasis, i.e., the 
perspective that the human body continuously tries to keep certain (physiological) variables 
between a certain range (e.g., Cañamero, 1997; Velasquez, 1997). 
The level of emotion aimed at depends also on the type of emotion. Most humans aim at a 
relatively high level of emotion for happiness, while they aim at a lower level of emotion for 
fear. The regulation process starts by comparing the actual emotion response level ERL to 
the emotion response level aimed at ERL_norm. The difference d between the two is the 
basis for adjustment of the choices made for each of the elements k; based on these adjusted 
choices, each element k will have an adjusted emotional value vn. The strength of such an 
adjustment is expressed by a modification factor αn, which can be seen as a flexibility or 
willingness (conscious or unconscious) to change one’s emotional value for a certain element. 
For instance, the α for the element ‘situation selection’ can be seen as the flexibility to change 
one’s situation.  
                                                           
4 Although we use words like ‘searching for’ and ‘choose’ to describe this process, it is not claimed 
that this process is always a conscious, deliberate activity. The mechanism by which this ‘choosing’ is 
performed is described in detail in Section 2.4.2. 
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In order to obtain a model that can adapt itself to various circumstances, the modification 
factors αn have been made adaptable. The flexibility to ‘choose’4 different emotional values vn 
can be adapted to an assessment of the emotion regulation process: a sort of reflection or 
meta-cognition about the emotion regulation process based on the history of differences d. 
The adaptation factor γn mediating this process represents the personal flexibility to adjust the 
emotion regulation behavior based on such an assessment. It takes some effort to change 
behavior in favor of emotion regulation. This effort, or the costs of adjusting the modification 
factor for element n, is represented by cn. Table 2.2 shows a summary of all the treated 
variables.  
Some of these variables were chosen to be set at forehand and remain constant during the 
process (in particular ERL_norm, β, wn, cn, γn).  The other variables depend on each other and 
on the fixed variables, as shown in a qualitative manner in the graph depicted in Figure 2.2. 
Note that the model contains two cycles. One is the basic emotion regulation cycle from the vn 
to ERL via d back to the vn. The other one is the adaptation cycle from the αn to the basic 
regulation cycle and back (via vn , ERL and d back to αn). Note that the basic regulation cycle 
is described literally by Gross (see, e.g., (Gross, 1998), Figure 4). He does not explicitly 
describe the adaptation cycle, but he refers several times to ‘individual differences’ in terms of 
people’s preferred regulation strategies (p.278-279, 281), which was our motivation to 
introduce parameter α.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Dependencies between the Variables. The basic emotion regulation cycle has 
been indicated by the red arrows, and the adaptation cycle by the blue arrows. Arrows that 
are part of both cycles are colored purple. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that the emotion response level ERL is affected by the emotional values vn 
for the different elements, the weights wn attached to these elements, and the persistency 
factor β that indicates to what extent the previous response level affects the current one. The 
difference d between response level and norm obviously depends on both of these factors. 
Finally, the emotional values vn for the different elements are affected by this difference d and 
the modification factor αn. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of All Variables 
Variable Meaning 
ERL Level of emotion 
ERLnorm Optimal level of emotion 
d Difference between ERL and ERLnorm 
β Slowness of adjustment ERL 
wn Weight of element n in adjusting the ERL 
vn Chosen emotional value for element n 
αn Modification factor that represents the 'willingness' to 
change the emotional value of element n 
γn Personal tendency to adjust the emotional value of 
element n much or little 
γbasic n Basic personal tendency to adjust the emotional value 
of element n much or little 
cn Costs of adjusting emotional value vn 
Event Value of an event that reflects the impact it has on 
personal tendency γ 
ζn Variable that determines the speed with which events 
influence personal tendencies 
∆t Time step 
 
 
In the model described so far, the modification factors αn could be taken fixed. In order to 
obtain a model that can adapt itself based on past experiences (with respect to the 
successfulness of the chosen strategies), however, the flexibility in adjusting emotional values 
vn as expressed by the modification factors αn need to be adaptable. For example, when a 
subject is adjusting its behavior all the time in order to obtain certain emotion levels aimed at, 
this may result in a stressful and energy-consuming life. In such a case it is useful if the 
emotion regulation process can adapt itself to obtain a more peaceful mode of functioning 
(Wehrle, 1998, p. 5). To obtain such adaptive capabilities, the flexibility to ‘choose’ situations, 
subsituations, attention focuses and cognitive meanings with different emotional values vn, as 
expressed by the modification factors αn can be adapted to an assessment of the emotion 
regulation process: a sort of reflection or meta-cognition about the emotion regulation process 
based on the history of differences d. The adaptation factor γn mediating in this adaptation 
process represents the personal flexibility to adjust the emotion regulation behavior based on 
such an assessment. This adaptation factor is not described literally by Gross, but several 
other authors emphasize the importance of such a flexibility (e.g., Schore, 2001; Wehrle, 
1998). With changing one’s behavior, there are always costs or effort involved. Theses costs 
of adjusting the modification factor for element n are represented by cn.  
 
2.3.2. Modeling approach 
 
Modeling the various aspects introduced above in an integrated manner poses some 
challenges. On the one hand, qualitative aspects have to be addressed, such as decisions to 
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regulate one’s emotion (e.g., by selecting a different situation). On the other hand, 
quantitative aspects have to be addressed, such as levels of emotional response.  
The modeling approach based on the modeling language LEADSTO (Bosse, Jonker, Meij, 
and Treur, 2007) fulfils these desiderata. It integrates qualitative, logical aspects such as used 
in approaches based on temporal logic (e.g., Barringer et al., 1996) with quantitative, 
numerical aspects such as used in Dynamical Systems Theory (e.g., Ashby, 1960; Port and 
van Gelder, 1995). Direct temporal dependencies between two state properties in successive 
states are modeled by executable dynamic properties defined as follows. Let a and b be state 
properties of the form ‘conjunction of ground atoms or negations of ground atoms’, then the 
notation a e, f, g, h b means: 
 
 
If state property a holds for a certain time interval with duration g, then after some delay 
(between e and f) state property b will hold for a certain time interval of length h. 
 
 
Atomic state properties can have a qualitative, logical format (e.g., desire(d), expressing that 
desire d occurs), or a quantitative, numerical format (e.g., has_value(x, v) expressing that 
variable x has value v).  
For a precise definition of the LEADSTO format in terms of the language TTL, see (Bosse, 
Jonker, Meij, Sharpanskykh, and Treur, 2006). A specification of dynamic properties in 
LEADSTO format has as advantages that it is executable and that it can often easily be 
depicted graphically. The LEADSTO format has also shown its value especially when 
temporal or causal relations in the (continuous) physical world are modeled and simulated in 
an abstract, non-discrete manner. Another advantage is that it is compatible with (and is a 
sublanguage of) the Temporal Trace Language (TTL) verification environment (Bosse et al., 
2009). As a result, simulation traces generated in the LEADSTO environment can be directly 
taken as input by the TTL environment, in order to perform formal analysis of these traces. 
However, in the current paper, LEASDTO is mainly used as a vehicle. We do not claim that 
this is the only possible way to formalize our model. 
 
2.4. The detailed model 
 
The emotion response level and the emotional values for the different elements for a given 
type of emotion are represented in the model by real numbers in the interval [0, 2] (where 0 is 
the lowest possible emotion response level and 2 the highest). Although, obviously, a large 
simplification, this point of departure is quite common in affective computing, especially in the 
area of Artificial Intelligence (e.g., Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti, 2002; Hudlicka, 2002; 
Velasquez, 1997). Moreover, a fixed level of emotion to aim at is assumed (the ERL norm), 
also expressed in a real number in the domain [0, 2]. This assumption has similarities with the 
approach taken by Cañamero (1997), who assumes a certain range within which agents 
should keep certain variables. As a simple illustration, suppose one wants to influence its 
state of anger by selecting an appropriate situation, and one deliberates whether to go to a 
party or not. This can be represented by introducing two different situations sit1 and sit2, for 
example with vsit1=1.5 (since going to the party will increase the state of anger) and vsit2=0.5 
(staying home will decrease the state of anger). Moreover, the ERL norm can for instance be 
0.7 (i.e., one aims at being a bit angry, but not too angry). In that case, if one’s current ERL is 
already high, one will be likely to stay home (i.e., choose sit2), and vice versa. 
The process of emotion regulation has a continuous, interactive and cyclic nature. At any 
point in time, the characteristics of the current situation affect a person’s emotional response 
level. Meanwhile, this emotional response level affects the person’s choice for the emotional 
values vn, which in turn influence the current situation (see also the cycle in Figure 2.2). An 
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approach to model such a process is the Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) based on 
differential equations; e.g., (Port and van Gelder, 1995). To use differential equations for 
simulation, some form of discretization is needed. Therefore, instead of differential equations, 
a set of difference equations is used, with a fixed step size s, that can be taken any size as 
desired (as long as s ≤ 1). 
 
2.4.1. Updating the emotional response level 
 
Based on the above ideas, the emotion response level is recalculated each step by the 
following difference equation formula: 
 
new_ERL = (1-β) * ∑n (wn * vn) + β * ERL 
 
In this formula5, new_ERL is the new emotion response level, and ERL is the old emotion 
response level. The persistency factor β is the proportion of the old emotion response level 
that is taken into account to determine the new emotion response level. The new contribution 
to the emotion response level is determined by the emotional impact of the ‘chosen’3 
situation, subsituation, attention focus and cognitive meaning. This is calculated by the 
weighted sum of the emotional values: ∑n wn * vn. By normalization, the sum of all the weights 
wn is taken to be 1. According to the indication of Gross (2001), elements that are affected at 
an earlier point in the emotion regulation process have higher weights. Within the simulation 
model, the update of the emotional response level is expressed by the following dynamic 
property in LEADSTO format (where s is the step size): 
 
 
LP1 (Update Emotion Response Level) 
emotion_response_level(erl) 
and has_weight(situation, w1) 
and has_weight(sub_situation, w2) 
and has_weight(aspect, w3) 
and has_weight(meaning, w4) 
and has_emotional_value(situation, v1) 
and has_emotional_value(sub_situation, v2) 
and has_emotional_value(aspect, v3) 
and has_emotional_value(meaning, v4) 
0, 0, s, s emotion_response_level( (1-beta) * 
(w1*v1 + w2*v2 + w3*v3 + w4*v4) + beta * erl) 
 
 
The remaining formulas will only be shown in mathematical format. The dynamic properties in 
LEADSTO are shown in the appendix of Chapter 2. 
 
2.4.2. Updating the emotional values 
 
The chosen emotional values vn, which affect the emotion response level, are on their turn 
recalculated each step by the following set of difference equations: 
 
                                                           
5 Note that the formula can also be rewritten into the following difference equation format. This format 
shows more explicitly how b determines the speed of adaptation of ERL to the new contribution Σk wk 
* vk; here Δt is taken 1. 
  ΔERL = (1-β) * (Σk (wk * vk) - ERL) Δt   with ΔERL = new_ERL – ERL 
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 d = ERL - ERLnorm 
 Δvn  = – αn * d / dmax  Δt 
 new_vn = vn +  Δvn 
 
These formulas manage that a situation, subsituation, attention focus and cognitive meaning 
are chosen that better fit the desired level of emotion. The speed with which the emotional 
values are changed is determined by the willingness to change behavior in favor of emotion 
regulation. In these formulas, new_vn is the new emotional value, and vn is the old emotional 
value, while Δvn is the change of the emotional value vn (either positive or negative), and Δt 
the time step, which is taken 1 in this paper. The change in the emotional value vn is 
calculated by the formula – αn * d / dmax. In this formula, αn is the modification factor, and d is 
the difference between the actual emotion response level and the desired emotion response 
level (represented by ERL_norm). Here dmax is an estimation of the maximum difference that 
can be reached. So d / dmax is the proportion of the maximal reachable level of emotion above 
the level of emotion aimed at (or below this level, if d is negative). 
When the actual emotion response level equals the desired emotion response level, then d 
= 0; this means that Δvn = 0, so the emotion response level will not change. Moreover, when d 
≠ 0, a person will ‘choose’ an element with a more extreme emotional value vn (i.e., Δvn will be 
bigger), when (s)he is more flexible in this emotional value vn (this is the case when αn  is 
high), or when (s)he experiences an emotion response level that is further away from the 
desired emotion response level (this is the case when d deviates more from 0).  
 
2.4.3. Adaptation of the modification factors 
 
In order to be able to simulate adaptive emotion regulation in the detailed computational 
model, the success of emotion regulation over a period of time is evaluated, and based on 
this evaluation, the willingness to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation can be 
adjusted. The following evaluation function is used: 
 
Eval(dt-t+p) = mean(abs(d))t-t+p 
 
To evaluate the emotion regulation process over the time points t until t+p (where currently 
p=5), the absolute difference of the actual level of emotion and the level of emotion aimed at 
is taken for all time points. The (arithmetic) mean value of these absolute differences gives 
the value of the evaluation function.  
Until the model has done enough steps to perform this evaluation function for two different 
periods of time, the αk's are kept constant. After that, the evaluation function is used to adjust 
the modification factors αk using the following difference equations: 
 
Δαn = γn * (αn / 1+αn ) * ( (Eval(new_d) / Eval(old_d)) – cn) Δt   
new_αn = αn + Δαn 
 
In these formulas, new_αn is the new modification factor αn and γn represents in a numerical 
manner the personal flexibility to adjust the emotion regulation behavior. When γn increases, 
in a proportional manner Δαn will increase, and αn will change more. The part αn / 1+αn 
assures that Dan is more or less proportional to αn. The denominator 1+αn prevents αn from 
under- or over-adaptation when it gets very high. Furthermore, new_d is the mean value of d 
in the last time interval, and old_d is the mean value of d in an older time interval. The ratio 
Eval(new_d) / Eval(old_d) will be smaller, if the actual level of emotion response deviated 
relatively more from the level of emotion aimed at in the older interval than in the newer 
interval. Currently, for the new interval the interval from t-5 to t is taken, with t the current time 
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point, and for the old interval the interval from t-10 to t-5. If Eval(new_d) / Eval(old_d) is 
smaller, Δαn will be lower. Finally, cn represents the costs of adjusting the modification factor 
for element n. When there are higher costs to adjust αn, the value cn is higher, and Δαn will be 
lower. However, due to the prevention from under- or over-adaptation, αn will never reach a 
value under 0, even with high costs. 
 
2.4.4. Adding the possibility to simulate events like trauma’s and therapies 
 
In order to simulate events that can change the personal tendency to adjust behavior in favor 
of emotion regulation (γn), we have chosen to express these events in real numbers in the 
domain [-1, 1]. If an event has a high value, for instance a successful therapy, it will lead to a 
higher tendency to adjust behavior in favor of emotion regulation. If the value gets closer to 0, 
it will have a smaller effect, and when it reaches 0 it will have no effect at all. An event with a 
negative value, for instance a trauma, will result in a lower tendency to adjust emotion 
regulation behavior. The following formula is used to let events influence the tendency to 
adjust behavior in favor of emotion regulation: 
 
Δγn  = ζn * Event / (1 + (γn - γbasic n) * Event) * Δt 
new_γn = γn  + Δγn 
 
In these formulas, new_γn is the new personal tendency, and γn is the old personal tendency. 
Δγn is the change of γn. The new γn is derived by adding Δγn to the old γn.  The variable ‘Δt’ is 
the time step, which is taken 1 in this paper. ζn is a variable that determines the speed with 
which the personal tendencies are adjusted by events. We performed simulation experiments 
which showed that a ζn  in the range 0.10 – 0.20 produced the most realistic simulations. 
Event is the value that is attributed to a particular event that is simulated in the model. γbasic n 
is a person’s basic personal tendency to change its behavior in favor of emotion regulation. 
Assumed is that a person is born with a basic personal tendency to change behavior in favor 
of emotion regulation, and this personal tendency can be changed by events. However, when 
the γn deviates more from γbasic n, and an event influences γn to deviate even more from γbasic n, 
γn will be changed less than when it is influenced by an event with the same strength in the 
different direction. So for instance, when a person has a very low γbasic n, but a series of events 
made the γn rise to a much higher level, an Event with the value 0.5 will make the γn raise only 
a little bit more, while an Event with the value -0.5 will make the γn decrease significantly. In 
other words, events can change a person’s personal tendency, but it gets harder when the 
personal tendency has already changed much. 
 
2.5. Simulation results 
 
In order to test whether the model produces realistic behavior for different circumstances, a 
number of experiments (under different parameter settings) have been performed. Each 
subsection below addresses a specific type of scenario. Various types of cases are 
addressed: those where the agent (or person) shows an optimal form (compared to the 
emotion response level aimed at) of regulation (Section 2.5.1), where it performs over- or 
under-regulation (Section 2.5.2), where it adapts its emotion regulation strategies (Section 
2.5.3), where it experiences a successful anger management therapy, and where it changes 
its personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation (Section 2.5.4). The 
different scenarios are established by taking different settings for some of the parameters 
involved (in particular, in the first two subsections, for the modification factors αn). The values 
of the other variables are the same for all experiments described in this section, see Table 
2.3.  
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Table 2.3: Values of variables used in the simulations. 
Variable Fixed Value  Variable Initial Value 
ERLnorm 0.5  ERL 1.85 
β 0.7  v1 1.90 
w1 0.35  v2 1.85 
w2 0.30  v3 1.80 
w3 0.20  v4 1.75 
w4 0.15      
s  1      
 
 
As shown in the table, the person considered has an optimal level of emotion of 0.5 in the 
domain [0, 2]. The factor β is set to 0.7, which means that in each step, 70% of the old 
emotional response level persists, and the remaining 30% is determined by the new 
emotional values. The weight attached to situation selection is 0.35, which means that the 
selected situation determines 35% of the 30% of the new emotion response level that is 
determined by the emotional values. Similarly, the weights for situation modification, 
attentional deployment, and cognitive change are set to 0.30, 0.20, and 0.15, respectively. 
The results of the experiments are shown and explained below. By comparing these traces 
with predictions made by Gross, we perform an initial check on the validation of the model 
(see also Section 2.6). If such a check is successful, in a next step the model may be used for 
different applications (both from an Artificial Intelligence and a Cognitive Science 
perspective), as mentioned in the introduction. 
 
2.5.1. Optimal forms of emotion regulation 
 
Experiment 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Results for an optimal case (equal αn). 
 
 
For the first experiment, we experimented with various values of the αn. With all modification 
factors αn set to 0.15 the emotion regulation seemed optimal. The results of this simulation 
experiment are shown in Figure 2.3. In such figures, time is on the horizontal axis; the values 
of the different variables are shown on the vertical axis. 
As shown in the upper graph, the emotional response level decreases monotonically without 
decreasing below the level aimed at. So, the subject gradually reaches his level of emotion 
aimed at. The emotional values show similar behavior.  
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Experiment 2 
In the second experiment, we experimented with setting the αn at different levels for each 
strategy. This should result in a preference for certain emotion regulation strategies. In this 
experiment, the subject has the following flexibilities αn in emotion regulation: α1 = 0.20,  α2 = 
0.15,  α3 = 0.10,  α4 = 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Results for an optimal case (different αn). 
 
 
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2.4. Here, the emotion response level 
reaches the emotion response level of 0.5 aimed for in a reasonable amount of time, just like 
in the optimal case. However, the way the emotional values change in order to achieve this 
differs from the first experiment. Here, it is important to note that the scale on the vertical axis 
is not the same for the different graphs in Figure 2.4. The graphs show that the emotion 
response levels of the elements with a higher α descend much quicker and further than the 
elements with a lower α. For example, situation selection (α=0.20) has reached an emotional 
value of 0 at the end of the simulation, whereas cognitive change (α=0.01) changes only a 
little bit, and reaches an emotional value of about 1.3. This means that the subject finds a way 
to reach his/her level of emotion aimed for, and does this by changing his/her behavior more 
for the elements for which (s)he has a higher flexibility. So indeed, these settings resulted in 
the subject having a preference for certain emotion regulation strategies.  
 
2.5.2. Over- and under-regulation 
 
Experiment 3 
In the third experiment, we set the modification factors for all elements αn to a very high level: 
0.4. This means that the subject has a relatively high flexibility in emotion regulation, for all 
elements. This should result in a too high adjustment of behavior: over-regulation. The 
behavior of the emotion response level in this experiment is shown in Figure 2.5.  
In this case, the emotion response level starts to decrease rapidly, immediate after the 
experiment has started. However, it decreases below the level of 0.5 aimed at. It reaches its 
minimum after 15 steps in the simulation, at about 0.3: the subject over-regulates his/her 
emotion. After this, the emotion response level starts to rise until it is just above the optimal 
level of 0.5, and stays more or less at this value aimed at for the rest of this simulation. This 
confirms that setting the flexibility in emotion regulation to a very high level results in over-
adaptation. 
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Figure 2.5: Results for the over-regulation case. 
 
 
The lower part of Figure 2.5 shows how the subject changed his/her emotional values in order 
to achieve this. These emotional values all show similar behavior, since the αn's, which 
represent the flexibility and willingness to change behavior, were set to the same value. Also, 
the graphs of the emotional values are comparable to the graph of the emotion response 
level. The emotional values make a somewhat steeper curve, especially at the start of the 
graph. This makes sense, because the emotion response level is only for 30% determined by 
the emotional values, and for 70% by its own old value. 
 
Experiment 4 
In the fourth experiment presented, we set the flexibility in emotion regulation to a very low 
level, with the αn set to a static level of 0.01 for all elements. A very low flexibility in emotion 
regulation should result in under-regulation. The results of this experiment are shown in 
Figure 2.6.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Results for the under-regulation case. 
 
 
In this experiment, the emotion response level decreases extremely slowly, so this indeed 
leads to under-regulation. After 50 steps, it has only decreased by 0.3 until 1.55, as can be 
seen in the graph. After 50 steps, the emotion response level continued decreasing gradually 
slower over time. 
 
2.5.3 Adaptive case  
 
Experiment 5 
To test the model for adaptivity of the emotion regulation process, some more experiments 
have been performed. In this experiment, the modification factors α1 - α4 are dynamic. Initially, 
they have a value of 0.01, the same as in the under-regulation experiment (experiment 4). 
However, in this experiment the αn can be adjusted by evaluating the success of the emotion 
regulation in the past. This adaptivity should prevent the subject from under-regulation, and 
enable the subject to successfully regulate its emotions. In this experiment, all adaptation 
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factors γn were set to 0.09 and the costs cn were set to 0.7, 0.4, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively. 
The subject starts with a very high ERL of 1.8, and very high emotional values, all set to the 
same level of 1.8. The weights attached to the various elements are the same as earlier. The 
result for the emotion response value is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Results for an adaptive regulation case (γk = 0.09). 
 
 
In this experiment, the ERL starts to decrease faster after a period of time. While with static αn 
(i.e., without adaptivity in emotion regulation), this lead to under-regulation, with adaptive αn, 
the optimal level of emotion, 0.5, is reached after 100 steps (see Figure 2.7). After these 100 
steps the ERL reached an equilibrium and did not increase or decrease significantly anymore. 
This confirms the hypothesis that adaptivity in emotion regulation can prevent the subject 
from under-regulation. 
The emotional values vn show a pattern similar to the ERLs over time. Some emotional 
values obviously decrease faster than others. The emotional value for situation selection 
decreases only until 1.1, and the emotional value for cognitive meaning until 0.8, while the 
emotional values for situation modification, attentional deployment, and response modification 
decrease until they are almost 0. The costs cn for situation selection are 0.7, and for cognitive 
meaning 0.6, while the costs for the other elements are 0.4. These results show that the 
emotional values for elements with higher costs are changed less. Figure 2.8 shows how the 
modification factors αn change over time. 
All modification factors show similar behavior, the main difference is that the modification 
factors with higher costs, situation selection and cognitive meaning, rise much less than the 
other modification factors. While the other three modification factors rise to a value of 0.3, the 
modification factor for meaning rises only until around 0.08, and the modification factor for 
situation selection only until around 0.04. Also, the modification factor for situation selection 
starts to decrease again, before the simulation stops. This is the effect of the higher costs to 
change behavior in situation selection or cognitive change. 
 
 
         
Figure 2.8: Modification factors for the adaptive case 
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2.5.4. The effect of events 
 
Experiment 6 
A number of experiments have been performed, to test whether the model can simulate the 
effects of events like traumas or therapies on emotion regulation. The variables that were 
used in the experiments are summarized in Table 2.4. The values of the fixed variables and 
the initial values of the remaining variables are shown (note that this table contains some 
overlap with Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.4: Values of Variables used for Simulations in Section 2.5.4 and 2.5.5. 
Variable Value Fixed / Initial 
ERLnorm 0.5 Fixed 
β 0.7 Fixed 
ERL 1.8 Initial 
v1-v4 1.8 Initial 
w1 0.35 Fixed 
w2 0.30 Fixed 
w3 0.20 Fixed 
α1 - α4 0.01 Initial 
c1 0.7 Fixed 
c2 0.4 Fixed 
c3 0.4 Fixed 
c4 0.6 Fixed 
γ1 - γ4 0.01 Initial 
γbasic 1 - γbasic 4 0.05 Fixed 
ζ1 - ζ4 0.15 Fixed 
 
The simulated emotion in the experiments in this subsection is anger, and the agent's optimal 
level of anger is 0.5. The agent starts with a very high emotion response level of 1.8, and very 
high emotional values, all set to the same level of 1.8. So at the start of the simulation, our 
agent is very angry, and is in a situation that keeps him angry. The weights, and the costs 
attached to the various elements are set to the same values as in the previous experiments. 
The γn’s, which represent the personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion 
regulation, are initially set to 0.01, which is a very low value. Another simulation experiment 
showed that without introducing any events during the simulation, this would lead to under-
regulation. Therefore, in this case events were introduced. The value for all γbasic n’s is set to 
0.05. This is somewhat lower than average, which means that by nature the agent has a 
relatively low personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation. The initial 
γn is even lower, which means that before the start of the simulation, the agent has had some 
experiences, for example a trauma, which decreased its personal tendency to change 
behavior in favor of emotion regulation. The ζn are all set to 0.15. Simulation experiments 
showed that this is a normal value. In the experiments in this chapter, the manipulated 
variables are the events that influence the personal tendency to change behavior in favor of 
emotion regulation.In this simulation, we let our agent experience an event that will increase 
its personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation very much: a 
successful cognitive-behavioral anger management therapy. This event takes place at time 
point 40, and has the value of 0.9 in the domain [-1, 1]. This should stop the subject from 
under-regulating its emotions, and enable it to reach its optimal level of emotion at the end of 
the simulation.  
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The results of this simulation can be seen in Figure 2.9. Because all emotional values and 
modification factors show similar behavior, and the only difference is made by the costs, only 
the graphs of the element with the highest costs, situation, and of one of the elements with 
the lowest costs, subsituation, are shown.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: Simulation of the ERL, the Emotional Values and the Modification Factors in 
Experiment 6 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9, the emotion response level first decreases very slowly. Later in 
the simulation, after the therapy has taken place, the emotion response level starts to 
descend more quickly, and at the end of the simulation the optimal level of emotion is 
reached. So at the beginning of the simulation, the agent is not able to let its level of anger 
decrease to its optimal level, but at the end of the simulation it is. This confirms the 
hypothesis that introducing a positive event, such as a successful cognitive-behavioral anger 
management therapy, can enable a person to successfully regulate its emotions. 
This can also be seen in the simulations of the emotional values. First these values decrease 
very slowly, and later in the simulation they decrease much quicker. This is the clearest in the 
emotional values of elements with lower costs, such as subsituation. These emotional values 
decrease much more than the emotional values of elements with higher costs. At the end of 
the simulation, the emotional values of elements with lower costs have almost reached 0, 
while the emotional value of situation selection, with higher costs, has decreased only until 
1.1. 
The modification factors αn increase very slowly at the beginning of the simulation, and 
start to increase more quickly after the therapy has taken place. The modification factors of 
elements with lower costs increase much quicker than the elements with higher costs. At the 
end of the simulation, the modification factors of elements with lower costs have increased 
until 0.37, while the modification factor of situation selection, with higher costs, has increased 
only until 0.042, and has started to decrease again. 
It makes sense that the modification factors increase very slowly at first, and start to 
increase quicker at a later time point in the simulation. At time point 40, an event takes place, 
which makes the personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, 
represented by the γn, rise from 0.01 to 0.15. These γn have a direct effect on the modification 
factors, as can be seen in Figure 2.8. Especially in the simulation of the modification factor of 
situation selection, the impact this has on the modification factors can be seen. A few steps 
after time point 40, the modification factor starts to increase much quicker. So after the anger 
management therapy, it immediately starts to increase its willingness to change its behavior in 
favor of emotion regulation. 
The impact this has on the emotional values can be seen very clearly. After time point 40, 
the emotional values start to decrease much quicker. After a while, the emotion response 
value has decreased enough to make the emotional value for situation selection decrease 
more slowly again. So our agent is not able to reach its optimal level of emotion by choosing 
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different situations, cognitive meanings, etc. in the first part of the simulation, but after the 
anger management therapy at time point 40, it starts to change its behavior, and at the end of 
the simulation it has reached its optimal level of emotion, and is able to keep it stable. 
 
Experiment 7 
 
Table 2.5: A Summary of the Events in Experiment 7 
Event at time point 20  0.9 
Event at time point 40 -0.9 
Event at time point 60  0.4 
Event at time point 80 -0.3 
 
In this simulation, we let our agent experience various events that change its personal 
tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, which are shown in Table 2.5. 
First, at time point 20, the agent experiences an event that is just as ‘strong’ as the event 
at time point 40 in experiment 6. So the same agent follows the same cognitive-behavioral 
anger management therapy with the same amount of success as in experiment 6, only now it 
already takes place at time point 20. At time point 40, the agent experiences an event that is 
just as strong as the event at time point 20, but now in the opposite direction, so that it will 
decrease its personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation. In real life, 
this event could be for instance a severe traumatic experience in which an applied emotion 
regulation strategy has the opposite effect, which severely decreases the belief of the subject 
that trying to regulate its emotions will help it to reach its optimal level of emotion. At time 
point 60, the agent experiences a positive event with the strength 0.4, for instance a therapy 
that helps it deal with the traumatic event it experienced at time point 40. Finally, at time point 
80, the agent experiences a negative event with the strength of 0.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Simulation of the ERL, the Emotional Values, the Modification Factors, and 
the γn in Experiment 7 
 
 
The results of this simulation can be seen in Figure 2.10. Again, because all emotional values 
and modification factors show similar behavior, and the only difference is made by the costs, 
only the graphs of the element with the highest costs, situation, and of one of the elements 
with the lowest costs, subsituation, are shown. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.10, the emotion response level decreases very slowly at the 
start of the simulation. After the anger management at time point 20, which makes the γn rise 
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to 0.15, the emotion response level starts to decrease somewhat quicker. Because the 
traumatic event at time point 40 makes the γn decrease to an even lower level than it was at 
the beginning of the simulation, this decreasing trend does not proceed the way it did in 
experiment 6. The effects of the less powerful events at time point 60 and 80 can clearly be 
seen by the kinks in the graphs of the modification factors, but the effects on the emotional 
values and the emotion response level are less clear. It can clearly be seen that the less 
powerful events have a smaller impact on the γn. 
 
2.6. Verification of global properties 
 
In the previous section, it was shown that the presented simulation model is capable of 
producing various simulation traces for different circumstances. Although intuitively these 
traces seem to show realistic patterns, no proof has been provided that they indeed match the 
predictions made by Gross’ theory. However, obtaining such a ‘proof’ is not trivial (Parkinson, 
2001; Neal Reilly, 1996). In order to do this, different perspectives can be chosen. Ideally, the 
results of the simulation are compared in detail with empirical data obtained from 
experiments. Such experiments could, for example, involve a setup where participants are 
confronted with an undesirable situation (i.e., their emotional response value for happiness is 
manipulated in such a way that it is far below the ERL norm). Next, by means of modern 
techniques (e.g., ‘face reading’ devices, or EEG scans) their ERL could be measured, while 
keeping track of which emotion regulation strategy they use. However, these types of 
experiments have various drawbacks. For instance, current measurements of emotional 
states are still rather unreliable (Busso et al., 2004; Cowie et al., 2001; Larsen and 
Fredericksen, 1999; Gunes and Picardi, 2007) and difficult to perform. A second type of 
validation would be to develop virtual characters, to endow them with the emotion regulation 
model presented here, and to ask human observers to judge whether their behavior is 
believable (Neal Reilly, 1996). A drawback of this second type of validation is that building the 
virtual characters would be a waste of effort if one does not have a clue that the developed 
model is correct. Moreover, to build such agents, in addition to the presented emotion 
regulation model, also an emotion generation model would be needed.  
For these reasons, as a first step, in the current paper a more modest form of validation is 
performed. The idea of this type of validation is that the literature by Gross (1998, 1999, 2001, 
2002) is taken as a basis, and is carefully inspected in order to extract qualitative statements 
about the types of patterns that are expected to occur in emotion regulation processes. Next, 
these statements are interpreted and translated into expressions in a formal language in a 
step-wise manner (cf. (Bosse, 2005), Chapter 1). The resulting formulae (which are in fact 
‘formalized interpretations of Gross’ theory’) are then verified (using automated checking 
software) against the simulation traces, to check whether these traces show the expected 
behavior. Since Gross’ theory itself is based on empirical evidence, this type of checking can 
be seen as some kind of ‘indirect validation’. 
The formal language that is used for this verification process is the Temporal Trace 
Language (TTL) (Bosse et al., 2009). This predicate logical language supports formal 
specification and analysis of dynamic properties, covering both qualitative and quantitative 
aspects. TTL is built on atoms referring to states of the world, time points and traces, i.e. 
trajectories of states over time. In addition, dynamic properties are temporal statements that 
can be formulated with respect to traces based on the state ontology Ont in the following 
manner. Given a trace γ over state ontology Ont, the state in γ at time point t is denoted by 
state(γ, t). These states can be related to state properties via the formally defined satisfaction 
relation denoted by the infix predicate |=, comparable to the Holds-predicate in the Situation 
Calculus: state(γ, t) |= p denotes that state property p holds in trace γ at time t. Based on 
these statements, dynamic properties can be formulated in a formal manner in a sorted first-
order predicate logic, using quantifiers over time and traces and the usual first-order logical 
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connectives such as ¬, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∀, ∃. A special software environment has been developed for 
TTL, featuring both a Property Editor for building and editing TTL properties and a Checking 
Tool that enables formal verification of such properties against a set of (simulated or 
empirical) traces. 
Based on this TTL language, a number of Gross’ informal statements about emotion 
regulation have been formalized in terms of dynamic properties. Below, a number of them are 
introduced, both in semi-formal and in informal notation (note that they are all defined for a 
particular trace and time interval between tb and te): 
 
P1a - Emotion approaches norm monotonically 
For all time points t1 and t2 between tb and te in trace γ 
if the value of the ERL norm is n 
and at t1 the value of v is x1 
and at t2 the value of v is x2 
and t1 < t2 
then |n-x1| ≥ |n-x2|. 
 
P1a(γ:TRACE, tb, te:TIME) ≡ 
∀t1,t2:TIME ∀x1,x2:REAL 
state(γ, t1) |= erl_norm(n) &  
state(γ, t1) |= emotion_response_level(x1) &  
state(γ, t2) |= emotion_response_level(x2) & 
tb ≤ t1 ≤ te & tb ≤ t2 ≤ te & t1 < t2 
⇒ |n-x1| ≥ |n-x2| 
 
P1b - Emotion approaches norm with speed s 
For all time points t1 and t2 between tb and te in trace γ 
if the value of the ERL norm is n 
and at t1 the value of v is x1 
and at t2 the value of v is x2 
and t2 = t1+1 
then s * |n-x1| ≥ |n-x2|. 
 
P1b(γ:TRACE, tb, te:TIME, s:REAL) ≡ 
∀t1,t2:TIME ∀x1,x2:REAL 
state(γ, t1) |= erl_norm(n) &  
state(γ, t1) |= emotion_response_level(x1) & 
state(γ, t2) |= emotion_response_level(x2) & 
tb ≤ t1 ≤ te & tb ≤ t2 ≤ te & t2 = t1+1 
⇒ |n-x1| * s ≥ |n-x2|
By checking property P1a, one can check for a given trace whether the emotion response 
level eventually approaches the emotion norm (in a monotonic manner). Note that this 
property subsumes both upward and downward regulation of emotions, similar to Gross’ 
interpretation:  
 
“I focus on five aspects of this definition of emotion regulation. First, individuals increase, 
maintain, and decrease negative and positive emotions...” (Gross, 1998, p.275).  
 
For example, this property could be confirmed (for a down-regulation case) for the trace that 
resulted from Experiment 1: property P1a(trace1, 0, 100) succeeded. Overall, this property 
turned out to be satisfied for all generated simulation traces, except for the one produced in 
Experiment 3. This is conform expectations, since Experiment 3 addressed a case of over-
regulation, which means that the emotion is regulated in such a way that the discrepancy 
between ERL and ERL norm may become larger. 
Property P1b is a refinement of P1a. It can be used to check not only whether the ERL 
approaches the norm, but also to determine the speed s with which this happens (where 0 < s 
< 1, and a high s denotes a slow speed). For the case of Experiment 1, this s turned out to be 
0.87. The resulting values of s for the different simulation traces, as determined by the 
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checks, are shown in Table 2.6. For Experiment 3, no regulation speed was found, since the 
ERL does not approach the norm for this case (see P1a above). 
Property P2 was designed to verify Gross’ prediction that “adjustments made early in the 
emotion trajectory are more effective than adjustments made later on” (Gross, 2001, p.218). 
In other words, situation selection results in a larger (and faster) change in emotional 
response level than situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change. 
However, it makes no sense to check this property against the traces introduced earlier, since 
in these experiments multiple strategies were used simultaneously. Therefore, a number of 
simulation traces have been generated in addition to the ones shown before, such that in 
each of these traces only one strategy was performed at a time. This has been done by 
always setting the modification factor α to 1 for one of the strategies, and setting them to 0 for 
the other strategies. Given the new simulation traces, property P2 turned out to be satisfied, 
which confirms Gross’ prediction for these traces. 
Since different individuals may differ in their preferred emotion regulation strategies 
(Gross, 1998, p. 279), it is useful to check whether more preferred strategies (i.e., in our 
model, strategies with a higher flexibility, expressed by a higher modification factor α) result in 
larger adjustments in the emotional values. This can be done by means of property P3. For 
example, is it the case that people who prefer situation selection over attentional deployment 
indeed perform situation selection more often? P3 checks this for all combinations of 
strategies. It turned out to be satisfied for all generated simulation traces. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Speed by which ERL 
approaches the ERL norm (for different 
experiments) 
Experiment Speed s 
1 0.87 
2 0.88 
3 --- 
4 0.99 
5 1.00 
6 1.00 
 1.00 
 
 
 
P3 - High strategy flexibility leads to large 
adjustments 
For all traces γ, time points t, and strategies s1 
and s2, 
if at t the modification factor of s1 is higher than 
the modification factor of s2 
then at t+1 the emotional value of s1 will have 
changed more than the emotional value of s2. 
 
P3 ≡ 
∀γ:TRACE, ∀t:TIME, ∀s1,s2:STRATEGY 
∀α1,α2,v1a,v1b,v2a,v2b:REAL 
state(γ, t) |= has_modification_factor(s1, α1) & 
state(γ, t) |= has_modification_factor(s2, α2) & 
state(γ, t) |= has_emotional_value(s1, v1a) & 
state(γ, t+1) |= has_emotional_value(s1, v1b) & 
state(γ, t) |= has_emotional_value(s2, v2a) & 
state(γ, t+1) |= has_emotional_value(s2, v2b) & α1 > α2 
Þ |v1a-v1b| > |v2a-v2b| 
 
 
 
P2 - Early strategies are more effective 
For all traces γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, 
if in γ1 only situation selection takes place 
and in γ2 only situation modification takes place 
and in γ3 only attentional deployment 
takesplace 
and in γ4 only cognitive change takes place 
then the change in emotion response level over 
the first 10 time points is highest for γ1,followed 
by γ2, γ3, and γ4. 
 
P2 ≡ 
∀γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4:TRACE ∀t:TIME 
"x1b,x2b,x3b,x4b,x1e,x2e,x3e,x4e:REAL 
state(γ1, t) |= has_modification_factor(situation, 1) & 
state(γ1, t) |= has_modification_factor(sub_situation, 0) & 
state(γ1, t) |= has_modification_factor(aspect, 0) & 
state(γ1, t) |= has_modification_factor(meaning, 0) & 
state(γ2, t) |= has_modification_factor(situation, 0) & 
state(γ2, t) |= has_modification_factor(sub_situation, 1) & 
state(γ2, t) |= has_modification_factor(aspect, 0) & 
state(γ2, t) |= has_modification_factor(meaning, 0) & 
state(γ3, t) |= has_modification_factor(situation, 0) & 
state(γ3, t) |= has_modification_factor(sub_situation, 0) & 
state(γ3, t) |= has_modification_factor(aspect, 1) & 
state(γ3, t) |= has_modification_factor(meaning, 0) & 
state(γ4, t) |= has_modification_factor(situation, 0) & 
state(γ4, t) |= has_modification_factor(sub_situation, 0) & 
state(γ4, t) |= has_modification_factor(aspect, 0) & 
state(γ4, t) |= has_modification_factor(meaning, 1) & 
state(γ1, 0) |= emotion_response_level(x1b) & 
state(γ1, 10) |= emotion_response_level(x1e) & 
state(γ2, 0) |= emotion_response_level(x2b) & 
state(γ2, 10) |= emotion_response_level(x2e) & 
state(γ3, 0) |= emotion_response_level(x3b) & 
state(γ3, 10) |= emotion_response_level(x3e) & 
state(γ4, 0) |= emotion_response_level(x4b) & 
state(γ4, 10) |= emotion_response_level(x4e) 
Þ |x1b-x1e| > |x2b-x2e| & |x2b-x2e| > |x3b-x3e| & |x3b-x3e| > 
|x4b-x4e| 
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All in all, the above checks have pointed out that the presented model satisfies a number of 
relevant dynamic properties that were formulated on the basis of Gross’ theory. Of course, 
this is by no means an exhaustive proof, but it is a first indication that the global behavior of 
the model is satisfactory. In addition, these kinds of checks allow the modeler to distinguish 
different groups of simulation traces from each other. For example, property P1 enables one 
to separate situations of over-regulation from other cases. Note that this feature is useful not 
only for simulation traces, but also for empirical traces. Since the TTL checker also takes 
empirical traces as input (in case these are available), in principle the approach can be used 
to classify different traces obtained from real world experiments. 
 
2.7. Discussion 
 
Below, section 2.7.1. provides a brief summary and conclusion about the presented work. 
Section 2.7.2. compares the approach with similar approaches in the literature, and section 
2.7.3. describes some possible directions of future research. 
 
2.7.1. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a formal model for Gross’ (informally described) model of emotion regulation 
has been introduced. The emotion regulation model has been constructed using the high-
level simulation language LEADSTO as a modeling vehicle, and integrates both quantitative, 
dynamical system aspects (such as levels of emotional response) and qualitative aspects 
(such as decisions to regulate one’s emotion). The model is adaptive, and gives the possibility 
to simulate the effects of events like trauma’s and therapies on emotion regulation. 
It is important to evaluate the relation of this model to the real world. Of course, a model is 
always a simplification of the real world. Emotion regulation is a complex process, and it 
would be overconfident to try to represent every aspect of emotion regulation in a 
computational model at this time point. The model is, however, able to simulate a 
simplification of an emotion regulation process, as illustrated in the simulation experiments 
described in this paper. 
Simulation experiments have been performed for different situations. The first experiments 
were constructed by using different settings for the modification factors αn: for ideal cases (all 
αn are medium, or the αn have different values), for cases of over-regulation (all αn are high), 
and for cases of under-regulation (all αn are low). The experiments show that different values 
for the modification factors αk indeed result in different patterns. In these experiments, the 
subject uses the difference between its actual level of emotion, and its optimal level of 
emotion to 'choose' different situations, sub-situations, attentional aspects and cognitive 
meanings. In experiment 1, the subject successfully regulates its emotions. In experiment 2, 
the subject has a specific preference for adjusting certain types of behavior above others. 
These choices have an influence on its level of emotion, and by doing this repeatedly, the 
subject regulates its emotions. Also over-regulation (experiment 3) in which the subject 
adjusts its behavior too much, and under-regulation (experiment 4), in which the subject 
adjust its behavior too little, could be simulated. 
By making use of a variable that represents the willingness to change behavior in favor of 
emotion regulation, adaptive emotion regulation can be simulated, as can be seen in 
experiment 5. In this simulation, the subject evaluates its emotion regulation over a past 
period of time, and uses this to change its willingness to change behavior in favor of emotion 
regulation.  
Finally, some experiments were performed to demonstrate that the model can simulate the 
effects of events that influence the personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion 
regulation, like trauma's, or therapies. In experiment 6, the agent has at first a low tendency to 
change its behavior, and is because of this low tendency not able to reach its optimal level of 
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emotion. After an anger management therapy, its personal tendency to change behavior in 
favor of emotion-regulation has increased, and the agent is able to regulate its emotions, and 
reach its optimal level of emotion. In experiment 7, a series of events influence the agent’s 
emotion regulation. In this experiment, the relatively ‘stronger’ events have a bigger impact on 
the emotion regulation process. These results are consistent with the literature (e.g., Beck 
and Fernandez, 1998; Deschner and McNeal, 1986). Validation involving extensive 
comparison with detailed empirical data is left for future work. 
As a preliminary validation of the model, the simulation results have been compared with the 
predicted behaviors for different situations as described by Gross, which are (partly) based on 
empirical evidence (Gross, 1998, 2001). The patterns produced by the model were found 
consistent with Gross’ descriptions of examples of human regulation processes. Validation 
involving extensive comparison with detailed empirical data is left for future work. When doing 
this, two types of validation will be performed, namely 1) aligning the results of the simulations 
with empirical data of human emotion regulation processes (see Section 2.6) and 2) 
incorporating the emotion regulation model with virtual characters, and asking human 
observers to judge their believability (see Reilly, 1996). 
 
2.7.2 Related work 
 
Although the process of emotion regulation is widely investigated in the literature (e.g., 
Eisenberg, 2000; Gross, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Goldsmith and Davidson, 2004; Ochsner 
and Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1994), not so many contributions address the possibility of 
developing a computational model of this process. The computational models that have been 
developed so far either address some very specific aspects of the process at a more detailed 
(neurological) level, see e.g. (Thayer and Lane, 2000), or they aim at incorporating emotions 
into software agents, in which case they focus more on emotion elicitation (appraisal) in 
general (e.g., Armony et al., 1997; Bates, 1994; Burkitt and Romano, 2008; Dias and Paiva, 
2008; Reilly, 1996; Reisenzein , 2009; Velasquez, 1997) than on emotion regulation, which 
can be seen as a sub-process of emotion elicitation. The current paper can be seen as an 
attempt to build a bridge between both directions. It provides a relatively coarse-grained 
model for emotion regulation using a high-level modeling language, but still in enough detail 
to be able to generate useful simulation traces, and to provide believable behavior of virtual 
agents.  
As such, it has some similarities with the work by Gratch, Marsella and Mao (Marsella and 
Gratch, 2002; 2003; Gratch and Marsella, 2004; Gratch, Marsella and Mao 2006), who 
propose an approach to incorporate both appraisal and coping behavior into virtual humans. 
However, an important difference in that their approach takes appraisal theory as point of 
departure, which emphasizes that emotions are rooted in cognitions. Thus, in these models, 
emotions arise when discrepancies between beliefs and desires (or other beliefs) are 
detected by automatic appraisal processes. Based on that perspective, they propose a 
“content model”, in which appraisal and regulation operate on rich representations of the 
emotion-evoking situation. Moreover, their approach (which has been evaluated against 
clinical data) makes use of plan-based causal representations, augmented with decision-
theoretic planning techniques, whereas our approach uses dynamical systems represen-
tations. 
The model presented here abstracts from a number of the details addressed in the work by 
Gratch, Marsella and Mao, such as the processes underlying emotion elicitation and 
appraisal. Due to this, the presented model is more abstract and makes fewer commitments. 
From this higher abstraction level it can be related to more fine-grained models based on 
different perspectives. 
Another existing model that may be worth aligning with the presented approach is the 
model by Reisenzein (2009). Similar to Gratch, Marsella and Mao, he presents a 
computational model of affect based on the belief-desire theory of emotions (BDTE), which 
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views emotions as nonconceptual metarepresentations. Due to the difference in grain size, 
these types of models seem to complement the model presented here. Therefore, an 
interesting possibility for future work would be to explore whether (parts of) our model may be 
useful in extending other computational models, in particular of emotion elicitation. For 
example, the parameters used in our model could be used to incorporate regulatory 
mechanisms in Reisenzein’s model. For example, as a first step, our parameters γ and ζ 
could be incorporated, respectively, into the belief/belief and belief/desire discrepancy 
detection engines. 
Furthermore, the model shows similarities with existing cognitive architectures, such as 
ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998) or CLARION (Sun, 2006; Wilson, Sun, and Mathews, 
2009). For example, CLARION is composed of a number of functional systems, such as an 
action-centered subsystem, a non-action-centered subsystem, a motivational subsystem, and 
a metacognitive subsystem. Within CLARION, emotion regulation could be modeled by 
adjustment of behavior (within the action-centered subsystem) in response to motivational 
drives (from the motivational subsystem), and/or meta-cognitive regulation (within the meta-
cognitive subsystem). The presented model does not attempt to connect the regulation 
process to these detailed cognitive factors (again, due to a difference in grain size). Instead, it 
focuses on the patterns in emotional response that are produced as a result of differences in 
regulation strategies. Nevertheless, for future work it may be worthwhile to compare the 
generated simulation traces with the emotion regulation behavior shown by CLARION or 
ACT-R. 
Finally, our model may be useful in computational studies of social norms. For example, 
Staller and Petta (2001) exploit computational modeling to investigate the interplay between 
emotions and social norms. They explicitly distinguish emotion generation from emotion 
regulation, and claim that both processes play an important role when studying people’s 
tendency to adhere to social norms. For example, if a person desires to perform a certain 
action that is disapproved by other people, she may decide not to perform the action and to 
regulate her emotions instead. It may be worth exploring whether frameworks such as in 
(Staller and Petta, 2001) can be extended with our formalized emotion regulation strategies.  
 
2.7.3 Future work 
 
Many improvements could still be made to the model. For example, emotion response level 
ERL_norm is currently fixed. This could be made dynamic, so that it can depend on specific 
circumstances, as humans are usually searching for emotion variation. Another improvement 
could be introducing decay for the γn, which represent the personal tendency to change 
behavior in favor of emotion regulation. This way, the γn would slowly return to the value of 
γbasic n if no events occur that influence the γn. Also, in the formulas that are used to calculate 
the new emotional values, the emotion response level could be modified by a random factor. 
The size of this random factor could be changed in order to simulate emotion regulation in 
people that are not able to recognize their level of emotion very well. Moreover, response 
modification is not considered in this model. In the real world, people modify their emotional 
response, regarding for instance social desirability. Additions could be made to the model, in 
order to be able to simulate this. Also, response modulation has no effect on the emotion 
regulation at all. It could be the case that response modulation at the long term, for instance 
the suppression of a traumatic experience, could have an effect on emotion regulation. The 
model could be changed in order to make it able to simulate this. Additionally, in the current 
model, a trauma cannot cause a relapse in the emotion regulation process. It can only slow 
down the process. The model could be changed so that a trauma would not only influence the 
personal tendency to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, but also the willingness 
to change behavior in favor of emotion regulation, and the chosen emotional values. A final 
extension would be to represent the different elements k using more complex knowledge 
structures, and to enable the model to dynamically derive the different emotional values from 
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these structures, as is done, for example, in (Marinier and Laird, 2004). Future work will 
explore such possibilities. 
When the model has been sufficiently refined, we will combine the model presented in this 
paper with an existing computational model of perception and affective decision making: I-
PEFiCADM (Hoorn, Pontier, Siddiqui, 2008). Whereas the current model focuses on the 
regulation of emotions and affective decision making, I-PEFiCADM addresses the elicitation of 
emotion, without explicit regulatory mechanisms. We expect that both models will smoothly fit 
together, since the affective decision making process of I-PEFiCADM could also be applied to 
emotion regulation strategies such as situation selection, situation modification, and 
attentional deployment. Initial steps for this approach have been taken in (Pontier and 
Siddiqui, 2009). Finally, in a later stage of the project, the formalization will be validated 
against empirical data of human affective trade-off processes. As soon as the model has 
been validated and adapted, we will start exploring the possibilities to apply it to real humans 
instead of agents; i.e., to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with humans in a 
more natural way, that is, with a mind of its own, in pursuit of its own goals. 
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Chapter 3: Incorporating emotion regulation into 
virtual stories6 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents an approach to incorporate emotion regulation as addressed within 
psychology literature into virtual characters. To this end, first Gross’ informal theory of 
emotion regulation has been formalised using a dynamical system style modelling approach. 
Next, a virtual environment has been created, involving a number of virtual agents, which 
have been equipped with the formalised model for emotion regulation. This environment has 
been used to successfully generate a number of emergent virtual stories, in which characters 
regulate their emotions by applying regulation strategies such as situation selection and 
attentional deployment. The behaviours shown in the stories were found consistent with 
descriptions of human regulation processes. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the area of virtual storytelling, 
addressing the development of computer systems that generate fictive stories in which the 
characters show realistic behaviour. In order to develop virtual stories, a large variety of 
approaches have been proposed, e.g., (Cavazza et al., 2002; Dautenhahn, 1998; Theune et 
al., 2003). A trend that can be observed in many of these approaches is the movement from 
stories with a fixed, pre-scripted storyline towards emergent narrative, i.e., stories in which 
only a number of characters and their personalities are fixed, rather than the precise script of 
the story (Aylett, 1999). In the latter type of storytelling, ideally, all the designer (or writer) has 
to do is to determine which (types of) characters will occur in the play (although usually it is 
still needed to roughly prescribe the course of events). Hence, advantages of emergent 
narrative are the reduced amount of work that has to be spent by the writer, and the non-
deterministic and unpredictable behaviour of the story. 
In parallel with the shift from fixed storylines to emergent narrative, there has been a 
development in the nature of the involved characters as well. Recently, the characters (or 
agents) that are present in virtual stories are transforming more and more from shallow 
avatars to complex personalities with human-like properties such as emotions and theories of 
mind, e.g., (Van Vugt, 2009). To accomplish this, researchers have started to incorporate 
cognitive models within virtual characters, (e.g., Marsella et al., 2000; Paiva et al., 2001). 
Despite these first promising attempts, there is still a wide area to explore when it comes to 
enhancing virtual agents with cognitive capabilities. 
In line with the development described above, this paper explores the possibilities to equip 
the characters involved in virtual stories with the capability of emotion regulation. Informally, 
emotion regulation can be described as the process humans undertake to increase, maintain 
or decrease their emotional response, (see e.g., Gross, 1998; 2001; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
Thompson, 1994). The idea is that, by offering virtual agents the capacity to actively regulate 
their emotions, they will be able to select those kinds of behaviours that they feel most 
comfortable with. As a result, such agents will 1) behave more realistically and 2) have more 
freedom in the choice of their actions, which enhances the emergent narrative effect. This 
                                                           
6 This chapter has previously been published as Bosse, T., Pontier, M.A., Siddiqui, G.F., and Treur, J. 
(2007). Incorporating Emotion Regulation into Virtual Stories. In: Pelachaud,et al. (eds.), Proceedings of 
the Seventh International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA'07. Lecture Notes in Artificial 
Intelligence, vol. 4722. Springer Verlag, pp. 339-347. 
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approach is similar to the approach taken in [9], which aims at incorporating coping behaviour 
into virtual humans.  
In order to build emotion regulation into virtual stories, in this paper the informal model by 
Gross (1998) as found in psychology literature was taken as a basis. This model describes a 
number of strategies humans use to adapt their emotion response levels, varying from 
situation selection to cognitive change and response modulation. Next, this model has been 
formalised using a dynamical system style modelling approach (see also (Bosse et al., 2007) 
for some initial steps). In addition, a virtual environment has been created, incorporating a 
number of virtual agents, and these agents have been equipped with the formalised model for 
emotion regulation. To test the behaviour of the model, a series of simulation experiments has 
been performed using the LEADSTO simulation language (Bosse et al., 2009). The model 
has been connected to the Vizard Virtual Reality Toolkit (Worldviz), to visualise the resulting 
stories in a graphical environment.  
 
3.2. Emotion regulation in the virtual agent context 
 
Gross (2001) describes a process model of emotion regulation using the following definition: 
‘Emotion regulation includes all of the conscious and nonconscious strategies we use to 
increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an emotional response’. In his 
model, Gross distinguishes four different types of emotion regulation strategies, which can be 
applied at different points in the process of emotion generation. First of all, when applying 
situation selection, a person chooses to be in a situation that matches the emotional response 
level the person wants to have for a certain emotion. For example, you can stay home instead 
of going to a party, because you are in conflict with someone who is going to that party. 
Second, when applying situation modification, a person modifies an existing situation so as to 
obtain a different level of emotion. For instance, when watching an irritating television 
program, you zap to another channel. Third, attentional deployment refers to shifting your 
attention to a certain aspect. For example, you close your eyes when watching an exciting 
penalty shoot-out. Finally, cognitive change refers to selecting a cognitive meaning to an 
event. For example, when a person loses a tennis match and blames the weather 
circumstances, instead of his own capacities.  
To incorporate these strategies into virtual characters, a modelling approach was used that 
is based on the LEADSTO simulation environment (Bosse et al., 2009) and the Vizard Virtual 
Reality Toolkit (Worldviz). Due to space limitations, the technical details of LEADSTO and 
Vizard are not shown here. However, they can be found in appendix A of Chapter 3. Below, in 
Section 3.2.1, at a language-independent level a global overview is given of the model, of 
which an initial version can be found in (Bosse et al., 2007). Next, in Section 3.2.2, for each of 
the regulation strategies it is shown how it is used in the virtual agents playing as characters 
in virtual stories. The complete formal specification of the model (in LEADSTO notation) is 
shown in appendix B of Chapter 3. 
 
3.2.1. Global overview 
 
In order to incorporate emotion regulation strategies into virtual agents, a virtual environment 
is created that is populated by a number of agents. Each agent is equipped with a mechanism 
to regulate its emotions, which is based on the model as described informally by Gross [7]. To 
create a formal model, for any given type of emotion a number of variables have been 
introduced. For convenience, the model concentrates on one specific type of emotion. In 
principle, this can (at least) be any emotion that is considered to be a basic human emotion, 
e.g., sadness, happiness, or anger [6]. In order to describe the regulation of such an emotion, 
the model takes into account the four strategies discussed by Gross are used (i.e., situation 
selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change). Based on the 
four strategies mentioned, in the formalisation four corresponding elements (denoted by k) 
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are introduced, for the objects that are affected by the particular strategies: situation, sub-
situation, aspect, and meaning. 
The model assumes that each agent aims at an optimal level of emotion. The regulation 
process in the virtual agents starts by comparing the actual emotion response level ERL to 
the emotion response level ERL_norm aimed at. The difference between the two is the basis 
for adjustment of the choices made for each of the elements k; based on these adjusted 
choices, each element k will provide an adjusted emotional value EVk. 
To obtain a quantitative model, the emotion response level and the emotional values for 
the different elements for a given type of emotion are represented by real numbers in the 
interval [0, 2] (where 0 is the lowest possible ERL (e.g., extreme sadness), and 2 the highest 
(e.g., extreme happiness)). In the model, the level of emotion to aim at (the ERL norm), is 
also expressed in a real number in the domain [0, 2]. Based on these concepts, the ERL is 
recalculated each step by the following difference equation formula: 
	  
new_ERL = (1-β) * Σk (wk * EVk) + β * ERL 
	  
In this formula, new_ERL is the new emotion response level, and ERL is the old emotion 
response level. The persistency factor β is the proportion of the old emotion response level 
that is taken into account to determine the new emotion response level. Initial tests have 
indicated that values for β around 0.9 deliver realistic results. The new contribution to the 
emotion response level is calculated by the weighted sum of the emotional values: Σk wk * 
EVk. By normalisation, the sum of all the weights wk is taken to be 1. The following section 
describes how the different strategies influence the values of EVk.   
      
3.2.2. Emotion regulation strategies 
 
Situation selection: which agent to meet. Every step, each agent chooses to be alone, or to 
contact another agent, by comparing the EVs it attaches to being alone and to being with 
other agents. The agent will always choose the option with the EV that is closest to its optimal 
ERL. When two agents contact each other, they decide to meet. When the agents are 
meeting, their EV for situation is set to the EV they attach to the other agent. When an agent 
chooses to be alone, its EV for situation is set to its EV for being alone. 
 
Situation modification: what to talk about. When two agents are in a meeting, they will talk 
about a certain conversation subject. To decide which of the agents will start talking, each 
agent has a personal dominance factor. The agent with the highest dominance factor will 
choose the first conversation subject. Each step after this, the agent who has not chosen the 
current conversation subject will choose the next conversation subject. When an agent gets to 
choose which conversation subject to talk about, it will compare the EVs it attaches to each 
conversation subject, and select the one that is closest to its optimal ERL. The EV for 
subsituation is set to the EV the agents attach to the conversation subject they are currently 
talking about. When an agent is not in a meeting, its EV for subsituation will be set to the 
neutral value of 1, since the agent is not in a subsituation. When an agent A talks to another 
agent B about a certain conversation subject CS, this will affect the way agent B thinks about 
agent A. Agent B's EV for agent A will change using the following formula: 
 
new_EVagent_A = βfriendship * EVagent_A + (1-βfriendship) * EVCS 
 
In this formula, new_EVagent_A is the new EV agent B will attach to agent A and EVagent_A is 
the old EV agent B attached to agent A. The persistency factor βfriendship is the proportion of 
the old EV that is taken into account to determine the new EV. Here, values for βfriendship 
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bigger than 0.9 (where βfriendship will get bigger when an agent knows another agent for a 
longer time) deliver realistic results. The new contribution to the ERL is determined by EVCS: 
the EV agent B attaches to the conversation subject agent A is talking about. So how much 
an agent likes another agent, depends on how much an agent likes the conversation subjects 
another agent talks about. 
The extent to which an agent likes to talk about a certain conversation subject can be 
changed by external events. For example, an agent will start to like a sports team more when 
this team wins a match. To accomplish this, the following formulas are used: 
 
new_EVCSn = EVCSn + ΔEVCSn 
When a positive event occurs: ΔEVCSn = η * EVCSn * (dmax – EVCSn) 
When a negative event occurs: ΔEVCSn = -η * EVCSn * (dmax – EVCSn)  
 
In these formulas,  new_EVCSn  is the new EV the agent attaches to the conversation subject, 
and EVCSn is the old EV the agent attached to the conversation subject. Here η is a variable 
that determines the speed of adjusting EVs to conversation subjects. A lower η will result in 
slower adjustment. Here, an η of 0.02 delivers realistic results. The part EVCSn * (dmax – 
EVCSn) prevents EVCSn from under- or overadjustment. 
 
Attentional deployment: on which aspect to focus. When an agent is in a conversation, it 
can choose to pay attention to, or to distract its attention from the conversation. Every step, 
the agent chooses the option with the EV closest to its optimal ERL. The EVs the agent 
attaches to paying attention or distracting its attention, depend on the conversation subject 
the agent is currently talking about, according to the following formulas: 
	  
new_EVpay_attention = βasp * EVpay_attention + (1-βasp) * EVCS 
new_EVdistract = βasp * EVdistract + (1-βasp) * (-EVCS + dmax) 
 
In these formulas, new_EVpay_attention  and new_EVdistract are the new EVs for pay_attention and 
distract, and EVpay_attention and EVdistract are the old EVs for pay_attention and distract. 
The persistency factor βasp is the proportion of the old EV that is taken into account to 
determine the new EV. The new contribution to the EV for pay_attention is determined by 
EVCS, the EV the agent attaches to the conversation subject it is talking about. The new 
contribution to the EV for distract is calculated by (-EVCS + dmax). This will reach a high value 
when the agent attaches a low EV to the conversation subject, and a low value when the 
agent attaches a high value to the conversation subject. So when the agent likes the 
conversation subject, it will be more likely to pay attention to the conversation. The agent 
chooses to distract from, or pay attention to the conversation, by comparing the two EVs for 
paying attention and distracting, and picking the option with the EV closest to its optimal ERL. 
 
Cognitive change: which meaning to attach. Every step, agents can choose to apply self-
talk. An agent can use self-talk to relativise its current state of mind, or on the other hand, to 
attach more meaning to its current state. Every step, an agent chooses to relativise, attach a 
stronger meaning, or to apply no self-talk, by picking the option with the EV closest to the 
optimal ERL of the agent. The EV for not applying self-talk always has the neutral value of 1. 
The EVs for relativising and attaching more meaning depend on the ERL of the agent, and 
are updated every step according to the following formula’s: 
	  
new_EVrelativise= dmax - ERL 
new_EVattach_more_meaning = ERL + (ERL-1) * (1 – abs(1-ERL)) 
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When an agent has a high ERL, the EV for relativising will be low, and when an agent has a 
high ERL, the EV for relativising will be high. So relativising always influences the ERL of the 
agent to reach a more neutral value. 
When the ERL of the agent has the neutral value of 1, (ERL-1) will be 0, and the EV for 
attaching more meaning will be 1. When the ERL of the agent is smaller than 1, then ERL-1 
will have a negative value, and the EV for attaching more meaning will have a value that is 
smaller than the current ERL. When the ERL of the agent is bigger than 1, then ERL-1 will be 
bigger than 1, and the EV for attaching more meaning will have a value that is bigger than the 
current ERL. So attaching more meaning always influences the ERL of the agent to a more 
extreme value than the current one. Multiplying by (1 – abs(1-ERL)) prevents the EV from 
reaching values that are out of the domain. 
 
3.3. Simulation experiments 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Example Simulation Trace 
 
Several experiments have been done to test the simulation model’s ability to generate 
interesting scenarios. To obtain movies in Vizard, events in the LEADSTO simulations were 
translated to visualisations in Vizard. The exact mapping that was used for this translation is 
shown in appendix C of Chapter 3. For example, the fact that an agent is happy is visualised 
by a certain type of smile, and the fact that an agent distracts from a conversation is 
visualised by this agent moving its head away from its conversation partner. 
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In all of the simulations, three agents are involved, which will be called Barry, Gary, and 
Harry. The particular emotion these agents will try to regulate during the scenario’s is their 
amount of happiness. To enable this, the particular topics they are allowed to talk about are 
football (in particular, the Dutch football teams Ajax and Feyenoord) and hockey. The 
parameter settings of all agents used in three specific experiments are shown in appendix D 
of Chapter 3.  
Due to space limitations, only one of the simulation experiments is discussed in this paper. 
The results of the LEADSTO simulation of this experiment can be seen in Figure 3.1. Here, 
time is on the horizontal axis, whereas different events are displayed on the vertical axis. A 
dark box on top of a line indicates that an event is true at that time point; a light box below a 
line indicates than an event if false. A detailed description of what happens in this scenario is 
provided in appendix E of Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Screenshot of an example scenario in Vizard 
 
As mentioned earlier, using a specific conversion program that has been implemented, 
LEADSTO simulations were translated into movies in Vizard. A screenshot of an example 
Vizard movie (which corresponds to the scenario shown in Figure 3.1) is shown in Figure 3.2. 
This figure shows a situation in which (on the foreground) two agents are having a 
conversation. The left agent is talking about hockey, but the right agent tries to distract from 
the conversation by moving its head away from the conversation. The cognitive meaning that 
each agent attaches to its current thoughts is displayed (in red) above the heads of the 
agents. Meanwhile, in the background a third agent is standing alone. The full Vizard movie of 
this scenario, as well as the movies that correspond to the two other experiments described 
can be found in appendix D of Chapter 3. 
The resulting movies provide a first indication that the emotion regulation strategies as 
described by Gross (1998) have been implemented successfully within the virtual agents 
used as characters. To be specific, the agents are able to perform situation selection by 
selecting different conversation partners, and withdrawing from conversations if desired. 
Moreover, they can perform situation modification by changing conversation topics, they can 
perform attentional deployment by changing the amount of attention they pay to a 
conversation, and they can perform cognitive change by changing the cognitive meaning they 
assign to their thoughts (e.g., by stating to themselves that something is not very important). 
These behaviours were found consistent with predicted behaviours for situations as described 
by Gross (1998; 2001) (which are based on empirical evidence). 
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3.4. Discussion 
 
Within the domain of virtual storytelling, the idea of emergent narrative has become more and 
more popular (Aylett, 1999). Moreover, there is a growing trend to incorporate cognitive 
models within the characters involved in virtual stories (e.g., Marsella et al., 2000; Paiva et al., 
2001). As a next step in that direction, the current paper aims at building emotion regulation 
as known from psychology literature into virtual characters. To this end, the informal model by 
Gross (1998) was taken as a basis, and has been formalised using a dynamical system style 
modelling approach (see also (Bosse et al., 2007) for some initial steps). A virtual 
environment has been created, which includes a number of virtual agents that have been 
equipped with the formalised model for emotion regulation. To test the behaviour of the model 
in a prototyping phase, a series of simulation experiments has been performed using the 
LEADSTO simulation language (Bosse et al., 2009); in the Vizard Virtual Reality Toolkit 
(Worldviz), such simulations have been visualised in a graphical environment. The resulting 
movies provide a first indication that the emotion regulation strategies as described by Gross 
(1998) have been implemented successfully within the virtual characters. The simulation 
results have been compared with the behaviours for different situations as described by 
Gross (1998; 2001) and found consistent. Validation involving comparison with detailed 
empirical data is left for future work. 
Concerning related work, an approach in the literature that has similarities to the current 
approach is (Marsella & Gratch, 2003). In that paper, a computational model is introduced 
that can simulate several strategies about how humans cope with emotions, such as ‘positive 
reinterpretation’ and ‘denial’. However, that approach makes use of plan-based causal 
representations, augmented with decision-theoretic planning techniques, whereas our 
approach uses dynamical systems representations. Another difference is that our model is 
meant to correspond tightly to one specific psychological theory (i.e., the one by Gross). 
Virtual stories involving characters with elaborated cognitive or psychological capabilities 
can be used for a number of purposes. On the one hand, they may be used for entertainment 
(e.g., for creating computer games with more complex, unpredictable and more human-like 
characters). On the other hand, they may be used for educational purposes (e.g., to create a 
virtual training environment for psychotherapists, which enables them to practice anger 
management sessions with virtual clients). Further research will investigate whether the 
model is suitable for such purposes. As soon as these types of challenges will be tackled, 
also a more precise evaluation will be performed of how humans perceive the current 
characters (e.g. in terms of believability). 
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Chapter 4: Matching skin conductance data to a 
cognitive model of reappraisal7 
 
Abstract 
 
In the present paper we show that an existing mathematical model of emotion regulation can, 
if reduced to its reappraisal-specific components, fit skin conductance data obtained from an 
empirical study of reappraisal. By applying parameter tuning techniques, optimal fits of the 
model have been found against the (averaged) patterns of the skin conductance data. The 
errors that were found turned out to be relatively low. Moreover, they have been compared 
with the errors produced by a baseline variant of the model where the adaptive cycle has 
been removed, and were found substantially lower. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Emotion regulation refers to ‘all of the conscious and nonconscious strategies we use to 
increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an emotional response’ (Gross, 
2001). This ability to regulate our own emotional states provides us with behavioral flexibility 
and is related to well-being and mental health (e.g., Gross, 1998, 2001; Ochsner and Gross, 
2005; Thompson, 1994). 
Recently, a number of authors have developed computational models of the processes 
related to emotion regulation and coping (e.g., Bach, 2008; Bosse et al., 2010; Gratch and 
Marsella, 2004; Marsella and Gratch, 2003; Reisenzein, 2009; Silverman, 2004). 
Computational models of emotion regulation may be useful for various reasons (see (Wehrle, 
1998) for an overview). From a Cognitive Science perspective, they may provide more 
insights into the nature of affective disease and the working mechanisms of therapy. From an 
Artificial Intelligence perspective, they may be used to develop virtual agents with more 
human-like affective behavior.  
In previous work (Bosse et al., 2010), we presented CoMERG, a Cognitive Model for 
Emotion Regulation based on Gross. Inspired by the theory put forward in (Gross, 2001), this 
model distinguishes five different strategies that humans typically use to affect their level of 
emotional response (for a given type of emotion) at different points in the process of emotion 
generation: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive 
change, and response modulation. The different strategies and their effects are represented 
in the model via a set of difference equations. 
An important asset of CoMERG is that the model is adaptive (see Bosse et al., 2007b). 
That is, based on the perceived success of an emotion regulation strategy that is performed, 
a person may adjust the degree of sensitivity of the process on the fly (e.g., in case a certain 
strategy does not decrease an undesired emotion sufficiently fast, the person may put more 
effort in the regulation). However, although a preliminary evaluation indicated that CoMERG 
produced plausible patterns (Bosse et al., 2010), to date the output of the model has never 
been compared with empirical data. 
In order to assess to what extent CoMERG is able to reproduce empirical data, we here fit 
the model to skin conductance data that resulted from two empirical studies of reappraisal 
(unpublished material). Reappraisal, a variant of the cognitive change strategy aimed 
specifically at down-regulating emotion, is one of the most widely studied emotion regulation 
                                                           
7 This chapter has previously been published as Bosse, T., Brenninckmeyer, J., Kallisch, R., Paret, C., 
and Pontier, M.A. (2011). Matching Skin Conductance Data to a Computational Model of Reappraisal., 
Proceedings of of the 33th International Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci'11, 
in press. 
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strategies. Gross (2001) defines reappraisal as a process where ‘the individual reappraises or 
cognitively re-evaluates a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in terms that decrease its 
emotional impact’. For example, losing a tennis match is usually appraised as negative and 
would induce anger or sadness. To reduce these negative reactions, one could reappraise 
the situation by blaming the weather circumstances instead of the own capacities or by 
considering sportive success as irrelevant. 
In (Kalisch, 2009), a novel (informal) model for reappraisal is presented, based on recent 
insights from imaging neuroscience. This model, called the implementation-maintenance 
model of reappraisal (IMMO), is characterized by its focus on the necessity of a mental 
reappraisal effort that needs to be maintained over the course of the emotional episode and is 
continuously adapted. Adaptation is realized through a loop of iterative evaluation and 
readjustment of the regulation process. IMMO thus shares a critical adaptation component 
with CoMERG. 
To be able to better fit the results of CoMERG to the skin conductance data, the general 
model needs to be tailored specifically to reappraisal. Thus, the current paper has two main 
goals, namely 1) to refine the generic computational emotion regulation model CoMERG to 
the reappraisal context, and 2) to evaluate the ability of the refined model to reproduce real 
data, by matching it to skin conductance data from empirical studies of reappraisal. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the main mechanisms of 
CoMERG relevant to reappraisal are briefly summarized. Next, the setup of the reappraisal 
studies is described, with an emphasis on how the skin conductance data (to fit the new 
model) have been obtained. The following sections discuss how the model has been fit to the 
data, and present the results. The paper is concluded by a discussion. 
 
4.2. CoMERG and its extensions  
 
CoMERG is composed of a set of difference equations, which represent how a person’s 
emotional state changes based on certain regulation strategies. For convenience, the model 
concentrates on one specific type of emotion, in this case the fear induced by the threat of 
receiving a painful electric shock. We have chosen to express the emotion response level 
ERL in a real number, in the domain [0, 1]. A higher emotion response level means more fear.  
In the model of Gross, five different elements n=1…5 (i.e., situation, sub-situation, aspect, 
meaning, and response) can influence the emotion response level. The experiments that 
produced the data to which the model is matched in this paper are restricted to the elements 
1 (situation, i.e., threat of shock) and 4 (cognitive meaning, i.e., reappraisal). In the model, at 
any point in time, a certain emotional value vn in the domain [0, 1] is attached to each 
element, representing the extent to which the current state of that element induces emotions. 
The model describes how persons increase or decrease those emotional values by 
comparing them with some desired values (or norms) vn_norm. Because the participants 
receive explicit instructions about how to cognitively reappraise events, for element 4 we 
introduce an explicit v4-norm in the domain [0, 1].  A value of 0 for v4-norm would mean that one’s 
aim is to reappraise the situation as not dangerous or frightening. 
The emotional value contributes to the emotion response level ERL via an element-specific 
weight factor wn, thereby taking into account a persistency factor β, indicating the degree of 
persistence or slowness of adjusting the emotion response level when new emotional values 
are obtained. Someone whose emotions can change rapidly (e.g., who stops being angry in a 
few seconds) will have a low β. 
The regulation process of the cognitive meaning compares the actual cognitive meaning v4 
to v4_norm at any time point. The difference d between the two is the basis for the adjustment of 
v4. We assume that the self-monitoring process necessary to determine a deviation from v4-
norm is a rather slow and effortful conscious process. We emulate this by the variable eval 
which is the integral of d over the past 3 seconds. Adjustment occurs via enhancing or 
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reducing the cognitive effort made to achieve the desired emotional value v4-norm, if eval 
signals a deviation. The regulation effort is expressed in the modification factor αn (Bosse et 
al., 2007b), i.e., the ‘willingness’ to change the emotional value of element n. The effort one 
makes thus responds to a sort of reflection or meta-cognition about the emotion regulation 
process based on the history of differences d. One step further, the modification factor itself is 
adaptable as well: an additional adaptation factor γn represents the personal flexibility to 
adjust the emotion regulation behaviour (i.e., the personal tendency to adjust the emotional 
value of element n much or little). This depends on the cognitive costs of reappraising, which 
are represented by c4. 
The model is shown in a qualitative manner in the graph depicted in Figure 4.1. The 
variables above the dashed line represent the adaptation layer. The model without adaptation 
layer (Bosse et al., 2007a) will serve as a control condition to explore the necessity of this 
layer.  
In terms of IMMO, determining eval can be seen as monitoring reappraisal success whose 
outcomes leads to an adjustment of the reappraisal effort α4. Note the difference between 
eval (which is calculated by taking the integral of d) and abs_eval (which is calculated by 
taking the integral of the absolute value of d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Dependencies between the Variables.  
 
 
The main difference equations used to model these cycles are the following (see (Bosse et 
al., 2010) for more details): 
 
Emotion Response Level 
ERL(t+Δt) = (1 - β) * Σk(wk*vk(t)) + β * ERL(t) 
 
Emotional Values 
vn(t+Δt) = vn(t) - αn(t) * eval(t)/dmax 
 
Modification Factors 
αn(t+Δt) = αn(t) + γn * (αn(t) / (1 + αn(t))) * (abs_eval(t) – cn)  
 
4.3. Obtaining the data 
 
To obtain skin conductance data about reappraisal processes, two within-subject experiments 
were performed. In both experiments, subjects were informed by an auditory warning signal 
that they might receive a shock to their hand at 25% probability during a given trial period 
(fear induction procedure). The warning signal was followed by another auditory cue telling 
them whether to reappraise (R) the situation or not (NR). Generally, the reappraisal strategy 
β wn    vn 
c
n 
ERL 
Adaptation layer cn γn 
d   vn-norm αn 
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consisted in taking a detached-observer perspective situation; that is, in distancing oneself 
from the situation and interpreting it as not affecting the core-self but being self-irrelevant. 
More specifically, in experiment 1 (n=24 right-handed healthy male subjects), subjects were 
told to imagine across both R and NR conditions a cloud in the sky that would symbolize the 
emotional aspects of a given situation, including all potential threats and accompanying 
reactions or feelings of tension or anxiety. For the R condition, they were asked to imagine 
themselves far away from this cloud, for example standing on a hill and observing the cloud 
from a distance (but not to look away). In addition to this mental image, they were given a 
self-statement that expressed the detached perspective: “The cloud is far out on the horizon. I 
observe it from a distance.” For the NR condition, subjects were told to imagine themselves 
surrounded by the cloud and to use the corresponding self-statement: “I am inside the cloud. 
It surrounds me from all sides”. They were to subvocally rehearse the appropriate statement 
throughout trials and to simultaneously keep the corresponding mental image in working 
memory. A similar strategy has been shown in previous studies to reduce fear of shock 
(Houston and Holmes, 1974; Kalisch et al., 2005).  In Experiment 2 (n=20 right-handed 
healthy male subjects), the R condition was identical to experiment 1 whereas in NR trials, 
subjects were instead  not told to use any self-statement or imagery but to simply attend to 
the situation and allow their emotional reaction to unfold, not attempting to change it.  
Skin conductance is a measure of the sympathetic arousal that accompanies most fear 
responses. Although it cannot capture all aspects of a fear response, it is one of the few 
available continuous and objective measures of the response and was thus used to generate 
ERL time courses. 
In all figures below, skin conductance time courses are averaged across trials and subjects 
in that experiment. Solid red lines represent average NR time courses, dotted red lines 
represent average R time courses. 
 
4.4. Matching Data to the Model 
 
To obtain a close fit of the simulation model to the empirical data obtained in the experiments, 
parameter tuning was used (Sorenson, 1980). Since the challenge is to tune the parameters 
of an existing dynamic model, rather than to come up with an optimal function from scratch, it 
is not possible to apply standard regression techniques in this case. Therefore, a dedicated 
parameter estimation method was used, which is similar to the approach used in (Bosse, 
Memon, Treur, and Umair, 2009). According to this approach, to match the model to the data 
it is first needed to obtain the sensitivity of a parameter: the change in difference between the 
model and the data with a given change in parameter value.  
To determine the sensitivity S, a small change ΔP in the parameter is tried to make an 
additional prediction for X, and based on the resulting change ΔX found in the two predicted 
values for X, the sensitivity S can be estimated: 
 
SX,P = ΔX/ ΔP  
 
After the sensitivity is determined, a better guess for the value of P can be determined by 
taking 
 
ΔP =  -λ * ΔX / SX,P 
 
where ΔX is the deviation found between observed and predicted value of X; so, for example, 
when ΔX = 0.25 and λ = 0.3, then for SX,P = 0.75  this obtains ΔP = -0.3*0.25 /0.75 = -0.1. 
However, when the sensitivity SX,P is a bit smaller, it could be possible that the adjustment of 
the value of P based on the formula above would exceed the maximum or minimum value of 
its range. If this happened, the parameter was adjusted by intuition.  
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Based on this adjustment approach, the overall parameter tuning process was done as 
follows: 
 
1. Take G the set of parameters P for which adjustment is desired; the other parameters 
are kept constant. 
2. Assume initial values for all parameters P, and for λ. 
3. By simulation determine predicted value CVX at time point t for X, using the assumed 
values of the parameters. 
4. For each parameter P in G, by simulation determine predicted value for VX at time 
point t, using only for P a value changed by some chosen ΔP and the unchanged 
assumed values for the other parameters. 
5. For each parameter P in G determine the sensitivity SX,P of X for P at time point t by 
dividing the difference between values for X found in step 4 and 5 by ΔP:    SX,P =  
(CVX - VX) / ΔP 
6. For each parameter P determine the change ΔP as:   -λ * ΔX / SX,P 
7. For each parameter P adjust its value by ΔP. 
8. Return to step 1 until the fit is satisfactory. 
 
The coefficient of determination R2 (Steel & Torrie, 1960) was calculated to determine the 
quality of the fit (the closer to 1 the better). The match was called satisfactory when the quality 
of fit did not increase anymore for several time steps. If the matching process seemed to be 
stuck into a local optimum, the parameters were adjusted by intuition to check whether the 
match could be improved. 
The set of parameters G looked at were β, γ, c, α, and w1. We did not use any constraints 
for the values, except that w1 should always be bigger than w4, as Gross described that 
emotion regulation strategies performed earlier in the regulation process are more effective 
(Gross, 2001). 
 
4.5. Results 
 
In this section, the results of the skin experiments are described, as well as the curves 
produced by fitting the model on the results. For both experiments, first the fits produced by 
the complete model (with adaptation) are presented, both for the NR and for the R condition, 
followed by the fits produced by the model without adaptation (with was used as a control 
condition). 
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Exp1 – Adaptation – No Reappraisal (NR) 
 
Figure 4.2: The fits of the model with the adaptation layer to Experiment 1. Thick, red, solid 
line: average skin conductance from Non-Reappraisal (NR) trials; Thick, red, dotted line: 
Reappraisal (R) trials. Thin, blue, solid line: model fit for NR trials; Thin, blue, dotted line: 
model fit for R trials. 
 
We modeled the NR condition (solid line in the figures) by setting v4_norm to the same level as 
v1 and v4 (which is always = v1 at the start of the simulation). This models that subjects do not 
intend to change their appraisal of the situation but allow their automatic appraisal systems to 
dominate and thus to solely determine the ERL.  
Because v4_norm has the same value as v4, d = 0, and v4 is not changed during the 
experiment. Therefore, α4 has no influence on v4, and thus no indirect influence on ERL. For 
the same reason, c4 and γ4 have no indirect influence on the ERL. Further, since v1 and v4 
have the same value throughout the complete experiment, the proportion of w1 does not 
influence ERL either. This leaves the parameter βERL as the only possible factor for fitting the 
data. 
Using the method described earlier in this paper, the optimal fit to the data was found for 
βERL = 0.9841. The R2 of the fit was 0.9960, and can be seen in the higher curve of Figure 4.2. 
 
Exp1 – Adaptation – Reappraisal (R) 
The goal to reappraise the situation as not self-relevant was modeled by setting v4_norm = 0. 
The starting value of v4 was still modeled to be the same as v1. Because this creates a 
discrepancy d between v4 and v4_norm, now all the five parameters have a direct or indirect 
influence on ERL. However, because βERL represents a personality factor which shouldn’t 
differ among experimental conditions, the value from the NR fit above was taken. This leaves 
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the other four parameters for optimizing the fit. Using the method described earlier in this 
paper, the optimal fit to the data was found for the following parameter settings: 
 
α4 = 0.188 
w1 = 0.6 
γ = 0.2 
c = 0.4 
 
This led to a fit with R2 = 0.9876, which can be seen in the lower curve of Figure 4.2. 
 
Exp1 – No Adaptation – Reappraisal (R) 
To explore the necessity of the adaptation layer in the emotion regulation model, we also 
made a fit for the model without the adaptation layer, in which α is kept constant. Because the 
fit for the NR condition already had a constant α, the curve does not change.  
Because γ and c are part of the adaptation layer, they cannot be considered for fitting the R 
condition, leaving α and w1 for optimizing the fit. 
The optimal fit to the R data was found for the following parameter settings: 
 
α4 = 0.027 
w1 = 0.79 
 
As can be seen in the lower curve of Figure 4.3, the fit still is still reasonable, with an R2 of 
0.9723. However, it was worse than the fit of the model with the adaptation layer added, 
where an R2 of 0.9876 was reached. 
 
Figure 4.3: The fits of the model without the adaptation layer to Experiment 1. 
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Exp2 – Adaptation – No Reappraisal (NR) 
In experiment 2 in NR trials, participants were instructed to think or feel as they normally 
would in such a situation. No cognitive effort to maintain any type of statement or image was 
required. This was modeled by setting α4 = 0. 
Because the update mechanism of α4 is proportional to α4, it would always stay at 0. 
Therefore, γ, and c had no direct or indirect influence on ERL, and were not considered. 
Because α stayed at 0 throughout the experiment, v4 also stayed constant, at the same level 
as v1. Therefore, w1 also did not influence ERL, leaving only βERL for optimizing the fit to the 
data.  
The optimal fit, which can be seen in the higher curve of Figure 4.4, was found for βERL = 
0.9869, with an R2 of 0.9556. 
 
Exp2 – Adaptation – Reappraisal (R) 
In the R condition, the value for βERL was taken from the value found in the NR condition, and 
the other four parameters could all be used for optimizing the fit to the data, similar to the R 
condition of experiment 1. 
 
The optimal fit was found for the following parameter settings: 
 
α4 = 0.003 
w1 = 0.75  
γ = 0.3 
c = 0.1 
 
This led to a fit with R2 = 0.9818, which can be seen in the lower curve of Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The fit of the model with the adaptation layer to Experiment 2. 
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Exp2 – No Adaptation – Reappraisal (R) 
For experiment 2 we also made a fit with the model without the adaptation layer. Again, 
because γ and c are part of the adaptation layer they cannot be considered for making the fit, 
leaving α4 and w1 for optimizing the fit. 
The optimal fit to the data was found for the following parameter settings: 
 
α4 = 0.004  
w1 = 0.51 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the fit is still quite good, with an R2 of 0.9806, but slightly worse 
than could be made using the version of the model with the adaptation layer, with which an R2 
of 0.9818 was reached. 
 
Figure 4.5: The fit of the model without the adaptation layer to Experiment 2. 
 
These results illustrate that the emotion regulation model by (Bosse et al., 2010) is capable of 
reproducing empirical data quite closely. Moreover, the fact that the fits of the model without 
the adaptation layer are worse provide evidence that reappraisal as performed by humans 
may indeed be an adaptive process.  
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4.6. Discussion 
 
Over the last decade, the number of computational models of affect has rapidly increased, 
especially in the area of Artificial Intelligence (e.g., Bach, 2008; Bosse et al., 2010; Gratch 
and Marsella, 2004; Marsella and Gratch, 2003; Reisenzein, 2009; Silverman, 2004). Most of 
these models have as their main goal to endow virtual agents (e.g., robots or avatars) with 
more believable human-like behavior. However, only a small subset of these approaches 
aims to reproduce the dynamics of the more subtle sub-processes involved (such as 
reappraisal) in a detailed manner (see (Bosse et al., 2010), for an extensive literature 
overview). An even smaller subset validates the results of the model against physiological 
data, such as skin conductance or fMRI data, yielding a large gap between AI-inspired 
modeling approaches and empirical psychological research.  
The main contribution of the present paper is a first step towards closing this gap. We have 
shown that an existing cognitive model of emotion regulation can, if reduced to its reappraisal-
specific components, fit empirical data. By applying parameter tuning techniques, optimal fits 
of the model have been found against the (averaged) patterns of the skin conductance data. 
The errors that were found turned out to be relatively low. Moreover, they have been 
compared with the errors produced by a baseline variant of the model where the adaptive 
cycle has been removed, and were found substantially lower. Although this is obviously not 
an exhaustive proof for the correctness of the model, it is an important indication that 
reappraisal as performed by humans may indeed be an adaptive process, as has been 
postulated by current informal models of reappraisal (Kalisch, 2009).  
Further validation and refinements of our model are obviously warranted. Regarding 
validation, the current work should be seen as an initial test whether the CoMERG model is 
capable of reproducing empirical data at all. In future research, more extensive tests will be 
performed, based on cross-validation and involving more participants. Regarding model 
refinement, it will be particularly interesting to see whether it can be adjusted to also simulate 
a proposed subparcellation of reappraisal effort into an early retrieval and a later working 
memory maintenance and monitoring component that has ensued from a recent analysis of 
neuroimaging data (Kalisch, 2009). The model might then also be useful for prediction brain 
activation time courses. 
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Chapter 5: A virtual therapist that responds 
empathically to your answers8 
 
Abstract 
 
Previous research indicates that self-help therapy is an effective method to prevent and treat 
unipolar depression. While web-based self-help therapy has many advantages, there are also 
disadvantages to self-help therapy, such as that it misses the possibility to regard the body 
language of the user, and the lack of personal feedback on the user responses. This study 
presents a virtual agent that guides the user through the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
questionnaire, which is used to measure the severity of depression. The agent responds 
empathically to the answers given by the user, by changing its facial expression. This 
resembles face to face therapy more than existing web-based self-help therapies. A pilot 
experiment indicates that the virtual agent has added value for this application. 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Self-help therapies have been investigated for several decades. Self-help therapy started with 
bibliotherapy, in which clients follow a therapy from a book. Previous research indicates that 
this is a very effective form of therapy; e.g., a meta-analysis by Cuijpers (1997) concluded 
that bibliotherapy in unipolar depression is an effective treatment modality, which is no less 
effective than traditional individual or group therapy.  
The advent of new communication technologies, like internet and videoconferencing, can 
also assist in the field of mental healthcare. Since the last decade, a lot of self-help programs 
have been delivered through the internet (Christiansen et al., 2002; 2004; Spek et al., 2007). 
Several previous studies concluded that self-help therapies are useful and efficient in 
reducing mental health problems convincingly (e. g., Cuijpers, 1997; Spek et al., 2007). 
Compared to traditional therapy methods, web-based self-help may be more efficient and less 
expensive (Bijl & Ravelli, 2000; Griffiths et al., 2006).  
Web-based self-help therapy can also be a solution for people who would otherwise not 
seek help, wishing to avoid the stigma of psychiatric referral or to protect their privacy 
(Williams, 2001). The majority of persons with a mental disorder in the general population do 
not receive any professional mental health services (an estimated 65%) (Bijl & Ravelli, 1990). 
In many occupations, such as the police force, the fire service and farming, there is much 
stigma attached to receiving psychological treatment, and the anonymity of web-based self-
help therapy would help to overcome this (Peck, 2007). Also many other people feel a barrier 
to seek help for their problems through regular health-care systems; e.g., in a study by Spek 
et al. (2007) about internet-based cognitive behavioural therapy for subtreshold depression 
for people over 50 years old, many participants reported not seeking help through regular 
health-care systems because they were very concerned about being stigmatised. Patients 
may be attracted to the idea of working on their own to deal with their problems, thereby 
avoiding the potential embarrassment of formal psychotherapy (Williams, 2001). Self-help 
therapy can also be offered to patients while they are on a waiting list, with the option to 
receive face to face therapy later, if required (Peck, 2007). 
However, there is also critique on internet-based self-help therapy. Drop-out rates from 
self-help therapy can be high, especially when the use of self-help is unmonitored by a health 
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care practitioner (Williams, 2001). A wide range of drop-out rates for bibliotherapy have been 
estimated: from about 7% (Cuijpers, 1997) up to 51.7% (Spek et al., 2007). People may miss 
personal feedback when performing self-help therapy, which might decrease their motivation. 
By making self-help therapy more similar to face to face therapy, it can become a more 
personal and entertaining experience, which might decrease drop-out. 
Several self-help therapy programs are already available on the internet. Two well-known 
examples of CBT (Cognitive Behavioural Therapy) programs are ‘BluePages’ and ‘MoodGYM’ 
(Christensen et al., 2002). BluePages gives information about the symptoms of depression 
whereas MoodGYM is designed to prevent depression (Christensen et al., 2002; 2004). 
However, none of the existing online self-help therapies include a virtual agent that provides a 
kind of face to face assistance.  
There have already been developed several agents in the health-supporting domain. For 
example, Bickmore et al (2007) describe a virtual agent that explains health documents to 
patients. This study presents an application for performing the Beck Depression Inventory 
questionnaire (Beck, 1972). The application is equipped with a virtual agent that responds 
empathically to the responses of the user. As the virtual agent is emotionally responsive to 
the answers given by the user throughout the questionnaire, the experience should resemble 
face to face therapy more than a similar application without a virtual agent. 
 
5.2. The application 
 
In the application, the user performs the BDI questionnaire. The main goal of the BDI is to 
measure the characteristic attitudes and symptoms of depression. The BDI is a self-report 
inventory that consists of 21 multiple-choice questions, and is generally used for measuring 
the severity of depression. Every question has at least four answer options ranging in 
intensity from 0 to 3.  
The virtual agent asks the questions to the user, and the user selects the appropriate 
answer from a given drop-down box. This virtual agent has a certain emotional state, 
consisting of two emotions: happiness and empathy. According to Eisenberg (2002), empathy 
is “An affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
emotional state or condition, and that is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be 
expected to feel.” Because in this application a depression questionnaire is conducted, which 
means empathy concerns rather sad things, showing empathy consists of showing sadness. 
If during the questionnaire the user appears to be more depressed the virtual agent will show 
more sadness, expressed by a relatively sad facial expression. On the other hand, if the user 
appears to be completely fine, the agent will show a relatively happy facial expression. When 
the webpage is loaded for the first time, the original emotional state of the virtual agent is 
loaded, which is a calm emotional state, with very little sadness and an average level of 
happiness. 
  
5.2.1. The emotion model of the agent 
 
The virtual agent responds empathically towards the user, by showing the right facial 
expressions on the answers given by the user. In consultation with clinical psychologists, we 
defined an impact of these answers as a real number in the domain [-1, 1] on the emotions of 
the virtual agent, represented by a real number in the domain [0, 1]. Further we defined in 
consultation with the clinical psychologists how the agent should behave towards the users 
using these impacts. The impacts are used to detect how the user is feeling. When the user 
gives a lot of answers that indicate he or she is not feeling well, the agent should show 
empathy, by showing a sad facial expression, without showing any happiness. When the user 
is feeling fine, the agent should show a neutral, calm facial expression, with some happiness 
and no sadness. Because it would be undesirable if the emotions of the agent suddenly shift 
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from very sad to very happy or vice versa, with any change in emotions, the old levels of the 
emotions are taken into account. If the answers of the user have no impact on the emotions of 
the agent, its facial expression should slowly return to the original emotional state it had at the 
start of the application. We have developed the following formula that meets the requirements 
as described above: 
 
New_emotion    =  Old_emotion + Decay + Change 
Decay  =  (Original_emotion – Old_emotion) * Decay_factor 
Change  =  ζ * Impact / (1 + (Original_emotion - Old_emotion) * Impact) 
 
New_emotion can be calculated by taking the old emotion, and adding decay and change. 
Here Old_emotion is the emotion of the virtual agent before the formula is applied. Decay is 
the size of the decay effect (i.e., how quickly the emotion will move towards the original 
emotion if the user response has no impact). Change is the change of the emotion of the 
virtual agent, according to the impact of the answer given by the user. 
Decay is calculated by subtracting Old_emotion from Original_emotion, and multiplying the 
result with the Decay_factor. In this formula, Decay_factor is a variable that determines the 
size of the decay effect, which is taken 0.1 in this paper. Original_emotion is the emotion of 
the virtual agent at the start of the application.  
Change is calculated by multiplying the impact of the answer given by the user with ζ, and 
dividing the result by 1 + (Original_emotion - Old_emotion) * Impact. In this formula, ζ is a 
variable that determines the speed with which the answers given by the user can modify the 
emotions of the virtual agent. Dividing Impact by 1 + (Original_emotion - Old_emotion) * 
Impact manages that when the current emotion of the agent deviates more from the original 
emotion the agent had at the start of the application, and the answer given by the user 
pushes the emotion of the agent even further away from the original emotion, the change will 
be relatively smaller as when the user’s answer would push the agent’s emotion back towards 
the original emotion with the same impact.  
 
Figure 5.1: The emotions of the agent during scenario 1 and scenario 2 
 
The emotions of the agent during two scenarios are shown in Figure 5.1. In this figure, along 
the x-axis the time is given and along the y-axis the levels of emotions are given. The pink 
line shows happiness and the blue line shows sadness. In scenario 1, the agent interacts with 
a severely depressed user, while in scenario 2 the agent interacts with a user who scores 
average on feelings of depression.  
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, initially the virtual agent has a very small level of sadness 
(0.2) and an average level of happiness (0.5). Each time point the virtual therapist asks a 
question to the user and gets an answer. This answer affects the emotions of the agent. The 
user in scenario 1 is severely depressed, coming to a final score of 61 on the BDI 
questionnaire. During the questionnaire, the agent notices this, which increases her level of 
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sadness and decreases her level of happiness. This results in the agent showing empathy 
towards the user by means of a sad facial expression. 
In scenario 2, the user got an average score on the BDI questionnaire (33). This means 
the user scores average on feelings of depression.  In Figure 5.1, the different emotional 
reactions of the agent on the answers of the user in scenario 2 can clearly be seen. On 
answers that indicate the user is depressed, such as the answer just before time point 5, the 
agent’s level of sadness increases, and the agent’s level of happiness decreases. On the 
other hand, on answers that indicate the user is not depressed, such as the answer just 
before time point 6, the agent’s level of sadness decreases, and the agent’s level of 
happiness increases. At the end of the questionnaire, the agent shows a facial expression 
with an average level of both sadness and happiness. 
 
5.2.2 The resulting website 
 
For creating the virtual agent, we used Haptek’s peopleputty software. Through this program 
we created the face of the virtual agent. Further, we created nine different emotional states 
using the sliders ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ given by the software; one for each possible combination of 
the three levels of the emotions happiness and sadness (showing empathy). We created a 
webpage for the BDI questionnaire, on which the virtual agent was embedded as a Haptek 
player. We used JavaScript, a scripting language, in combination with scripting commands 
provided by the Haptek software, to control the Haptek player within a web browser.  
We performed a pilot experiment to test whether the virtual agent has added value for the 
application. To recruit participants, we invited people by sending an e-mail with a link to the 
website. The first page of this website does not show the virtual agent, and contains 8 
demographic questions. The next page contains the 21 questions of the BDI questionnaire. 
The virtual agent is shown on top of this page. Before the first question, the agent introduces 
itself, and states that it will guide the user through the questionnaire. Instead of showing all 
the questions in a form, only one question at a time was shown, to let the application more 
resemble face to face therapy. Each question is shown in a text area below the virtual agent. 
Below the question, there is a dropdown-box from which the user can select an answer.  
Because some of the possible participants were Dutch, we created a Dutch, as well as an 
English version of the website. In the English version, the virtual agent asks the question 
using speech. Because at the moment of this study, we did not have a Dutch speech 
synthesis engine available that included lip-syncing, in the Dutch version the question was 
only shown in the text area below the virtual agent. We used this shortcoming of the Dutch 
version to investigate the added value of speech in this application. 
Each time the user selected an answer from the drop-down box, the virtual agent changed 
its emotional state depending on the calculated values of the emotions, as described in 
Section 5.2.1. Each answer has a score, as described in Section 5.2, and during the 
questionnaire these scores are accumulated to calculate the final score. When the user 
presses the submit button, it proceeds towards the next page, where the virtual agent gives 
feedback about the final score of the user on the questionnaire, showing an appropriate facial 
expression. When the final score was below 16, the virtual agent indicates that the user is 
less depressed as average and shows a facial expression with a low level of sadness and a 
medium level of happiness. When the user scores between 16-41, the virtual agent indicates 
that the user scores average on feelings of depression and shows a facial expression with a 
medium level of sadness and a low level of happiness. When the user scores above 41, the 
virtual agent indicates that the user scores high on feelings of depression and shows a facial 
expression with a high level of sadness and a low level of happiness. If the user responded 
that he or she considers committing suicide, the agent stringently advises the user to contact 
his or her general practitioner. 
After receiving the feedback, the user clicks a button to proceed to the next page, which 
contains the evaluation form. This page consists of 5 questions about the virtual agent, such 
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as whether the user prefers performing the BDI questionnaire with or without the virtual agent. 
The virtual agent itself is not shown on this page, to prevent the user from giving socially 
desirable answers towards the agent. 
 
5.3.   Experiment 
 
We have performed a pilot experiment to test whether the virtual agent has added value for 
this application. 
 
5.3.1. Participants 
	  
The participants were recruited by sending an e-mail with an invitation to participate in the 
experiment. The participants could choose between a Dutch and an English version of the 
questionnaire. 28 participants completed the experiment, of which 16 the English, and 12 the 
Dutch version. 
 
5.3.2. Procedure 
	  
First the participants entered some demographical information in a web-form, without the 
virtual agent. Next the application with the virtual agent was loaded, and the participants 
performed the BDI questionnaire. When the questionnaire was finished, the participants 
received feedback from the virtual agent about their result. In the English version, the 
question was shown in a text area below the agent, and the agent additionally asked the 
questions to the participants using speech. In the Dutch version however, the virtual agent 
could not speak, and the text was only shown in the text area below the agent. Finally, the 
participants filled in an evaluation questionnaire, without the virtual agent present to prevent 
socially desirable answers towards the agent. The complete procedure can still be performed 
at the online appendix. 
 
5.3.3. Results 
	  
The participants evaluated on an eight-point scale whether they thought the virtual agent was 
friendly, interested, trustworthy and kind. In both the English and the Dutch version, for all 
properties, the participants scored the agent just above moderate, as can be seen in Table 
5.1. No statistical differences were found between the English version with voice, and the 
Dutch version without voice. 
Further, the participants answered the question “If you were to administer the same 
questionnaire, would you rather do this with or without virtual interviewer?” on the evaluation 
form. For the English version, with speech, 81% of the participants preferred to perform the 
questionnaire with the virtual agent (sign test, p = .021). However, for the Dutch version, 
without speech, only 64% of the participants preferred to fill in the questionnaire with the 
virtual agent (sign test, p = .55).  
 
Table 5.1: The score of the virtual agent on several properties on an eight-point scale. 
 English Dutch 
 M SD M SD 
Friendly 4.75 1.98 4.91 1.30 
Interested 4.50 2.13 4.00 1.95 
Trustworthy 4.31 1.66 4.27 1.56 
Kind 4.75 1.69 4.55 1.44 
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The participants were asked to explain their answer in an open question. On this question 
people gave various responses, but a response that came back several times was that with 
the virtual agent, it “feels more personal” and that it “feels friendlier”. Participants also 
indicated that it was more fun to perform the questionnaire with the virtual agent. This 
indicates that the virtual agent makes it more attractive and entertaining to perform the 
questionnaire, and adding the virtual agent to a self-help application might decrease drop-out 
of the self-help therapy.  
Participants that preferred to perform the questionnaire without a virtual agent gave as 
reasons for this that the agent was still too “cold and computer-like”, and with the Dutch 
version, without speech, that the agent did not have any added value. The responses on the 
open question “How do you think the virtual interviewer should be improved?” indicated that 
there is still a lot of work to do. In the Dutch version, a lot of participants responded that the 
agent should speak, while in the English version many participants responded that the voice 
of the agent should be friendlier. In both versions many participants responded the agent 
should give feedback on each answered question.  
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
This study presents a virtual agent that guides the user through a questionnaire about 
depression. The agent responds empathically to the answers given by the user, by changing 
its facial expression. 
A pilot experiment has been performed to test the applicability of a virtual agent in this 
application. Due to time limitations, the way of recruitment of the participants was not ideal, 
and the participants are probably not a very good representation of the target group of online 
self-help applications. When the application has been improved, an extensive validation will 
need to be performed before it can be used in practice. However, the experiment has led to 
some interesting results that can be used to determine a direction for further research. 
In both the English version, with speech, and the Dutch version, without speech, the 
participants found the agent moderately friendly, interested, trustworthy and kind. Further, 
although there were not many participants, an interesting statistical significant result was 
found. For the English version, the amount of participants who preferred to perform the 
questionnaire with the virtual agent was significantly bigger than the amount of participants 
who preferred to perform the questionnaire without the virtual agent. For the Dutch version 
also more participants preferred to perform the questionnaire with the agent than without, but 
this result was not significant. However, none of the participants appeared to actually be 
depressed, and the agent thus will not have shown much obvious empathic expressive 
behaviour. In the Dutch version of the application, without speech, this means the participants 
just saw a rather passive face above the questions. Given this information, and that there 
were only 12 participants, it is not very surprising that the for the Dutch questionnaire, the 
amount of participants that preferred performing the questionnaire with the agent was not 
significantly bigger than the amount of participants that preferred performing the questionnaire 
without the agent. 
Taking into account many improvements can still be made to the application, the results 
described above are very promising, and motivate further research in this direction. The 
response of a participant that he did not feel shy of the virtual interviewer as he would with a 
real one further indicates nicely the use of this kind of applications. For people who feel 
uncomfortable with undergoing face-to-face therapy and therefore choose not to seek help, 
an application like this can be a nice solution. 
As also indicated by the responses in the experiment, many improvements can still be 
made to the application. As pointed out by many participants in the open questions, the agent 
should provide appropriate feedback after each answer on a question. This should increase 
the humanness of the agent, enhancing the feelings of a personal, realistic experience during 
the questionnaire.  
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Another possible point of improvement is the voice of the agent. The fact that with the Dutch 
version, without speech, the amount of participants that preferred to perform the 
questionnaire with the virtual agent was not significantly bigger than the amount of 
participants that preferred to perform the questionnaire without the virtual agent indicates that 
this is an important issue. Moreover, in the open questions, many participants gave 
responses that indicated that speech should be added (in the Dutch version) or improved (in 
the English version). Since the application should ultimately also be available for Dutch 
speaking users, possibilities for adding Dutch speech synthesis including lip-syncing should 
seriously be considered. Also possibilities to create a friendlier voice that is able to show 
emotions should be considered. 
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Chapter 6: A robot’s experience of another 
robot: simulation9 
 
Abstract 
 
To develop a robot that is able to recognize and show affective behavior, it should be able to 
regulate simultaneously occurring tendencies of positive and negative emotions. To achieve 
this, the current paper introduces a computational model for involvement-distance trade-offs, 
based on an existing theoretical model. The main mechanisms of this model have been 
represented as regression equations, using the LEADSTO modeling environment. A number 
of simulation experiments have been performed, which indicated that the model is adequate 
for simulating the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on 
satisfaction. More specifically, the experiments confirmed the empirical finding that positive 
features do not exclusively increase involvement.  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
We are a research group on a mission. Our aim is to model aspects of emotion regulation and 
involvement-distance trade-offs to build a robot that can contribute to the wellbeing of patients 
in need of psychological support. Once the software is capable of simulating emotion-
regulating mechanisms and, where appropriate, can trade involvement for distance (or vice 
versa), we will develop a prototype virtual therapist that is tested against real patients. This 
therapist should be capable of recognizing emotional behavior and should respond to that in 
an emotionally appropriate way. People often find it hard to admit that they are in need of 
therapy or coaching. Experimenting with a virtual therapist as a support tool for self-diagnosis 
may help to overcome that barrier more easily. 
However, as luring as this far horizon may be, there is quite some groundwork to be done 
first and this paper is addressing some of the modeling issues involved. In a counterpart 
paper in this volume (Hoorn, 2008), we dealt with theoretical matters of humans perceiving a 
virtual other and the way to formalize this (i.e. fuzzy sets). The idea was that the empirically 
validated models of human encounters with agents (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2007) and models 
of emotion regulation (e.g., Gross, 1998; 2001; Marsella and Gratch, 2003) could be 
integrated and used to do the reverse, have a robot determine its level of engagement with its 
user and have it choose the appropriate affective response to it. 
There are two things we want to do in this paper, leaving aside many of the other important 
issues (Hoorn, 2008). First, we want to test the formula of Werners (1988) to see whether it 
represents the trade-off well between involvement (the robot becomes friendly with its user) 
and distance (the robot stays aloof). This involvement-distance trade-off is the fundamental 
mechanism in user encounters with agents (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2007), film characters 
(Konijn and Hoorn, 2005), and photographs of people (Konijn and Bushman, 2007). Although 
one would expect the notions of “involved” (i.e., the tendency to be friendly) and “at a 
distance” (i.e., the tendency to stay aloof) to be part of one and the same continuum, the 
above studies have pointed out that their interplay is in reality more subtle. For example, 
humans can at the same time find another person attractive but morally repulsive, useful to 
achieve certain goals but distasteful in his or her manners (e.g., Konijn and Hoorn, 2005). We 
want to see whether Werners’ fuzzy trade-off works well enough to implement this 
mechanism in our prototype “emobot” (cf. Hooley et al., 2004).  
                                                           
9 This chapter has previously been published as Bosse, T., Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. 
(2008). A Robot’s Experience of Another Robot: Simulation. In: Sloutsky, V., Love, B.C., and McRae, K. 
(eds.), Proceedings of the 30th International Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 
CogSci'08, pp. 2498-2503. 
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Second, we want to show that we can simulate the way perceptual and experiential factors 
feed into the involvement-distance trade-off. A number of factors help establish the 
involvement-distance trade-off. For the body of empirical work that sustains this view, see 
Hoorn (2008). The ethics of the user, for example, whether the user is of good or bad intent 
(take care of or kill the robot) directly affects how the trade-off develops. Another important 
factor is the affordances a user offers as an aid or obstacle for task performance. A user that 
performs a simple task causes less trouble for the machinery of the robot than a demanding 
user does. Additional factors are the aesthetics of the user (beautiful or ugly), epistemics or 
realism (realistic or unrealistic), and similarity (user resembles robot or not). The upshot is 
that not anything positive leads to involvement but can increase distance as well (Van Vugt, 
Hoorn et al., 2006; Van Vugt, Konijn et al., 2006). This has to do with the goals of the robot. If 
it admires the skills of a user but if those same skills mean it is going to be dumped soon, 
being skilled raises involvement - but for different reasons - distance as well. This 
redistribution of information runs via the factors of relevance (whether user is important to 
achieve robot goals such as being needed or timely maintenance), and valence (the expected 
positive or negative results of interacting with the user). For an overview of the complete 
model, see (Van Vugt, Hoorn et al., 2006), Figure 1.  
The involvement-distance trade-off that is fed by all these factors is used for affective 
response selection (see Hoorn, 2008). This is the process of (qualitatively) evaluating the 
emotional significance of events, see (Gratch, 2000; Marsella and Gratch, 2003). In this 
paper, we focus explicitly on events related to what Gross (2001) calls situation selection, i.e. 
selecting situations that bring the robot in a more desirable state. Examples are walking away 
from a person the robot feels uncomfortable with and looking for another conversation 
partner. Thus, in our model the term satisfaction indicates the level of appreciation that a 
robot attaches to a certain situation it is in. If this level of current satisfaction is too low, the 
robot may want to select another situation based on the expected satisfaction in the future 
situation. 
    To account for the trade-off between conflicting options (e.g., ‘involvement’ vs. ‘distance’) 
that influence the level of satisfaction, Werners (1988, p. 297) employs the fuzzy_AND-
operator γ. Following this approach, each feature u in a trade-off has a membership function µ 
in the fuzzy sets of involvement (I) and distance (D), which allows the feature to move 
between the minimum and maximum degree of membership to these sets: 
 
 
µ and (µI (u), µD (u)) =  
γ ⋅ min{µI~ (u), µD (u)} + ((1-γ)(µI (u)+µD (u))/n), 
 
where u ∈ U, γ ∈ [0, 1], and n is the number of fuzzy sets (I and D) for which the mean is 
calculated (in the remainder of this chapter, we only address the simple case of n=2). 
Basically, then, there are two ways to calculate a trade-off, using the (γ ⋅ min) option or the (γ ⋅ 
max):  
 
γ ⋅ max{µI (u), µD (u)} + ((1-γ)(µI (u) + µD (u))/n) 
 
When the robot feels ambivalent about its user (“sympathetic but clumsy”), using either option 
may lead to quite different results for the level of satisfaction. When the mean of involvement 
and distance (the part after (1 - γ) in the formula) is the same, the (γ ⋅ min) version favors 
decision options in which the involvement and distance values are close to each other, i.e., to 
decision options which involve relatively more doubt. The (γ ⋅ max) version favors options in 
which involvement and distance differ more from each other, i.e., options of which the robot 
feels less ambivalent. 
    Our hypothesis (H1), then, explores whether our system can simulate counter-intuitive 
empirical results concerning the influence of features on involvement and distance: 
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H1: Positive features do not necessarily and exclusively increase involvement. Due to the 
redistribution of information via relevance and valence, also distance can be increased. (The 
same mechanism may apply to negative features that partly increase involvement). 
 
6.2. Simulation model 
 
To simulate the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on 
satisfaction, the theoretical model by Hoorn (2008) was taken as a basis and was 
implemented in the LEADSTO modeling environment (Bosse et al., 2007). This environment 
enables the modeler to represent the most elementary steps of a process in terms of direct 
temporal dependencies, and features a dedicated simulation tool. In this section, we describe 
how we represented the basic mechanisms of the model in LEADSTO10. First, a number of 
design decisions had to be made. In particular, we chose to treat what are actually factor 
levels as single features. We then represented the features of different agents (e.g., their 
goodness, realism, or beauty) by real numbers between 0 and 1. In addition, the satisfaction 
an agent had in a particular situation was represented by a real number between 0 and 1. To 
model the impact of (the perception of) the different features on an agent’s satisfaction, Hoorn 
(2008) proposed to use fuzzy set theory. The idea of fuzzy set theory is that features have 
membership functions for various sets, which determine to what degree they are member of 
these sets. Within LEADSTO, this principle can easily be simulated by using regression 
equations, but only to the extent that we used factor levels for features. The process of 
extracting factor levels from features would require a more elaborated model, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 
6.2.1. Domain 
 
Table 6.1: Variable names and meanings. 
Variable Meaning Range 
Perceived(<Feature>, A1, A2) 
Agent1’s perception of a certain 
feature of Agent2 [0, 1] 
Designed(<Feature>, A2) 
Value assigned by ‘the designer’ to a 
certain feature of Agent2 [0, 1] 
Bias(A1, A2, <Feature>) 
Bias that Agent1 has about a certain 
feature of Agent2 [0, 2] 
Skill(A1, <Language>) Skill of Agent1 in a certain language [0, 1] 
ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, language) 
Skill Agent1 expects Agent2 to have 
in a certain language [0, 1] 
βfactor1ßfactor2 
Regression weight factor2 has for 
another factor1 for a certain agent [0, 1] 
γinv-dist 
Variable that is used to calculate the 
involvement-distance trade-off [0, 1] 
Satisfaction(A1, A2) 
Indicates to what extent Agent1 is 
satisfied withAgent2 [0, 1] 
 
 
We created a virtual environment that was inhabited by a number of virtual agents. These 
agents are fans of soccer teams and express this by wearing club clothes of their favorite 
team. When these agents meet, to a certain degree they are involved with and at a distance 
towards each other. These tendencies are based on features of the agents, according to the 
                                                           
10for details about the model, see part A of the appendix 
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formulas described in this section. Table 6.1 shows certain variables that were used in these 
formulas. 
 
6.2.2. Aesthetics 
 
Each agent has a value for ‘designed beautiful/ugly’. This is a value the designer expects to 
raise in the user, or in another agent, based on general principles of aesthetics. This value 
could be seen as the mean ‘score’ an agent receives for its beauty / ugliness from all other 
agents. This designed value has a data-driven influence on how agents perceive the beauty 
of another agent. The variable bias represents the concept-driven influence on how agents 
perceive other agents’ beauty. Depending on its value, a bias may increase or decrease an 
agent’s perception of another agent’s beauty. Note that ‘another agent’ could also be the 
agent itself. This is represented by the following formulas, given in mathematical format.  
 
 
Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Beautiful) * Designed(Beautiful, A2) 
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
 
When two agents meet for the first time, they will assign a perceived value in the range [0, 1] 
to each other’s beauty and ugliness according to the formulas above. Bias in the range [0, 2] 
is multiplied with the designed value for the feature in the range [0, 1]. If agent A1 has a bias 
of 1 for, for instance, the beauty of agent A2, then A1 does not under- or overestimate the 
beauty of A2. If the bias is bigger than 1, then A1 is relatively positive about the beauty of 
agent A2. When the resulting value for the perceived feature is bigger than 1, it is set to 1, to 
prevent the formula from going out of range.  
 
6.2.3. Ethics 
 
In line with soccer tradition, good guys are those who are fan of the club, and bad guys are 
fan of the opponent. Agents recognize good and bad guys by the club clothes they are 
wearing. E. g., if agent A1 is a fan of the soccer club Ajax, and agent A2 wears club clothes of 
Ajax, then A1 will think of A2 as a ‘good guy’, but if A2 wears club clothes of the rival soccer 
club Feyenoord, then A1 will think of A2 as a ‘bad guy’. This is represented by: 
 
 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2) = Satisfaction(A2, Club) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) = 1 – Satisfaction(A2, Club) 
 
 
These formulas say that when two agents meet for the first time, they will perceive a value in 
the range [0, 1] for each other’s goodness and badness. The perceived goodness is exactly 
the same value as the level of satisfaction the agent attaches to the club of which the other 
agent is a fan. The perceived badness is 1 minus the level of satisfaction. If an agent wears 
neutral clothes, the values of good and bad are assigned according to a variable that reflects 
the agents’ perception of neutral clothes (which is 0.3 for both good and bad in the 
simulations in this paper). 
 
6.2.4. Epistemics 
 
The first time agents meet, each agent perceives the epistemics (or realism) of itself and 
other agents, the same way it perceives the aesthetics of itself and other agents: 
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Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Unrealistic) * Designed(Unrealistic, A2) 
 
6.2.5. Affordances 
 
In the simulation model, the languages Urdu, English, and Dutch are used as the affordances 
to have a conversation about soccer. Each agent has a certain skill level for each language. 
Agents perceive each other’s affordances according to the expectations they have about the 
possibilities to communicate with the other agent, according to the following formulas (where 
the sum over all languages is taken):  
 
 
Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) = Σ(ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, language) * Skill(A1, language)) 
Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) = 1 - Σ(ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, language) * Skill(A1, language)) 
 
 
When two agents meet, they assign a value to each other’s affordances (aid and obstacle) in 
the range [0, 1], using the presuppositions they have about the language skills of the other 
agent, which is based on outer appearance. E.g., when Agent A2 has a dark skin, in the 
simulation, Agent A1 will think Agent A2 has good skills in Urdu, average skills in English, and 
bad skills in Dutch. Because of this, the value of aid is calculated by taking the sum of the 
language skills of Agent A1 multiplied by the language skills A1 expects A2 to have. These 
expectations of Agent A1 about the language skills of Agent A2 are normalized, and are 
based on skin color (although politically incorrect, this was convenient for simulation 
purposes). The perceived value for obstacle was 1 minus the calculated value for aid.  
 
6.2.6. Similarity 
 
For an agent to perceive its similarity with another agent, it needs to perceive the features of 
the self. Agents perceive their own features the same way they perceive the aesthetics and 
epistemics of other agents. Only this time, the bias is the bias in self-perception, instead of in 
the perception of another agent. 
 
 
Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) = Bias(A1, A1, Feature) * Designed(Feature, A1) 
 
Similarity is perceived according to the differences between the agent’s perception of its own 
features (good, bad, beautiful, ugly, realistic and unrealistic) and its perception of the features 
of the other agent (where the sum over ranges over these six features): 
 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 1- (Σ(βsim←feature * abs(Perceived(Feature, A1, A2) – Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) )) 
Dissimilarity(A1, A2) =  Σ(βds←feature * abs(Perceived(Feature, A1, A2) – Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) )) 
 
 
To calculate the dissimilarity between two agents, the differences between the perceived 
values for its own features, and those perceived for the other agent are taken. These 
differences are all added, with a certain (regression) weight β.  Similarity is calculated in a 
similar manner, but with different weights, and 1 was subtracted by the sum of all differences. 
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6.2.7. Relevance, valence, involvement and distance 
 
The formulas in this paragraph were designed using generalized linear models (Nelder & 
Wedderburn, 1972;  McCullagh & Nelder, 1983). Hoorn (2008) shows that the calculated 
dependent variable (e.g., relevance) is fed by a number of contributing variables. Each 
contributing variable has a certain main effect on the dependent variable. The size of this 
main effect is represented by a (regression) weight β, the same way as for calculating 
similarity. When two variables interact, the interaction effect on the dependent variable is 
calculated by multiplying the product of the values of these two variables with a certain 
regression weight, which accounts for the interaction effect on the dependent variable. When 
the interaction is over-additive, the weight will be positive, and when it is under-additive, the 
weight will be negative. 
The formula for the calculation of a variable A that is dependent on the variables B, C, and 
D, of which C and D interact, would be: A = βB*B + βC*C + βD*D + βCD*C*D. In this formula, βB, 
βC, and βD are the (regression) weights for the main effect of variables B, C, and D 
respectively, and βCD is the (regression) weight for the interaction effect of C and D. 
Due to space limitations, the formulas for relevance, valence, involvement and distance 
are not given completely, but all the effects on the variables are summarized in Table 6.2. The 
formulas are then constructed using the algorithm described above. For theoretical reasons, 
each variable in Table 6.2 is in the actual formula split up in two unipolar variables (ethics is 
split up into good and bad, valence is split up into positive valence and negative valence, 
engagement is split up into involvement and distance, etc.).  To give an example, the formula 
to calculate relevance looks as follows. In this formula ‘Perceived’ has been replaced by ‘Perc’ 
for clarity. 
 
 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
βrel←good * Perc(Good, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bea * Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
βrel←ugly * Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
βrel←real * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
βrel←unr * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
βrel←aid * Perc(Aid,. A1, A2) +  
βrel←obst * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-aid * Perc(Good, A1, A2) * Perc(Aid, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-obst * Perc(Good, A1, A2) * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-obst * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-aid * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) * Perc(Aid, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-bea-real * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-bea-unr * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-ugly-real * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←good-ugly-unr * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-bea-real * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-bea-unr * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-ugly-real * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
βrel←bad-ugly-unr * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) 
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Table 6.2: Effects of features on relevance, valence, involvement and distance. 
 
Effects on: Main effects Interaction effects 
Relevance Ethics 
Aesthetics 
Epistemics 
Affordances 
Ethics x Affordances 
Ethics x Aesthetics x Epistemics 
Valence Ethics 
Aesthetics 
Epistemics 
Affordances 
Ethics x Affordances 
Ethics x Aesthetics x Epistemics 
Engagement Similarity 
Relevance 
Valence 
Relevance x Valence 
 
 
6.2.8. Satisfaction 
  
Within our model, satisfaction is a certain appreciation the agents attach to the possible 
decisions they can make (about situation selection). They use their expected satisfaction with 
each option, to decide which option ‘feels’ best for them. Satisfaction is calculated by a trade-
off between involvement and distance: 
 
Satisfaction(A1, A2) =  
  γinv-dist * max(Involvement(A1, A2), Distance(A1, A2)) +  
  (1 - γinv-dist) * ((Involvement(A1, A2), Distance(A1, A2)) / n) 
 
When there is relatively more involvement, this will lead to a relatively more positive type of 
approach towards the other agent. Note that a lot of distance also can lead to a high 
satisfaction, reflecting a desire for a negative approach (“Beat up the soccer opponent”). 
The trade-off is calculated using a variant of the fuzzy_AND-operator γ (Werners, 1988; 
Zimmermann, 1994). In the simulation experiments, two variants of this formula tested H1. In 
the min version, a part γ was taken of the minimum of involvement and distance, and a part (1 
- γ) was taken of the mean of involvement and distance, as originally proposed by Werners. In 
the max version, instead of a part γ of the minimum, a part γ of the maximum of involvement 
and distance was taken. In this paper, the value for γ is always set to 0.5. 
 
6.3. Simulation results 
 
To test our hypothesis, the simulation model introduced in the previous section was used to 
perform a number of experiments under different parameter settings. In each experiment, 
three agents were involved, named Harry, Barry, and Gary. The results of these experiments 
are described below. Due to space limitations, not all parameter settings are shown in this 
paper11.  
 
Baseline condition 
To start, an initial experiment was performed, to test whether the model behaves as expected, 
and as a control condition for the remaining experiments. In this condition, all the agents had 
a white skin, and wore Ajax clothes. For the chosen regression weights, see part B of the 
appendix (to give one example, βpv←good = 0.3, which means the regression weight of good on 
                                                           
11 For a detailed description of parameter settings, see appendix of chapter 6, part B. 
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positive valence is 0.3). Because all language skills for each agent were set to 0, which 
means they had no language skills at all, they expected not to be able to communicate with 
each other, which resulted in assigning 1 to obstacle, and 0 to aid for each other. With the 
formula for calculating good and bad, ‘good = 1’ implies ‘bad = 0.’ For this reason, the 
appraisal the agents attached to Ajax were all set to 0.5, which resulted in all agents 
assigning 0.5 to each other’s goodness, as well as their badness. The satisfaction of each 
agent with Feyenoord and all Designed(<Feature>) parameters for the agents were set to 0. All 
bias parameters were set to the neutral value of 1 for each agent. For all agents these 
parameter settings led to an involvement of 0.11, a distance of 0.25, and a level of 
satisfaction with each other of 0.21. These values are identical, because all agents are 
identical. This situation functions as a baseline for the following experiments. 
Next, in order to test whether our system could simulate counter-intuitive empirical results 
(H1) concerning the influence of features on involvement and distance, we experimented with 
changing the values of aesthetics and epistemics, see Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Experiment 1: Aesthetics – beautiful vs. ugly  
In this experiment, the parameter settings were the same as in the baseline condition, except 
that in this experiment, Barry was beautiful (beautiful = 1), and Gary was ugly (ugly = 1). 
Because of this, Harry’s involvement towards Barry (0.11→0.18) increased. Surprisingly, also 
his distance towards Barry (0.25→0.31) increased. Moreover, both Harry’s involvement 
(0.11→0.14) and distance (0.25→0.37) towards Gary increased as well. It is clear that 
increasing the value for beautiful adds relatively more to involvement, and increasing the 
value for ugly adds relatively more to distance. As beautiful is a positive feature, which would 
intuitively be expected to only increase involvement, and ugly is a negative feature, which 
would intuitively be expected to only increase distance, this corresponds with H1.  
 
Experiment 2: Epistemics – realistic vs. unrealistic 
In this experiment, the parameter settings were the same as in the baseline condition, except 
that in this experiment, Barry was realistic (realistic = 1), and Gary was unrealistic (unrealistic 
= 1). Because of this, Harry’s involvement towards Barry (0.11→0.14) increased. Surprisingly, 
also his distance towards Barry (0.25→0.30) increased. Moreover, both Harry’s involvement 
(0.11→0.14) and distance (0.25→0.31) towards Gary increased as well. As a result of the 
chosen regression weights, these effects were much smaller than the effects of adding 
beautiful and ugly. Adding to realistic adds relatively more to involvement, and adding 
unrealistic adds relatively more to distance, although this is much less clear than the 
difference between adding beautiful and ugly. Because realistic is a positive feature, which 
traditionally is expected to only increase involvement, and unrealistic is a negative feature, 
which in conventional theories would only increase distance, this result confirms H1. 
 
Additional experiments 
In addition to the above experiments, we experimented with changing the values of ethics and 
affordances. However, within these formulas, ‘good = 1’ implies ‘bad = 0’, and ‘aid = 1’ implies 
‘obstacle = 0’, and vice versa. Because of this, experimenting with these variables was not 
suitable for testing H1, since it would never be clear whether the changes in involvement and 
distance are caused by the increase in good, or by the decrease of bad, etc. Nevertheless, a 
number of experiments were performed with these variables, which confirmed that the 
behavior of that part of the model globally corresponds to the theoretical model (Hoorn, 
2008)12. 
  
                                                           
12 See appendix of chapter 6, part C. 
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6.4. Discussion 
 
In this paper, the theoretical model for involvement-distance trade-offs by (Hoorn 2008) has 
been translated into a simulation model in the LEADSTO language. Two main results were 
established. First, the model turned out to be adequate for simulating the dynamics of 
involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on satisfaction. To model the trade-offs, 
the (γ × max) version of Werners’ (1998) fuzzy_AND operator seemed to provide more 
plausible results than the (γ × min) version, since in ambiguous cases (where an agent 
experiences a more or less equal amount of involvement and distance simultaneously), it 
results in a relatively lower value for satisfaction than the (γ × min) version. This is explained 
by the fact that the (γ × max) version favors options in which involvement and distance differ 
much from each other. For example, it favors situations with I=0.2 and D=0.8 over situations 
with I=D=0.5), whereas for the (γ × min) version this is the other way around. Second, and 
perhaps more surprisingly, it was found that positive features can increase the level of 
distance, and that negative features can increase involvement. This is explained by the fact 
that the factor levels do not directly influence involvement and distance, but only indirectly via 
the factors of similarity, relevance and valence. Although this finding may be counterintuitive, 
it corresponds to empirical evidence by (e.g., Van Vugt, Hoorn et al., 2006; Van Vugt, Konijn 
et al., 2006).  
As mentioned above, our model was able to exhibit an increase in distance when the only 
change to the inputs of the model was an increase in a "positive" parameter. This success 
may seem arguable because the model is so complicated that almost any result is "possible." 
It might have been wiser to identify the simplest model that could exhibit this behavior, so as 
to identify the necessary/sufficient components that explain this phenomenon. 
However true as this may seem theoretically, from an empirical point of view the model's 
complexity is warranted by years of experimentation (e.g., Konijn & Hoorn, 2005; Van Vugt et 
al., 2007). More important than complexity yet is the fact that the model excludes phenomena 
as well. Based on empirical evidence (ibid.), the model asserts that no more than 10 factors 
are needed to describe the full of human-robot interaction. These studies (ibid.) also show 
that realism is subordinate to ethical considerations, that no effects are established but 
through the mediation of relevance and valence, etc. 
Yet, however nicely these empirical data were established, the theory as such still suffered 
from internal inconsistencies and logical blind spots. This is exactly what we repaired in the 
current paper. As such, simulations cannot count as a test on ecological validity but we did 
show that we can simulate empirical results in a logically consistent way. In other words, 
model verification led to theory improvement. 
To do so, we had to create a large number of different bias parameters that were set 
individually and parameters for setting the other individual characteristics, again underscoring 
the presumed over-complexity of the model. For one thing, the values of these parameters 
need to be settled empirically and because we could not do so right away, we set them to 
zero and one - to neutral that is - thereby reducing complexity again. But what we do have 
now, by making explicit hidden assumptions and creating internal consistency, is a framework 
to simulate the more complex affective behaviors and have a solid theoretical basis to do 
further empirical testing. 
In future research, the model will be used to test other, more refined hypotheses. For 
example, it may be explored whether the use of bipolar variables instead of two unipolar 
variables (e.g., ethics instead of good and bad) provides different results. In addition, the 
process of extracting factor levels from features may be modeled in more detail, possibly 
taking more explicit goals of the robot into account. Another direction for future work is to 
combine the model with an existing computational model for emotion regulation (Bosse, 
Pontier, and Treur, 2007). Whereas the current model focuses on the elicitation of emotion, 
that model addresses the regulation of emotion. We expect that both models will smoothly fit 
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together, since the satisfaction that is generated as output of the involvement-distance trade-
off can almost directly be used as input to affective situation selection. In that case, current 
satisfaction is checked for a certain threshold and if it is too low, the robot will evaluate its 
expected satisfaction in alternative situations. Finally, in a later stage of the project, the model 
will be validated against empirical data of human affective trade-off processes. As soon as the 
model has been validated positively, we will start exploring the possibilities to apply it to real 
humans instead of agents, i.e., to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with 
humans. 
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Chapter 7: When the user is instrumental to 
robot goals13 
 
Abstract 
 
To create a robot with a mind of its own, we extended a formalized version of a model that 
explains human-robot interaction with mechanisms for goal-directed behavior. By running 
simulation experiments, we found that robots could perceive affordances in other agents to 
achieve their goals and suppress rational decisions in favor of affective decisions, given 
baseline involvement or distancing tendencies. Limitations are that models of situation 
selection are still wanted and empirical validation is needed. However, our good-bad 
balancing approach explains more complex phenomena in (affective) decision making than 
hedonic-bias models do. 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
 
Recently, much research has been dedicated to developing Intelligent Virtual Agents (IVAs) 
with more realistic graphical representations. However, these agents often do not show very 
realistic human-like emotional behavior. For example, many IVAs can show emotions by the 
means of facial expressions or the tone in their voice, but most of them still struggle to show 
the right emotions at the right moment (e.g., emotion regulation (Marsella & Gratch, 2003), 
stress and workload (Endsley, 1995), and moods (Beck, 1987)). Let alone actually 
understanding and reacting empathically to the emotional state of other agents, or human 
users. Since a requirement of virtual agents is to closely mimic human affective behavior, this 
is a problem that should be solved. Previous research has shown that closely mimicking 
humans is important for an agent to increase human involvement in a virtual environment 
(e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2006). Existing systems based on IVAs typically lack abilities to show 
emotions (not only by means of facial expressions, but also by behavior), and to interpret 
those of others. This means that existing systems based on IVAs can be made more 
effective.   
An important view from emotion psychology is that emotions are goal-driven. The 
emotional system scans the environment for relevant stimuli that are either potentially beneficial 
or harmful for the concerns, motives, and goals of the individual (p. 494, and p. 463). 
In the robot world, the user can be seen as a personal friend as well as a means to an end 
(Hoorn, 1998). With regard to being a personal friend, the Interactive model of Perceiving and 
Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-PEFiC) serves as a starting point (Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
Within this framework, the robot can calculate a trade-off between what involves the robot 
with the user (e.g., user is skilled) and what keeps the robot at a distance (e.g., user mistreats 
my hardware) (Bosse et al., 2008). In addition, use intentions are calculated that prompt the 
robot to undertake action in favor or against the user (ibid.)  
These actions are based on robot goals, which play a role in the judgment formation of the 
robot about its user. There are eight (23) possible types of judgments a robot can have about 
how the features of a user afford the achievement of different robot goals or not (Table 1) (cf. 
Hoorn et al., 2007). A judgment consists of an ontological statement about the user plus a 
measure of agreement. Each constituent in the judgment evokes a positive (p) or negative (n) 
covert response. During the weighing, mixed emotions occur, which is a somewhat confusing 
experience. That is why 1) (Table 1) is the preferred mode of conversation and the easiest 
                                                           
13 This chapter has previously been published as Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2008). 
When the user is instrument to robot goals. In: Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE/WIC/ACM International 
Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'08, 2008, pp. 296-301. 
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statement to respond to. Because affordances have predictive power for user engagement 
(Van Vugt et al., 2006), all the n-responses that occur during weighing feed into distance; all 
the p-responses into involvement. The action tendencies that are connected to positive or 
negative valence (Frijda, 1987, p. 207) will feed into the intentions to ‘make use’ of the user 
and above threshold, the robot shows overt behavior (e.g., to converse with the user, kick, 
hug). 
We came to the following general hypothesis, which depends on the eight possibilities 
tabulated in Table 7.1 for its outcome. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Robot judgments on user as means to an end, resulting in valencies that 
precede action tendencies 
Judgment Means Affords Goal Agreement1 Weighing Valence3 
Agree            p p = (p · p) · p = (p) · p = p 1) Skilled user p 
facilitates 
p 
Robot 
efficiency p Disagree2   n p = (p · p) · n = (p) · n = n 
Agree            p p = (n · p) · p = (n) · p = n 2) Skilled user p inhibits 
n Robot 
efficiency p Disagree     n p = (n · p) · n = (n) · n = p 
Agree            p p = (p · n) · p = (n) · p = n 3) Skilled user p 
facilitates 
p 
Robot 
inefficiency n Disagree     n p = (p · n) · n = (n) · n = p 
Agree            p p = (n · n) · p = (p) · p = p 4) Skilled user p inhibits 
n Robot 
inefficiency n Disagree     n p = (n · n) · n = (p) · n = n 
Agree            p n = (p · p) · p = (p) · p = p 5) Unskilled user n 
facilitates 
p 
Robot 
efficiency p Disagree     n n = (p · p) · n = (p) · n = n 
Agree            p n = (n · p) · p = (n) · p = n 6) Unskilled user n inhibits 
n Robot 
efficiency p Disagree     n n = (n · p) · n = (n) · n = p 
Agree            p n = (p · n) · p = (n) · p = n 7) Unskilled user n 
facilitates 
p 
Robot 
inefficiency n Disagree     n n = (p · n) · n = (n) · n = p 
Agree            p n = (n · n) · p = (p) · p = p 8) Unskilled user n inhibits 
n Robot 
inefficiency n Disagree     n n = (n · n) · n = (p) · n = n 
1 Attribution of truth according to robot’s world view or ‘belief system’ 
2 Gray cells indicate an unconventional, counter-intuitive, belief system that urges to adapt conventional theory 
3 If valence is positive, an action tendency to approach the means (here, the user) occurs. If valence is negative, 
depending on situation, context, or personality, an action tendency to avoid, attack, remove, or change the means 
occurs (e.g., the robot starts educating the user) 
 
 
H1: Features of a user or other agent are means to afford robot goals, and through weighing 
lead to a measure of valence toward that means, propelling action tendencies to approach, 
avoid, attack, change, or do nothing with the means. 
 
We will test this hypothesis by performing simulation experiments on the formalized model, 
under various parameter settings. 
 
 
7.2.  Implementation 
 
I-PEFiC is a model (Figure 7.1) that is empirically well validated (Van Vugt et al., 2009). In the 
formalization of the I-PEFiC model (Bosse et al., 2008), the robot bases its involvement-
distance trade-off towards the user or other agents on ethics, aesthetics, affordances, realism 
and similarity. The value for affordances was based on the expected possibilities to 
communicate with another agent. This is a simplification, as perceived affordances should 
always relate to goals (Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
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Figure 7.1: Graphical Representation of I-PEFiC 
 
In this paper, the formalized I-PEFiC model (Bosse et al., 2008) is extended with goal-
directed, rational behavior, and implemented in the LEADSTO modeling environment (Bosse 
et al., 2009). The model in this paper, however, bases the affordances and their effects on 
use intentions, involvement, and distance on the goals of the robot, and how the affordances 
of the agent that are perceived by the robot relate to those goals. Further, we somewhat 
modified the formalization, so that it better fits the I-PEFiC model as described in (Van Vugt et 
al., 2009). Space limits a full description of the formalization, therefore see the appendix of 
Chapter 7. 
To relate affordances to goals, the robot has goals it wants to achieve: desired goals. For 
example, a robot wants maintenance, power supply, and a knowledge base. The robot also 
has goals it wants to avoid: undesired goals. For example, a robot does not want to hurt its 
owner nor does it want to be destroyed. 
The goals of the robot have a certain value for valence [-1, 1] and relevance [0, 1]. If a goal 
is desired, it will have a positive valence. If a goal is undesired, it will have a negative valence. 
If one goal is more relevant for the robot than another, the relevance of that one goal is 
higher. By multiplying valence with relevance, the level of ambition for a goal is calculated. 
Within the system, robots perceive that agents, users, or other things have features. These 
features can afford a robot to perform a certain action, which affects achieving a certain goal. 
In other words, these features are means to an end (Table 7.1).  
In the system, robots perceive the affordances of each other, and of other things. These 
perceived affordances are not necessarily the same as the affordances meant by the 
designer. For instance, the designer can design a chair to sit on (designed affordances), but 
an agent could also use this chair to beat up another agent (perceived affordances). 
The robots in the system can compare their perceived affordances of other agents or 
things to the goals they want to achieve or avoid. While doing this, they can reason about the 
outcome expectancies of using the other agents for a certain action (e.g., speech acts, 
kicking, or hugging). For example, if a robot has the desired goal to go inside a house, it could 
believe that the action to open the door of that house could be an action that facilitates this 
goal. 
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In humans, such outcome expectancies lead to certain quick and mostly subconsciously 
generated action tendencies. In our robots, action tendencies influence the experienced 
involvement and distance towards the other agent. The four possible action tendencies to 
perform towards another agent in our system are:  
(1) Positive approach (e.g., to hug)  
(2) Negative approach (e.g., to attack) 
(3) Change (e.g., to teach; mix of positive / negative approach) 
(4) Avoidance 
 
7.2.1. Calculating expected utilities 
 
In the system, the robots can perform actions to reach their goals. The system contains a 
library of goals, and each robot has a level of ambition for each goal. There are goals the 
robot wants to reach, and goals that the robot wants to avoid, all with several levels of 
importance. The levels of ambition the robot attaches to the goals are represented by a real 
value between [-1, 1], where a negative value means that the goal is undesired and a positive 
value means that the goal is desired. A bigger value means the goal is more important for the 
robot. 
The robots can perform actions to reach their goals. The system contains a library of 
actions from which the robots can choose. The robot has a belief about each action that it will 
inhibit or facilitate a certain goal. Its estimation of the facilitation of the goal by the action is 
represented by a real value between [-1, 1], -1 being full inhibition, 1 being full facilitation. The 
following formulas are used to calculate the expected utilities of actions. 
 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal) = Belief(facilitates(Action, Agent, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent) = Σ(ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal)) 
 
 
Given the level of ambition for a goal and the believed facilitation of a goal by an action 
towards another agent, the robot calculates the expected utility of performing that action 
towards that agent regarding that goal by multiplying the believed facilitation of the goal with 
the level of ambition for the goal.  
Because an action usually affects several goals that might be conflicting, the ‘general’ 
expected utility of performing a certain action towards an agent is calculated by summing all 
expected utilities regarding all goals in the system that are related to the action. 
Because a robot usually performs only one action at a time with respect to another agent, 
the use intentions of the robot are calculated by taking the maximum expected utility of all 
actions the robot can perform to the agent. Agents that facilitate desired or inhibit undesired 
goals raise positive use intentions with the robots, while agents that facilitate undesired or 
inhibit desired goals will raise negative use intentions. 
 
 
UseIntentions(Robot,Agent)=max(ExpectedUtility(Robot,Action,Agent)) 
 
 
7.2.2. Effects on involvement and distance 
 
In the action library, the type of each action is specified. Actions can be specified as (1) 
Positive approach, (2) Negative approach, (3) Change, or (4) Avoid.  
The heuristic to calculate the expected utilities of actions, as described in the previous 
paragraphs, is also used to generate action tendencies. So if an agent has a high expected 
utility for a certain action, it will also generate a strong action tendency for that specific action.  
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ActionTendency(Action, Agent)  = ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent) 
 
The generated action tendencies are used to calculate the effect of the affordances of an 
agent on the robot’s involvement with and distance towards that agent. To calculate this 
effect, a weighed sum of all the action tendencies is taken, as can be seen in the formulas 
below. In these formulas, the b’s represent the weights of the action tendencies on 
involvement and distance. 
 
 
Effect of Affordances on Involvement =  
βi←na*ATneg_appr + βi←pa*ATpos_appr + βi←ch*ATchange + βi←av*ATavoid 
 
Effect of Affordances on Distance =  
βd←na*ATneg_appr + βd←pa*ATpos_appr + βd←ch*ATchange + βd←av*ATavoid 
 
 
Table 7.2: Weights of action tendencies on robot’s involvement and distance 
Weight Value Weight Value 
βi←pa 0.75 βd←pa -0.75 
βi←na 0.25 βd←na 0.75 
βi←ch 0.50 βd←ch 0.50 
βi←av -0.50 βd←av 0.50 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.2, the generated action tendencies classified as negative approach 
increase the robot’s involvement a little and increase distance a lot. If the robot feels the 
tendency to negatively approach the user or another agent, this will slightly increase its 
involvement with that agent, as involvement represents a tendency to approach [van Vugt, 
2008], but simultaneously will increase its distance toward the user or agent, as negative 
approach implies quite some distance. The generated action tendencies classified as 
“positive approach” increase involvement and decrease distance. The generated action 
tendencies classified as “change” increase involvement as well as distance. Finally, the 
generated action tendencies classified as “avoid” decrease involvement and increase 
distance. The effects of affordances on involvement and distance are computed as can be 
found in [17]. 
 
7.2.3. Making a decision 
 
All possible actions in the system are related to other agents. In the decision process, the 
robot first selects an agent to perform the action on. To do this, for all possible agents it 
meets, the robot calculates the expected satisfaction (Figure 7.1) of interacting with that 
agent, using the following formulas: 
 
 
Involvement-Distance-Tradeoff = γ*max(I, D) + (1-γ)*(I+D)/2 
Expected_Satisfaction(Robot, Agent) = βes←idt * IDT + βes←ui * UI 
 
 
The expected satisfaction is calculated by trading involvement (I) for distance (D) as 
described in (Bosse et al., 2008), and taking a weighed mean of the involvement-distance 
tradeoff (IDT) and the use intentions (UI). In this paper, the weight of the involvement-
distance-tradeoff for expected satisfaction is taken as 0.8 and the weight of use intentions for 
 96 
expected satisfaction is taken as 0.2, which is arbitrary and needs future empirical validation. 
Thus, the robot bases its choice which agent to interact with on the rationally generated use 
intentions, as well as on the more affectively generated trade-off between involvement and 
distance. The robot approaches the agent that promises the highest expected satisfaction 
during interaction.  
Once the robot has selected an agent to interact with, it decides which action to take. For 
each possible action, it calculates the expected satisfaction, according to the following 
formulas: 
 
 
Expected Satisfaction Positive Approach =  
βespa←i * I + βespa←d * (1-D) + βespa←eu *  EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Negative Approach =  
βesna←i * (1-I) + βesna←d * D + βesna←eu * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Change =  
βesch←i * I + βesch←d * D + βesch←eu * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Avoid =  
βesav←i * (1-I) + βesav←d * D + βesav←eu * EUact 
 
 
The expected satisfaction of doing a specific action with a certain agent is calculated by 
taking a weighed sum of the robot’s involvement and distance, and the expected utility of the 
particular action. In the paper, these weights are taken as can be seen in Table 7.3, but they 
can differ per robot, according to its ‘personality’. A robot might have a high threshold for 
negative approach, while another robot easily approaches other agents negatively. If the 
robot has a high level of involvement with and a low level of distance towards an agent, it will 
approach the agent positively. If the agent has a low level of involvement and a high level of 
distance, it approaches the agent negatively or avoids it. If the agent evokes a high level of 
involvement as well as a considerable level of distance, the robot is most likely to try to 
change the agent, for example, to teach it. The robot will pick the action with the highest 
expected satisfaction and perform it. 
If the effects of the robot’s actions on user or agent are captured and analyzed, this model 
could be used to let robots interact with each other in a meaningful way, based not only on 
rationality, but also on affective tendencies. 
 
Table 7.3: Values for weights of involvement, distance, and expected utility on the expected 
satisfaction of performing a type of action 
Weight Value Weight Value 
βespa←i  0.4 βesch←i  0.4 
βespa←d  0.4 βesch←d  0.3 
βespa←eu  0.2 βesch←eu  0.3 
βesna←i  0.4 βesav←i  0.5 
βesna←d  0.4 βesav←d  0.3 
βesna←eu  0.2 βesav←eu  0.2 
 
 
 
 97 
7.3.  Simulation results 
 
To test our hypothesis H1, the simulation model introduced in the previous section was used 
to perform a number of experiments under different parameter settings. In each experiment, 
three robots (Harry, Barry, and Gary) followed a (fictitious) anger management therapy. In this 
setting, an infinite number of actions can be inserted in the system, but for clarity, for each 
action type we inserted only one instance of an action. The action related with positive 
approach was to comfort the other agent, whereas the action for negative approach was to hit 
the other agent. Criticizing another agent was the action associated with change, and the 
action for avoiding the agent was to simply move away from it. The results of the experiments 
are described below.  
 
Baseline condition.  
To start, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for the 
remaining experiments. In this condition, the designed features for beautiful and ugly 
(aesthetics), good and bad (ethics), and realistic and unrealistic (epistemics) were set to 0 
(see Figure 7.1). All beliefs of the robots about actions facilitating goals as well as the 
ambition levels for those goals were set to 0. As can be seen in Table 7.4, this parameter 
setting led all robots to have a level of involvement of 0.12, and a level of distance 0.1 
towards each other. Because the robots did not have any goals or beliefs about goals, the 
expected utilities of all possible actions were 0, and therefore their use intentions towards 
each other were also 0. Because all robots were exactly the same, and had a very low 
involvement, distance, and use intentions with respect to each other, they all had the same 
low (0.09) expected satisfaction of interacting with each other. The expected satisfaction of 
the actions to perform towards the other robots was 0.39 for fighting, 0.41 for comforting, 0.47 
for avoiding, and 0.08 for criticizing. This resulted in all robots avoiding each other, as they 
had the highest expected satisfaction for performing this action. 
 
 
Table 7.4: Simulation results of the baseline condition 
and the meaning of all abbreviations in the tables in this paper 
 All Other Agents  Meaning of Abbreviations 
A 
l 
l 
A 
g 
e 
n 
t 
s 
I= 0.12  
D =  0.1 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
ES of  PA = 0.41 
ES of NA = 0.39 
ES of CH = 0.08 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Action = avoid 
 I = Involvement 
D = Distance 
UI = Use Intentions 
ES = Expected Satisfaction 
PA = Positive Approach 
NA = Negative Approach 
CH = Change 
AV = Avoid 
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Experiment 1: The effect of having a goal 
In this experiment, the parameter settings are the same as in the baseline condition, except 
that now Harry had a strong ambition for the goal to reduce his anger (level of ambition with 
value = 1) and thought he could do this by fighting with Gary (belief with value=1). Because of 
this, Harry had an expected utility of 1 for fighting Gary, and generated an action tendency of 
1 for this action, which caused Harry to have use intentions of 1 for Gary. The generated 
action tendency to fight Gary had a small increasing effect on his involvement with 
(0.12→0.17) and a bigger increasing effect on his distance (0.1→0.25) towards Gary. Harry’s 
expected satisfaction for fighting Gary increased greatly (0.39→0.63), while there were only 
minor changes in the expected satisfaction of the other possible actions. Although Harry did 
not feel very involved with or at a distance towards Gary, he primarily rationally chose to fight 
Gary to reach his goal of reducing his own anger. Note that in the Table 7.5, Harry only 
calculates expected satisfactions for actions to perform to Gary. This is, because Harry’s 
expected satisfaction of interacting with Gary is higher than that for Barry, and therefore Barry 
is left out of consideration.  
 
 
Table 7.5: Simulation results of Experiment 1 
 Harry Barry Gary 
H 
h
a
r
r
y 
 I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
 
I = 0.17 
D = 0.25 
UI = 1 
ES = 0.38 
EU of fight =1 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.63 
ES CH = 0.14 
ES AV = 0.49 
Action = fight 
B
b
a
r
r
y 
I = 0.12  
D =  0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.41 
ES NA = 0.39 
ES CH = 0.08 
ES AV = 0.47 
Action = avoid 
 I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.41 
ES NA = 0.39 
ES CH = 0.08 
ES AV = 0.47 
Action = avoid 
G
g
a
r
y 
I = 0.12  
D =  0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.41 
ES NA = 0.39 
ES CH = 0.08 
ES AV = 0.47 
Action = avoid 
I = 0.12  
D =  0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0  
ES PA = 0.41 
ES NA = 0.39 
ES CH =0.08 
ES AV = 0.47 
Action = avoid 
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Experiment 2: The effect of being involved 
In this experiment, compared to the baseline, the robot Gary was designed to be a beautiful, 
good, and realistic character (the designed values for these three parameters are set to 1).  
Because of this, the other agents had a much higher involvement with (0.12→0.49), and a 
somewhat lower distance (0.10→0.07) towards Gary. The expected satisfaction of the actions 
for the other agents to perform to Gary were influenced by these changes in involvement and 
distance towards him. It had a facilitating effect on the expected satisfaction of comforting 
Gary (0.41→0.60) and criticizing him (0.08→0.20). It had an inhibiting effect on fighting Gary 
(0.39→0.20) and avoiding him (0.47→0.25). This resulted in Harry and Barry comforting Gary 
instead of avoiding him. 
 
 
Table 7.6: Simulation results of Experiment 2 
 Harry Barry Gary 
H
h
a
r
r
y 
 I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
 
I = 0.49 
D = 0 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.29 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.60 
ES NA = 0.20 
ES CH = 0.20 
ES AV = 0.25 
Action = Comfort 
B
b
a
r
r
y 
I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
 
 
 
I = 0.49 
D = 0. 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.29 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.60 
ES NA = 0.20 
ES CH = 0.20 
ES AV = 0.25 
Action = Comfort 
G
g
a
r
y 
I = 0.07 
D = 015 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
Action = Avoid 
I = 0.07 
D = 0.15 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
Action = Avoid 
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Experiment 3: Having a goal and being involved 
In Experiment 1, Harry wanted to reduce his anger and thought he could do this by releasing 
his anger on Gary and fight him. In experiment 3, however, Gary was designed to be 
beautiful, good, and realistic (the designed values for these three parameters are set to 1), 
which made Harry be very involved (0.17→0.54) with Gary and less distant (0.25→0.15). This 
decreased his expected satisfaction of fighting (0.63→0.44) and avoiding (0.49→0.27) Gary 
and increased his expected satisfaction of comforting (0.37→0.56) and criticizing (0.14→0.26) 
him. 
Because Harry was too involved with Gary and had too little distance to fight him, he chose to 
comfort him instead, although he did not believe this would help him achieve his goals. The 
expected utility for Harry to fight Barry was 1, whereas all other expected utilities were 0, so 
that rationally Harry would choose to fight Barry. However, due to other factors, Harry was 
involved with Barry, which caused him to make an affective decision and comfort Barry. 
 
 
Table 7.7: Simulation results of Experiment 3 
 Harry Barry Gary 
H
h
a
r
r
y 
 I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
 
I = 0.54 
D = 0.15 
UI = 1 
ES = 0.55 
EU fight = 1 
ES of  PA = 0.56 
ES of NA = 0.44 
ES of CH = 0.26 
ES of AV = 0.27 
Action = Comfort 
B
b
a
r
r
y 
I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
EU actions = 0 
 
 I = 0.49 
D = 0 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.29 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.60 
ES NA = 0.20 
ES CH = 0.20 
ES AV = 0.25 
Action = Comfort 
G
g
a
r
y 
I = 0.07 
D = 0.15 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
Action = Avoid 
I = 0.07 
D = 0.15 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
EU actions = 0 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
Action = Avoid 
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7.4.  Discussion 
 
In this paper, the computational I-PEFiC model (Bosse et al., 2008) was extended with goal-
directed judgment formation (Hoorn et al., 2007) and overt actions. This way, the robots had 
the availability over goals to establish beliefs about how certain actions would sustain or 
obstruct them. 
Simulation experiments were performed to test the behavior of this model. The hypothesis 
was that users or agents were means to achieve robot goals and that the calculated valence 
to those means would make the robot select one of possibly five actions: positive approach, 
negative approach, avoid, change, or do nothing. Our experiments showed that indeed this 
was the case and that robots could combine rational decisions with affective decisions.  
In experiment 1, Harry primarily chose rationally to fight Gary, because he believed this 
would reduce his anger. In experiment 3, Harry held the same belief and by looking at the 
expected utilities of his actions alone, he should have chosen to fight Gary, but he did not. 
Because Harry was strongly involved with Gary, Harry suppressed the aggressive tendency 
of kicking Gary and comforted him instead, an affective choice. 
There has been a continuous debate over the conflict between rational and emotional 
decision making. Most models of decision-making assume the process to be rational, which 
would exclude the possibility of emotion playing a role, other than of hindrance (Gutnik et al., 
2006). However, humans often make irrational decisions. A good example for this is the 
Ultimatum game (Thaler, 1988). In this game the players have to split a sum of money. The 
first player makes an offer how to split the money, and the second player can either accept or 
reject this offer. When the second player rejects, none of the players receives any money. In 
this game, the rational decision for the second player would be to accept any offer, as some 
money is always better than no money. In reality, behavioral research has shown that low 
offers (20% of total amount) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Based on participant 
reports, they rejected low offers because of anger (negative emotion), felt due to unfairness 
(Gutnik et al., 2006). This nicely shows the existing conflicts between rational and emotional 
influences.  
The somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, 2005) indicates that emotions have a strong 
influence over our decision-making abilities. According to this hypothesis, feelings (somatic 
markers) mark response options to real or simulated decisions. These somatic markers are 
then used in an automatic process to quickly select good decision options.  
Existing models of decision making, such as (Gutnik et al., 2006), usually have a hedonic 
bias, and generally try to find the action with the highest expected utility. Some decision 
theoretic models take emotions into account, but in those models emotions only have the 
function to assist in making good rational decisions; e.g., emotional states are viewed as 
modes of decision making (Gmytrasiewycz & Lisetti, 2001). However, these models cannot 
explain irrational behavior, where actions with a (relatively) small expected utility are chosen. 
The model presented in this paper takes the expected utility, as well as involvement-distance-
tradeoffs into account, according to the I-PEFiC model (Van Vugt et al., 2009). This way, the 
model takes rational as well as emotional influences into account, and not only rational 
behavior, but also behavior where emotional influences override the rational choice can be 
explained and simulated. 
In future research, we will combine the model presented in this paper with an existing 
computational model for emotion regulation (Bosse et al., 2007). Whereas the current model 
focuses on the elicitation of emotions and affective decision making, that model addresses 
the regulation of emotion. We expect that both models will smoothly fit together, since the 
affective decision making as described in this paper could also be applied to emotion 
regulation strategies such as situation selection, situation modification, and attentional 
deployment. Finally, in a later stage of the project, the formalization will be validated against 
empirical data of human affective trade-off processes. As soon as the model has been 
validated and adapted, we will start exploring the possibilities to apply it to real humans 
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instead of agents; i.e., to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with humans in a 
more natural way, that is, with a mind of its own, in pursuit of its own goals. 
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Chapter 8: Affective agents perceiving each 
other’s actions14  
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, an extension of a formalized model of affective decision making is presented, 
based on the informally described I-PEFiC model. This extension manages that the actions 
agents undertake have an effect on other agents. The agents change their perceptions and 
beliefs about other agents if actions are taken. Further, the anger level of the agents is 
simulated. Simulation experiments show that the actions of agents can change the beliefs and 
the perceptions of another agent so much that the other agent changes its mind and chooses 
to perform another action than it was currently doing.  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
From the last decade, a lot of research has been dedicated to developing Intelligent Virtual 
Agents (IVAs) with more realistic graphical representations. However, these agents often do 
not show very realistic human-like emotional behavior. For example, many IVAs can show 
emotions by the means of facial expressions or the tone in their voice, but most of them still 
struggle to show the right emotions at the right moment (e.g., emotion regulation (Marsella 
and Gratch 2003) and moods (Beck 1987)). Let alone actually understanding and reacting 
empathically to the emotional state of other agents, or human users. Previous research has 
shown that closely mimicking humans is important for an agent to increase human 
involvement in a virtual environment (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2006). 
From Frijda’s point of view, emotions are goal driven (Frijda 1986). The emotional system 
examines the surroundings for related stimuli that are either beneficial or harmful for the 
concerns, motives, and goals of the individual (Frijda 1986, p. 494, p. 463). According to 
broaden-and-build theory, positive emotions are vehicles for individual growth and social 
connections: by building people’s personal and social resources, positive emotions transform 
people for the better, giving them better lives in the future (Fredrickson 2001, p. 224). 
Previous research also showed that human beings usually make unconscious rather than 
conscious decisions (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). 
We created agents for imitating human behavior, who can recognize each other as a 
personal friend as well as means to an end. The Interactive model of Perceiving and 
Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-PEFiC), which is based on the theory of Frijda (Frijda 
1986), was taken as a foundation with regard to recognizing each other as a personal friend 
(Van Vugt 2008). Within this model an agent A can compute the trade-off between how 
involved it is with another agent (e. g., Agent B is good) and what keeps the agent at a 
distance (e. g., Agent B is bad) (Bosse et al., 2008). This involvement-distance trade-off is the 
outcome of assessing the features of an agent on several dimensions. Use intentions are 
calculated additionally that prompt the agent to carry out actions towards another agent. 
These actions are based on goals, which play a role in the judgment formation of the agent 
about the other agent, but also more affective influences are taken into account. The previous 
decision making model (Hoorn et al., 2008) only describes the affective decision making 
process itself. Simulation experiments with this model showed that in situations where this 
can be considered human-like, agents make affective decisions rather than decisions that 
                                                           
14 This chapter has previously been published as Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2009). Affective 
agents perceiving each other’s actions. In: Otamendi, J., Bargiela, A., Montes, J.L., Pedrera, L.M.D. 
(eds.), Proceedings of the 23rd European Conference on Modelling and Simulation, ECMS'2009. 
European Council for Modelling and Simulation, pp. 194-202. It was nominated for best paper award. 
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would be the best rational decision (i. e., the decision option with the highest expected utility). 
However, it did not explain the effects of the performed actions on the agents’ perceptions, 
beliefs and levels of anger. Neither did it explain how these changed beliefs and perceptions 
influenced the following decision making processes. 
In this paper we improved the affective decision making model (Hoorn et al., 2008), so that 
the agents update their beliefs and perceptions of the ethics and affordances of other agents 
when actions are being performed. Further, the effects of these actions on the emotions of the 
agents are simulated. These changes on their turn influence the decision making process in 
the agents. This enables the agents to change their mind and decide to change the action 
they want to perform. The simulation experiments described in this paper will show what kind 
of effects the actions have on the agents’ beliefs, perceptions, and emotions and how this 
affects their decision making. 
 
8.2. Modelling approach 
 
Modelling the various aspects involved in affective decision making in an integrated manner 
poses some challenges. On the one hand, qualitative aspects have to be addressed, such as 
performing an action. On the other hand, quantitative aspects have to be addressed, such as 
levels of anger. The modelling approach based on the modelling language LEADSTO (Bosse 
et al., 2007) fulfils these needs. It integrates qualitative, logical aspects such as used in 
approaches based on temporal logic (e. g., Barringer et al., 1996) with quantitative, numerical 
aspects such as used in Dynamical Systems Theory (e. g., (Ashby 1960), (Port and Gelder 
1995)). 
In LEADSTO, direct temporal dependencies between state properties in two successive 
states are modelled by executable dynamic properties defined as follows. Let a and b be state 
properties of the form “conjunction of literals” (where a literal is an atom or the negation of an 
atom), and e, f, g, h non-negative real numbers. Then in the leads to language a e, f, g, h b, 
means: 
 
If state property a holds for a certain time interval with duration g, then after some delay 
(between e and f) state property b will hold for a certain time interval of length h. 
 
Here, atomic state properties can have a qualitative, logical format, such as an expression 
desire(d), expressing that desire d occurs, or a quantitative, numerical format such as 
has_value(x, v) expressing that variable x has value v. 
 
8.3. Implementation 
 
I-PEFiC is a model (Figure 8.1) that is empirically well validated (Van Vugt et al., 2006, Van 
Vugt et al., 2007, Van Vugt, 2008). The I-PEFiC model has three phases: encoding, 
comparison, and response (Van Vugt et al., 2007). 
During encoding, the user appraises an agent’s features for their level of ethics (good or 
bad), aesthetics (beautiful or ugly), and epistemics (realistic or unrealistic). During the 
encoding, moreover, the user evaluates in how far the agent system has affordances (aids or 
obstacles), which make the agent useful as a computer tool or not. 
In the comparison phase, the features are judged for similarity (similar or dissimilar) (e.g., 
“I am not like the agent”), relevance of features to user goals (relevant or irrelevant) and 
valence to goals (positive or negative outcome expectancies). The measures in the encode 
phase - moderated by the factors in the comparison phase - determine the responses, that is, 
the levels of involvement with and distance towards the embodied agent. Moreover, the 
intention to use the agent as a tool indicates actual use and together with involvement and 
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distance, this determines the overall satisfaction of the user with the agent; in our case of 
Agent A with Agent B. The I-PEFiC model has been formalized in (Bosse et al., 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Graphical Representation of I-PEFiC 
 
 
The model presented in this paper is an extension of a model of affective decision making 
(Hoorn et al., 2008) based on a formalization of the I-PEFiC model (Bosse et al., 2008) in the 
LEADSTO environment (Bosse et al., 2007). In this decision making model, decisions are 
made based on rational as well as affective processing. In the model an agent has desired 
and undesired goal-states. The agent perceives affordances of the other agents by means of 
beliefs that the agents facilitate or inhibit reaching certain goal-states. These perceived 
affordances of other agents are compared to the goal-states it wants to achieve or avoid. 
While doing this, it can reason about the outcome expectancies of using the other agent for a 
certain action (e. g., comforting, fighting, or criticizing). In humans, such outcome 
expectancies lead to certain quick and mostly subconsciously generated action tendencies. In 
our agents, as in humans, action tendencies influence the experienced involvement and 
distance towards the other agent. The involvement and distance towards another agent are 
combined with the use intentions of that agent and the expected utilities of the possible 
actions to calculate the expected levels of satisfaction of these actions. These expected levels 
of satisfaction are compared to reach a final decision that is based on rationality as well as 
affective influences. 
We created a library of actions the agents can perform. In this action library, the type of 
each action is specified. Actions can be specified as  
 
(1) Positive approach   
(2) Negative approach  
(3) Change    
(4) Avoid  
  
In this paper, the action library consists of one action for each type. Comfort is an action of 
the type positive approach, fight is an action of the type negative approach, criticize is an 
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action of the type change, and avoid obviously is an action of the type avoid.  If an agent tries 
to perform an action of type 1, 2, or 3 towards another agent, while the other agent is avoiding 
the agent, it will not succeed in performing this action. If an agent performs an action towards 
another agent, this affects the agent that is the object of the action, as well as the agent that 
is performing the action itself. The formulas and values not described in this paper can be 
found in http://www.few.vu.nl/~mpontier/ECMS-2009-Appendices.pdf. 
 
8.3.1. Adjusting the perceived ethics 
 
If an agent performs an action towards another agent, the agent that is the object of the action 
can change its perception of the goodness and badness of the agent performing the action. 
For example, if an agent fights another agent, the agent that is the object of this action will 
probably decrease its perception of the goodness of the fighting agent, and increase its 
perception of the badness of the fighting agent. To establish this change in perception, the 
bias (in the range [0, 2]) changes according to the actions that are being performed. A bias > 
1 means overestimation, and a bias < 1 means underestimation. To calculate the effect of an 
action on the bias for perceiving the goodness of the agent performing the action, we have 
developed the following formula: 
 
 
new_bias(good) = pgood * old_bias(good) + (1-pgood) * v(agent, action, good) 
new_bias(bad) =   pbad * old_bias(bad) + (1- pbad) * vagent, action, bad 
 
 
In this formula, new_bias(good) is the new value of the bias, old_bias(good) is the old value of 
the bias, and the persistency factor pgood is the proportion of the old bias that is taken into 
account to determine the new bias for perceiving goodness of the agent that is performing the 
action. In this paper, for clarity in the simulation experiments this persistency factor is set to 
0.85 for all agents, but this could just as easy be personalized per agent. The new 
contribution to the bias is v(agent, action, good), a value that an agent attaches to the goodness of 
being the object of the performed action. In practice this means that if a certain action is 
performed towards an agent, the bias of good will move towards the value the agent attaches 
to being the object of that action. In this paper, all the agents attach the same, arbitrarily 
chosen values to being the object of actions, but also this could easily be personalized per 
agent. As the biases are in the range [0, 2], these values are also in the range [0, 2]. The 
values can be found in Table 8.1. The actions for calculating the effect of an action on the 
bias for perceiving badness are calculated in a similar way as the effect on the bias for 
perceiving goodness. The only difference is that the values used in this formula are the values 
the agents attach to the badness of being the object to the performed action. These values 
can be found in Table 8.2. 
 
 
Table 8.1: The Values of Goodness the 
Agents Attach to Being the Object of an Action 
 
Action Value 
Comfort 1.5 
Fight 0.5 
Criticize 1.25 
Avoid 0.75 
 
Table 8.2: The Values of Badness the 
Agents Attach to Being the Object of an Action 
 
Action Value 
Comfort 0.5 
Fight 1.5 
Criticize 1.25 
Avoid 1.25 
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8.3.2. Adjusting the perceived affordances 
 
If an agent performs an action towards another agent, the agent that is the object of the action 
can also change its beliefs about the affordances of the agent performing the action. Beliefs 
have a value in the domain [-1, 1]. A belief of 1 represents a strong belief that the statement 
the belief is about is true, and a belief of -1 represents a strong belief that it is not true. For 
example, if an agent fights another agent, the belief that avoiding the other agent helps to 
reduce your anger might increase. To calculate the effect of an action on beliefs about the 
agent performing the action, we have developed the following formulas: 
 
if beliefchange ≥ 0: 
new_belief = old_belief + belief_adaptation *  beliefchange * ((1 - old_belief) / 2)   
if beliefchange < 0: 
new_belief = old_belief + belief_adaptation * beliefchange * ((1 + old_belief) / 2) 
 
In these formulas, new_belief is the new value of the belief, old_belief is the old value of the 
belief, and belief_adaptation is a variable, set at 0.1, that determines the speed with which the 
beliefs are changed when being the object of an action. The beliefchange is a variable in the 
range [-1, 1] that determines the change of a belief about the performing agent when an agent 
is performing an action, or is the object of an action performed by another agent. Multiplying 
with ((1 - old_belief) / 2) when beliefchange is positive, and with ((1 + old_belief) / 2) when 
beliefchange is negative manages that the values of the beliefs change less if they approach 
their boundaries, and prevents them from going out of the domain [-1, 1]. In this paper, the 
values for beliefchange are the same for all agents, but this could easily be personalized per 
agent. All beliefchange values can be found in Table 8.3.  
 
 
Table 8.3: The beliefchange Values when Actions Are Performed 
Affected Belief Actions causing the belief change 
Action Goal Comfort Criticize Fight Avoid 
Comfort Self 0.2 -0.2 -0.75 -0.6 
Criticize Self -0.5 0.9 -0.5 0.6 
Fight Self -0.9 0.3 0.75 0.4 
Avoid Self -0.25 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Comfort Others 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 
Criticize Others -0.25 -0.25 0.25 -0.4 
Fight Others -0.8 -0.8 0.25 -0.7 
Avoid  Others -0.35 -0.6 0.75 0.8 
 
 
In this table, in the columns the actions that are the cause of the belief change are shown. In 
the rows the affected beliefs are shown. These beliefs are about an action facilitating a certain 
goal. For example, if an agent A fights another agent B, agent A will change its belief that 
comforting agent B will help to reduce his own anger with a beliefchange value of -0.75, as 
can be seen in Table 8.3. 
 
8.3.3. Adjusting the emotions of the agents 
 
The actions that an agent performs, and the actions that are performed to an agent, affect the 
emotions of that agent. The emotion simulated in this paper is the level of anger, but also 
other or even multiple emotions could be simulated in a similar manner. To calculate the 
effect of actions performed on the anger level, we have developed the following formula: 
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new_anger = panger / n * old_anger + (1- panger / n) * Σ(changed_anger) / n 
 
 
In this formula, new_anger is the new anger level, and old_anger is the old anger level. The 
persistency factor panger is the proportion of the old anger level that is taken into account to 
determine the new anger level. In this paper, for clarity in the simulation experiments, this 
persistency factor is set to 0.95 for all agents, but this could easily be personalized per agent. 
The number of actions that is taken into account for calculating the new anger level is 
represented by n. The persistency factor is divided by n, so that there will be less persistency 
in the anger level if multiple actions are taken into account.  
The new contribution to the anger level is the mean of all the changed_anger variables that 
are attached to the actions taken into account. This changed_anger is a variable that 
indicates which value the anger level approaches given a certain action. In practice this 
means that if a certain action is performed towards an agent, the anger level will move 
towards the value of the changed_anger attached to that action. For example, if an agent 
fights another agent, this will make its anger level approach 0.7, because if the anger level is 
very high, fighting another agent might help to release this anger, although it will never help to 
decrease it to a low anger level. On the other hand, if an agent has a low anger level, fighting 
another agent will probably increase the level of anger. 
 In this paper, all the agents attach the same changed_anger values to actions, but it would 
be just as easy to let each agent have its own personal values. As the anger levels are in the 
range [0, 1], the changed_anger values are also in the range [0, 1]. The values used for this 
paper can be found in Table 8.4. 
 
 
Table 8.4: The changed_anger Values the Agents Attach to Specific Actions 
Action Value if subject Value if object 
Comfort 0.2 0.2 
Fight 0.7 0.9 
Criticize 0.2 0.6 
Avoid 0.3 0.7 
 
 
 
8.4. Simulation experiments 
 
The simulation model introduced in the previous section was used to perform a number of 
experiments under different parameter settings. In the experiments, the three agents Harry, 
Barry, and Gary followed a (fictitious) anger management therapy. An infinite number of 
actions could be inserted in the system, but for clarity, nonetheless, for each action type we 
inserted only one instance of an action. The action to comfort another agent is a type of 
positive approach whereas the action for negative approach was to fight another agent. 
Criticizing another agent was the action associated with change, and the action for avoiding 
the agent was to simply move away from another agent. In the simulation experiments, a 
calculation step takes one timepoint and an action takes five timepoints. After these five 
timepoints the action taken can be reconsidered and changed. The results of the experiment 
are described below. Notice that in each graph in this paper, the scale on the y-axis can differ. 
We expected that the system can generate simulations in which actions lead to changes in 
perception in such a way, that agents change their mind and perform another action than they 
would have done before their perception was changed. 
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Experiment 1: Baseline 
To start, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for the rest of 
the experiments. In this experiment, the designed features for beautiful and ugly (aesthetics), 
good and bad (ethics), and realistic and unrealistic (epistemics) are all set to 0.5 (see Figure 
8.1). All biases for perceiving these features are set to the neutral value of 1. The agents have 
no beliefs about other agents (all beliefs are set to 0), and the only ambition they have is to 
reduce their own anger with an ambition level of 0.5.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Simulation Results of Experiment 1 
 
 
In Figure 8.2, along the X-axis the timepoints are shown, and along the Y-axis several 
statements are shown. A dark blue bar means the statement holds at that timepoint, and a 
light blue bar means the statement is false at that timepoint. As can be seen in Figure 8.2, 
these settings result in Barry and Harry avoiding Gary, and Harry avoiding Barry after 
timepoint 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Harry’s Involvement, Distance, 
Perceived Goodness, Perceived Badness of Gary 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.3, the agents who are being avoided increase their distance from 
0.49 to 0.82, and decrease their involvement from 0.44 to 0.28 towards the avoiding agent. 
This happens because the perceived goodness of these agents decreases from 0.5 to 0.38 
and badness increases from 0.5 to 0.62. Being avoided also causes changes in beliefs. 
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Figure 8.4: The Beliefs of Barry about Harry during Experiment 1. 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.4, the agents who are being avoided start to think that avoiding, 
criticizing, or fighting the avoiding agent will help them to reduce their own anger, and that 
comforting the avoiding agent will inhibit their goal of reducing their own anger.  As initially the 
agents have no beliefs about each other, the agents have no intentions to use each other at 
the start of the simulation.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Harry’s Intentions to Use Gary during Experiment 1. 
 
 
Because the agents that are being avoided start to have beliefs about the avoiding agents, 
their intentions to use that agent also increase from 0 to 0.46, as can be seen in Figure 8.5.  
Being avoided also changes the anger level. As can be seen in Figure 8.6, the anger level 
of Barry decreases from 0.60 to 0.50, and the anger level of Harry decreases only from  0.60 
to 0.57 (notice the differences in scale on the y-axis). Harry’s anger level decreases less 
because he is avoided by both Barry and Gary. Gary’s anger level reduces to 0.30, which is 
even more than that of Barry, because he is not being avoided by any agent. This shows that 
being avoided by multiple agents has a greater impact than being avoided by only one agent. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Anger Levels of the Agents in Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2: Harry believes he should not avoid Barry  
We performed an experiment in which Harry has a strong belief (value = 1) that avoiding 
Barry will inhibit his goal of reducing his own anger. Harry also has a stronger ambition to 
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reduce his own anger, with a value of 1 instead of 0.5. The remaining variables have the 
same values as in the baseline condition.  
Due to this, instead of avoiding Barry, Harry now tries to comfort Barry at time-point 11, as 
can be seen in Figure 8.7. However, he does not succeed in comforting Barry, as Barry is 
avoiding Harry, just like in the baseline experiment.  This causes Harry to stop avoiding Barry 
at time point 16 and increases his anger level to from 0.53 to 0.70, as can be seen in Figure 
8.8. 
Not being comforted anymore also slightly increases Barry’s anger level from 0.25 to 0.27 
in the five following time steps. In the mean time, Barry has observed that Harry tried to 
comfort him, which decreases his anger level from 0.60 to 0.25. It also changes his 
perceptions of the ethics of Harry. As can be seen in Figure 8.9, Barry starts to see Harry as a 
good guy, with a perceived goodness of 0.64 and a perceived badness of 0.36.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Simulation Results of Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Anger Levels of the Agents in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
Figure 8.9: Barry’s Perception of the Ethics of Harry during Experiment 2 
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Figure 8.10: Barry’s Involvement and Distance towards Harry during Experiment 2 
 
 
This also slightly increases Barry’s belief that comforting Harry will help him to reduce his 
anger, while his beliefs that avoiding, criticizing or fighting Barry will help him to reduce his 
own anger are slightly reduced. 
These changes in beliefs and perceptions cause the involvement of Barry towards Harry to 
increase from 0.44 to 0.56 and the distance from Barry to Harry to decrease from 0.50 to 
0.34, as can be seen in Figure 8.10. This causes him to start comforting Harry instead of 
avoiding him at timepoint 21.  
 
 
  
Figure 8.11: Harry’s Perception of the Ethics of Barry during Experiment 2 
 
 
However, in the mean time, being avoided by Barry has changed Harry’s opinion about him. 
The perception of his goodness has decreased from 0.50 to 0.39, and the perception of his 
badness has increased from 0.50 to 0.61, as can be seen in Figure 8.11.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.12: Harry’s Beliefs about Barry during Experiment 2 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.12, also Harry’s beliefs that fighting, criticizing, and especially 
avoiding Barry will help to reduce his own anger increase, whereas his belief that comforting 
Barry will help to reduce his own anger decreases. In the mean time, being avoided by Gary 
has decreased Harry’s involvement towards Gary, increased his distance towards Gary, and 
has increased his beliefs that criticizing, fighting, or avoiding Harry will help him to reduce his 
own anger in a similar way as in experiment 1. 
As can be seen in Figure 8.13, this increases Harry’s expected satisfaction of performing 
an action towards Gary, namely avoiding him, and this expected satisfaction exceeds the 
expected satisfaction of performing an action towards Barry. This causes Harry to change his 
mind and start avoiding Gary at timepoint 26. In the mean time, after Barry started to comfort 
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Harry at timepoint 21, Harry’s anger level decreases from 0.70 to 0.40, and Barry’s anger 
level from 0.28 to 0.20.  
Also the distance from Harry to Barry decreases from 0.66 to 0.09 and his involvement 
increases from 0.37 to 0.67, as can be seen in Figure 8.14. This happens due to an increase 
in Barry’s perception of Harry’s goodness from 0.39 to 0.75 and a decrease in perceived 
badness from 0.61 to 0.25, and because his increasing belief that comforting  Harry will help 
him to reduce his own anger, and fighting, criticizing or avoiding Harry will inhibit his goal to 
reduce his own anger. 
 
 
  
Figure 8.13: Harry’s Belief that Avoiding Gary Will Help Him to Reduce his own anger, and 
his Expected Satisfaction of Performing an Action towards Barry and Gary during Experiment 
2 
 
 
  
Figure 8.14: Harry’s Involvement and Distance towards Barry during Experiment 2 
 
 
 
8.5. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we presented an extension of a formalized model of affective decision making 
(Hoorn et al., 2008), based on the informally described I-PEFiC model (Van Vugt et al., 2006, 
Van Vugt et al., 2007, Van Vugt, 2008). This extension manages that the actions the agents 
undertake have an effect on the agents. The agents change their perceptions and beliefs 
about other agents if actions are taken. Further, the anger level of the agents is being 
simulated. Simulation experiments have been performed to show how the actions affect the 
agents. Experiment 1 showed that if multiple agents perform an action towards another agent, 
this has a bigger effect on its anger level than if only one agent would perform that action. 
Experiment 2 showed that if an agent performs an action towards another agent, this can 
change the beliefs and the perceptions of the other agents so much that the other agent 
changes its mind and chooses to perform another action than it was currently doing, leading 
to a completely different situation than in experiment 1, confirming our expecations as 
mentioned in section 8.4. These results are as would have been expected from the theory 
(Hoorn et al., 2007, Van Vugt et al., 2006, Van Vugt, 2008).  
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In this paper, the simulation experiments are performed in the domain of anger management 
therapy. The only simulated emotion is anger, and for each type of action there is only one 
possible action to perform. However, this model could be used for any type of domain, with 
other, or multiple emotions simulated at the same time. Also as many actions as desired 
could be added to the action library. This way, the model could be used to perform 
simulations involving decision-making, emotions, and changing perceptions for any domain. 
Of course, a lot of additions could still be made to our model. For instance, the persistency 
factors for changing the beliefs and perceptions of other agents could be made dependent on 
the period of time the agents know each other (or on the number of interactions).  
Existing models of decision-making usually assume this process to be rational, which 
would exclude the possibility of emotions playing a role other than disturbing the process 
(Gutnik et al., 2006). However, humans often make irrational decisions. A good example for 
this is the Ultimatum game (Thaler, 1988), for which behavioral research showed that low 
offers (20% of total amount) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Participants reported that 
they found low offers unfair, and therefore out of anger they selected the irrational option 
(Gutnik et al., 2006).  
Models of decision making usually have a hedonic bias, and generally try to find the action 
with the highest expected utility. Some decision theoretic models, such as (Gmytrasiewycz 
and Lisetti, 2001), take emotions into account, but in those models, emotions merely confirm 
good rational decisions – emotional states as modes of decision making. However, these 
models cannot explain irrational behavior, where actions with a (relatively) low expected utility 
are chosen. Our balancing model takes the expected utility as well as involvement-distance 
trade-offs into account. This way, situations in which emotions overwhelm rationality can be 
explained and simulated. 
There have been a number of approaches to model decision-making based on emotions in 
autonomous agents. However, none of these studies uses a detailed model of perception of 
others to explain how these affective influences in the decision making process are 
generated. Usually, these models somehow assume that emotions are there. For instance, 
(Velasquez 1998) presents a model of emotion-based decision-making, which is an extension 
of a previous model (Velasquez 1997). The model that is presented in this paper assumes a 
perceptual system, but how this perceptual system actually works is not considered in the 
paper. 
Ahn & Picard (Ahn & Picard 2005) present a computational framework of affective-
cognitive learning and decision making for affective agents. This model integrates affect and 
cognition, where ‘internal rewards from cognition and emotion’ and ‘external rewards from the 
external world’ serve as motivations for learning and decision making. In this model emotions 
are generated based on these rewards, but perceiving others in the world is left out of 
consideration. 
In future research, we plan to combine the model with an existing computational model for 
emotion regulation (Bosse et al., 2007). Whereas the current model focuses on the elicitation 
of emotion, that model addresses the regulation of emotion. Further, we intend to explore 
where these models and the EMA model (Gratch and Marsella 2004) complement each other, 
and use this to further refine the models. 
Finally, in a later stage of the project, we will confront our formalization with empirical data 
of human affective trade-off processes. As soon as the model is validated and adapted, we 
will start exploring the possibilities to build a robot that can interact with real humans. We 
hope to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with humans in a more natural way, 
that is, with a mind of its own, in pursuit of its own goals, and acting emotionally intelligent. 
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Part 4: Silicon Coppélia 
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Chapter 9: Coppélius’ Concoction: Similarity and 
Complementarity Among Three Affect-related 
Agent Models15 
 
Abstract 
 
In aiming for behavioral fidelity, artificial intelligence cannot and no longer ignores the 
formalization of human affect. Affect modeling plays a vital role in faithfully simulating human 
emotion and in emotionally-evocative technology that aims at being real. This paper offers a 
short expose about three models concerning the regulation and generation of affect: 
CoMERG, EMA and I-PEFiCADM, which each in their own right are successfully applied in the 
agent and robot domain. We argue that the three models partly overlap and where distinct, 
they complement one another. To enable their integration, we provide an analysis of the 
theoretical concepts, resulting in a more precise representation of affect simulation in virtual 
humans, which we verify with simulation tests. 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
Recently, much research has been dedicated to developing more realistic Intelligent Virtual 
Agents (IVAs). However, these agents are often emotionally not very human-like. For 
example, many IVAs can show emotions using facial expressions or the tone of their voice, 
but most of them still struggle to be believable in terms of what emotions to show at what 
moment (e.g., emotion regulation (Marsella & Gratch, 2003), stress and work-load (Endsley, 
1995), and moods (Beck, 1987));; let alone that they actually understand and react 
empathically to the emotional state of other agents or human users. Previous research has 
shown that closely mimicking humans is important for an agent to increase human 
involvement in a virtual environment (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2006), although mimicking is not 
always effective; (e.g., Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005).  
To create a more natural communication system in intelligent agents, our earlier work and 
that of our colleagues in the Institute for Creative Technologies, University of Southern 
California focused on different aspects of emotion generation, regulation, and affective 
processes. Gratch and Marsella (2006; 2009) formalized the theory of Emotion and 
Adaptation of Smith and Lazarus (1990) into EMA to create agents that cope with negative 
affect. The emotion-regulation theory of Gross (2001) inspired Bosse, Pontier, & Treur (2007) 
to develop CoMERG (the Cognitive Model for Emotion Regulation based on Gross). Hoorn, 
Pontier, & Siddiqui (2008) used the concern-driven theory of Frijda (1986) to design I-
PEFiCADM and built agents that can trade rational for affective choices. 
Together, these theories cover a large part of appraisal-based emotion theory (Frijda, 
Smith & Lazarus, Gross) and all three boil down to appraisal models of emotion. We therefore 
expected that the related computational models would nicely fit together so that we would 
better account for the complexity of human behavioral affect than the separate approaches 
would do alone. 
All three approaches point at important aspects of human affective behavior, but each 
misses out on some aspect. CoMERG and EMA address the regulation of affective states, but 
Gratch and Marsella (2006; 2009) do not regulate positive affect. CoMERG has no provisions 
for generating affect and does not account for a causal interpretation of the world-state. I-
                                                           
15 This chapter has previously been published as Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F. (2011). 
Coppélius' Concoction: Similarity and Complementarity Among Three Affect-related Agent Models. 
Cognitive Systems Research Journal, in press.	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PEFiCADM (Hoorn et al., 2008) generates and balances affect but addresses only one 
regulation mechanism. We created a new model, Silicon Coppélia, in which we combined the 
most useful parts of the three models mentioned above. This integrated model is expected to 
simulate richer agent behavior than what CoMERG, EMA and I-PEFiCADM can do alone. We 
will test this by performing simulation experiments on Silicon Coppélia under various 
parameter settings.  
We coined our integrated and simulated model “Silicon Coppélia” after the mechanic doll, 
dancing in the ballet of Arthur Saint-Léon (1870). She is the concoction of sinister Doctor 
Coppélius, who made her so human-like that a young man named Franz was prepared to 
denounce his fiancée Swanilda for her. 
 
9.2. Model Overview  
 
We collected three models (CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM) of agent affect-generation and 
affect-regulation. In our view these models offer plenty of opportunities for integration. Note 
that the presented models embody a particular variant of an affect theory in that they have 
some unique properties that distinguish them from their original sources.  Many design 
choices underlying such models arise from the need to create a working computational 
system, a challenge the original theorists have never confronted. 
 
9.2.1. CoMERG 
 
Gross (2001) states that “Emotion regulation includes all of the conscious and unconscious 
strategies we use to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an 
emotional response.” Bosse et al. (2007b) developed difference equations and logical rules to 
simulate the dynamics of Gross’ emotion-regulation strategies. The CoMERG model was 
incorporated into agents in a virtual storytelling application (Bosse et al., 2007a). Gross 
distinguishes five different emotion-regulation strategies: situation selection, situation 
modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change and response modulation (see Figure 
9.1). Humans have strategies to influence the level of emotions to avoid extreme responses. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Emotion regulation model by Gross (2001). 
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Gross distinguishes (1) an experiential component (subjective feeling), (2) a behavioral 
component (behavioral responses), and (3) a physiological component (e.g., heartbeat and 
respiration). In situation selection, a person chooses the situation that matches the preferred 
emotional response level (e.g., a person may not want to go to a party because (s)he dislikes 
someone who will go there too). In situation modification, a person changes the situation to 
obtain a different level of emotion (e.g., zapping to another channel because of an annoying 
performer). 
 Attentional deployment refers to shifting focus (e.g., when looking away from a scary 
movie scene). Cognitive change selects a cognitive meaning to an event (e.g., the weather is 
blamed for losing a match). With response modulation, people try to influence the process 
that response tendencies may become a behavioral response (e.g., hiding shyness).  
 
9.2.2. Emotion & Adaption (EMA) Model 
 
EMA (Figure 9.2) is a computational model of the cognitive antecedents and consequences of 
emotion as posited by Smith and Lazarus (1990). In cognitive appraisal theories, appraisal 
and coping center on people’s interpretation of their relationship with the environment. This 
interpretation is constructed by cognitive processes, summarized by appraisal variables, and 
altered by coping responses. EMA maintains an explicit symbolic representation of the 
relationship between events and an agent’s internal beliefs, desires, and intentions. AI 
planning then makes explicit use of such event-consequence representations, while a BDI 
framework handles the epistemic factors (i.e. beliefs and intentions) that underlie social 
activities.  
 
Figure 9.2: Computational instantiation of the cognitive-motivational-emotive system. 
 
Appraisal processes characterize this representation in terms of individual appraisal 
judgments.  These extend traditional AI concerns such as the following, with notions of utility 
and probability, e.g.; desirability, likelihood , causal attribution , controllability and 
changeability  
Patterns of appraisal elicit emotional displays but they also initiate coping processes to 
regulate the agent’s cognitive response to the appraised emotion. Coping strategies work in 
the reverse direction of appraisal, identifying plans, beliefs, desires or intentions to maintain or 
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alter in order to maintain positive or reduce negative emotional appraisals. These include 
“problem focused” strategies (e.g., planning) directed towards improving the world (the 
traditional concern of AI techniques) but also encompasses “emotion-focused” strategies that 
impact an agent’s epistemic and motivational state. Some examples of copingstrategies are 
planning, seeking instrumental support, procastrination, denial, mental disengagement and 
blame shifting. 
The above strategies provide input to the cognitive processes that actually execute these 
directives.  For example, planful coping generates an intention to act, leading a planning 
system associated with EMA to generate and execute a valid plan to accomplish this act. 
Alternatively, coping strategies might abandon the goal, lower the goal’s importance, or re-
assess who is to blame.  
EMA is a fully implemented model and has been applied to simulate realistic human 
emotional responses (e.g., decision-making and nonverbal behaviors of computer-generated 
role-players in a variety of social training environments). Several empirical studies 
demonstrated EMA’s effectiveness in modeling the influence of emotion over human 
judgments when compared with human behavior in laboratory settings (Mao and Gratch, 
2006). 
 
 
The algorithm of EMA is as follows (Marsella and Gratch, 2009): 
 
1.  Construct and maintain a causal interpretation of ongoing world events in terms of 
beliefs, desires, plans, and intentions. 
2.  Generate multiple appraisal frames that characterize features of the causal 
interpretation in terms of appraisal variables. 
3.  Map individual appraisal frames into individual instances of emotion. 
4.  Aggregate emotion instances into a current emotional state and overall mood. 
5.  Adopt a coping strategy in response to the current emotional state. 
 
9.2.3. I-PEFiCADM 
 
Originally, the empirically validated framework of Perceiving and Experiencing Fictional 
Characters (PEFiC) described the receiver’s reception of fictional characters (Konijn and 
Hoorn, 2005). Later versions were applied to embodied agents with user interaction 
possibilities, resulting into Interactive PEFiC (Van Vugt, Hoorn, & Konijn, 2009). I-PEFiC was 
then used to model affective behavior of agents, while a module for Affective Decision Making 
was added to simulate irrational agent behavior, hence I-PEFiCADM (Hoorn et al., 2008). I-
PEFiCADM assumes an encoding, a comparison, and a response phase (Figure 9.3.). During 
encoding, the agent perceives the user and the situation the user is in, in terms of ethics, 
aesthetics, epistemics and affordances.. Affordances are action possibilities that make the 
user instrumental to achieve agent goals (e.g., maintenance, security).  
In the comparison phase, the agent appraises the relevance and the valence of user 
features to agent goals. Relevance determines the intensity of the effect [0, 1], while valence 
determines its direction [-1, 1]. User features  may afford the facilitation of a desired agent 
goal. Additionally, the agent estimates a level of similarity between agent and user.  
In the response phase, the agent establishes the levels of involvement with and distance 
towards the user. These  two tendencies occur in parallel and compensate one another. In 
addition, the agent calculates a value for the so called use intentions, the willingness to 
employ the user again to achieve agent goals. 
The Affective Decision Making manages that the agent makes a decision on the more 
rationally generated use intentions in unison with the more affectively generated involvement-
distance trade-off. This enables the agent to make irrational choices where this is considered 
to be human-like.    
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Figure 9.3: Dependencies in I-PEFiCADM.  Curved arrows indicate interaction effects. IDT = 
involvement-distance trade-off, UI = use intentions. 
 
 
9.3. Triple comparison  
 
Figure 9.4. depicts the similarities and differences between CoMERG, EMA, and I-
PEFiCADM.  By and large, all three assume the perception of situational features that 
provoke subsequent appraisals, which are related or matched to goals and desires. 
All three describe affective responses (overt or covert) and the regulation of those 
responses. Next, we offer a comparison of models, using Figure 9.4. as our central 
reference point. 
Features in CoMERG are called “aspects” and people can focus on different 
aspects (features) of the world to regulate emotions. EMA does not work with 
‘features’ as such but the “current state predicates” are statements about features of 
the environment that can be true or false. In I-PEFiCADM, features receive a certain 
weight according to frequency of occurrence, salience, or familiarity. What exactly the 
weight should indicate is empirically an unsettled matter. Weights can change as a 
function of attentional shifts, switching foci, or situation changes. 
With respect to appraisal domains, CoMERG does not explicitly mention any, 
whereas PEFiC (e.g., Konijn & Hoorn, 2005) and I-PEFiC (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 
2009) focus their appraisal domain on perceiving characters. For the judgment of 
fictional characters and embodied agents, users classify features as good or bad, 
beautiful or ugly, realistic or unrealistic, and as aids or obstacles (Van Vugt et al., 
2009). For user engagement and use intentions, appraisals of ethics and affordances 
are the most important determinants.  Appraisal domains in EMA focus on 
interpreting the relationship with the environment. In EMA, agents perceive the world 
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according to a causal interpretation of past and ongoing events, including past 
actions and plans as well as intentions of self and others. 
 
 
Figure 9.4: Graphical overview of CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM. 
 
 
9.3.1. Compare  
 
The appraisal process is least explained in CoMERG, which uses “meanings”. As an 
emotion-regulation strategy in CoMERG, people can attach different cognitive 
meaning to a situation. One type of such ‘cognitive change’ is called reappraisal 
(Gross, 2001), which is a re-evaluation of a potentially emotion-eliciting situation to 
decrease emotional impact (e.g., poor personal performance is blamed on the 
weather). I-PEFiCADM attaches personal meaning to a feature through relevance and 
valence. Something may potentially benefit or harm goals, beliefs, or concerns and 
as such, acquires individual ‘meaning’ (Frijda, 1986; 1988, cf.  primary appraisal in 
Lazarus, 1991). 
In EMA, this meaning is acquired through multiple appraisal frames, which allow 
for perspective taking. Appraisal frames are generated from many appraisal 
variables, which are called appraisal components by Smith and Lazarus and 
appraisal dimensions by Roseman (1984).  Most of these appraisal variables can be 
mapped to relevance and valence as used in I-PEFiCADM. According to EMA, 
‘relevance’ measures the significance of an event for the agent .  Unlike Frijda, 
however, EMA equates significance with utility, which in Frijda’s terms would be 
‘valence.’ An event outcome is only deemed significant in EMA if it facilitates or 
inhibits a state predicate with non-zero utility. Valence is not explicitly mentioned in 
EMA although “utility” and “desirability” can be regarded as two instantiations of it. 
Utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from (or desirability of) environmental 
features. EMA represents preferences over environmental features as numeric utility 
over the truth-value of state predicates. Utilities may be either intrinsic (meaning that 
the agent assigns intrinsic worth to this environmental feature) or extrinsic (meaning 
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that they inherit worth through their probabilistic contribution to an intrinsically 
valuable state feature). Utility, then, may be viewed as positive or negative outcome 
expectations about features in the current situation and is expressed in current state 
predicates (hence, ‘current valence’).   
Desirability covers both a notion of intrinsic pleasantness and goal congruence (in 
Scherer’s (1993) typography), as well as a measure of importance or relevance. It 
captures the appraised valence of an event with regard to an agent’s preferences. An 
event is desirable, from some agent’s perspective, if it facilitates a state to which the 
agent attributes positive utility or if it inhibits a state with negative utility. An event is 
undesirable if it facilitates a state with negative utility or if it inhibits a state with 
positive utility. Like utility, desirability  may be viewed as positive or negative outcome 
expectations but this time about features in the future situation (‘future valence’). 
The explicit division in current and future states is what I-PEFiCADM is missing as 
well as the possibility to change perspectives. EMA and I-PEFiCADM resemble each 
other in that causal interpretation of ongoing world events in terms of beliefs, desires, 
plans, and intentions in EMA is comprised in the beliefs, goals, and concerns that are 
checked for relevance and valence in I-PEFiCADM. However, EMA uses a number of 
variables, called appraisal frames, to cover the appraisal process, whereas in I-
PEFiCADM, these appraisal frames appear to pertain to the more general concepts of 
relevance and valence. For example, urgency would be a clear-cut specification of 
relevance (cf.  Frijda, 1988, p. 352) and ego involvement could be seen as a part of 
valence. However, EMA also uses some variables (such as causal attribution and 
coping potential) which are more related to the environment and less to the 
character, and which are somewhat broader than relevance and valence.  
 
9.3.2 Respond  
 
Figure 9.4 exemplifies that in EMA, relevance of an event as well as utility and 
desirability (current and future valence) of features are mapped via an appraisal 
frame onto emotion instances of a particular category and intensity. These are called 
affective states.  This may be seen as a covert response to the situation – an internal 
affective state that does not yet translate into overt actions. In I-PEFiCADM, affective 
states as such are not the focus, but rather the involvement-distance trade-off is, 
which is seen as the central process of engagement.   
What comes closest to EMA’s affective states are involvement-distance in 
combination with what I-PEFiCADM calls “emotions” (Figure 9.3, curved arrows). On 
this view, emotions are byproducts of the trade-off. For example, when Franz woos 
Coppélia, her involvement with him may be accompanied by happiness. When he 
looks at another girl, Coppélia may still be involved with Franz but this time she may 
feel challenged.   
The involvement-distance trade-off could also count as the concretization of the 
emotion-response tendencies that CoMERG hinges on. In CoMERG, these 
tendencies result into several responses: experiential, behavioral, and physiological. 
EMA and I-PEFiCADM are restricted to the experiential and behavioral domain. In 
EMA, affective states (experiential) lead to coping behavior. Here, coping is 
instantiated within some specific domain action. For example, if Franz has 
pathological fear towards dating androids and suspects Coppélia of being one, he 
might adopt emotion-focused coping (e.g., engage in wishful thinking and lower the 
probability she is an android) which will inform the next decision; or he might adopt 
problem-focused coping to take a specific overt action to address the threat (i.e. 
destroy Coppélia). In I-PEFiCADM, the combination of involvement, distance, and use 
intentions predicates the level of satisfaction (experiential), which feeds into affective 
 124 
decision making.  This results into overt responses (behavior) such as kissing, 
kicking, or walking away.  
CoMERG proposes a broad model of five emotion-regulation strategies (see Sec. 
2.1). Following Gross, CoMERG predicts that strategies that are performed earlier in 
the process are more effective to regulate one’s emotions. EMA provides a more 
specific model which focuses (in much detail) on coping.  Situation selection and 
situation modification are implemented in EMA via problem-focused coping strategies 
(i.e. take-action) and avoidance. The domain-model given to EMA must encode that 
the situational features producing a negative emotion would be reversed/blocked by 
the effects of some action. Attentional deployment corresponds to EMA’s strategies 
to seek/suppress information. Cogni¬tive change corresponds to EMA’s various 
emotion-directed strategies. EMA does not model suppression. I-PEFiCADM focuses 
on situation selection.  Another difference is that CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM allow the 
regulation of affect by increasing, maintaining, or decreasing the positive or negative 
response, whereas EMA focuses on decreasing negative affect alone. In EMA, being 
overenthusiastic is left uncontrolled, whereas in CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM, positive 
affect can be down-regulated or compensated for e.g.; in CoMERG positive affect 
can be suppressed and negative affect can be up regulated. As a result, one can 
state that the coping in EMA is superceded by the emotion regulation in CoMERG. 
For EMA, there must be an explicit causal connection between coping strategies 
and the emotions they are regulating whereas for CoMERG that is not a prerequisite. 
In CoMERG, people perform strategies to change their level of emotion but how this 
works is described informally. EMA gives a more detailed and formal description of 
how emotion regulation works. For example, reappraisal as a general emotion-
regulation strategy in CoMERG is in EMA described in terms of a change in causal 
interpretation.  
In EMA, several emotions are combined to calculate an ‘overall mood’. I-PEFiCADM 
supports several affective processes to be calculated at the same time but there is 
not a way to calculate an overall mood. I-PEFiCADM focuses on the trade-off between 
involvement and distance and not on coping per se. Also in CoMERG, several 
emotion-regulation strategies may be performed simultaneously, but it is not 
mentioned how these aggregate into an ‘overall mood’.  
 
9.4. Conceptual decisions  
 
We adhered to the linguistic convention that an agent detects ‘features’ in a situation 
instead of ‘aspects’, because both EMA and I- PEFiCADM use that concept and 
because it is interchangeable with “aspects” in CoMERG. Moreover, the term 
‘features’ better fits mathematical approaches that use feature sets to calculate 
certain values for a situation. 
Only I-PEFiCADM explicitly mentions the appraisal domains that are important in 
perceiving features.  Therefore, the agent will use ethics, affordances, aesthetics, 
and epistemics as the main domains through which features are funneled into the 
appraisal process.  
CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM all assume or elaborate an appraisal process.  
CoMERG is least explicit and the concept of ‘meaning’ can easily be attached to 
‘personal significance’ and ‘personal relevance’ in both EMA and I-PEFiCADM. In EMA 
and I-PEFiCADM, relevance and valence play an active role, but EMA models the 
specific manifestations rather than the general concepts. In unison, we will use the 
term relevance to indicate importance or meaning to personal goals, concerns, 
beliefs, intentions, plans, etc. and valence to indicate (current) utility or (future) 
desirability of features in a situation. This may instantiate in the form of, for example, 
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urgency as an aspect of relevance and likelihood or unexpectedness as an aspect of 
future valence.  
On the response side, EMA focuses on moods and emotions whereas I-PEFiCADM 
emphasizes the more general trends of involvement, distance, and use intentions. 
Yet, they are two sides of the coin that could be called ‘affective states’. Emotions 
and moods may evolve from involvement-distance trade-offs and both the specific 
(e.g., happy emotions) and general experiential response (e.g., involvement) may be 
liable to regulation strategies.   
CoMERG provides the most profound distinctions with respect to the type of 
responses (experiential, behavioral, and physiological) and the number of regulation 
strategies. However, in no way are these distinctions at odds with EMA or I-
PEFiCADM. Coping is best worked out by EMA and situation selection by I-PEFiCADM. 
The latter encompasses a module for affective decision making that on the basis of 
expected satisfaction chooses from four distinct kinds of overt behaviors (i.e., fight, 
flight, change, embrace). Note that strategies such as CoMERG’s response 
modulation are on the response side of the affect process but that they impinge upon 
encoding aspects: the situations and features, respectively (see next).  
 
9.5. Silicon Coppélia  
 
Figure 9.5 shows how we combined CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM into Silicon 
Coppélia, a framework for computerized affect generation and regulation.  When on 
the far left of Figure 9.5, Coppélia looks away from Franz, attentional deployment 
makes her weigh the features that make Franz attractive or not (e.g., dancing 
capacities over loyalty). 
 
Coppélia develops state predicates about Franz - and her situation with him - upon 
which she will eventually base her decision to adore him or leave. Features receive 
indices for different appraisal domains. Franz acquires personal meaning or 
significance for Coppélia because she compares his features with her personal goals, 
beliefs, and concerns. This establishes Franz’ relevance and valence to Coppélia. 
While relevance determines the intensity of affect, valence governs its direction. 
Coppélia can also take perspectives and look at Franz through the eyes of Swanilda.   
With the appraisal process completed, Coppélia is ready to affectively respond to 
Franz. Relevance, current and future valence form an appraisal frame that feeds into 
her (un)willingness to use Franz for her purposes (e.g., dancing, getting married) and 
that helps her trade friendship (involvement) for keeping her cool (distance). Inside, 
Coppélia now experiences several (perhaps ambiguous) emotions and moods. On a 
physiological level, she may be aroused (e.g., increased brain activity). All this is not 
visible for Franz yet; they are covert responses.   
During affective decision making, Coppélia selects the option that promises the 
highest expected satisfaction and chooses from four overt actions: positive approach 
(e.g., compliment Franz on his dancing), negative approach (e.g., push him away), 
change (e.g., teach Franz on moral standards), or walk away from him. She might do 
each action one at a time. This may be accompanied by physiological reactions such 
as blushing and trembling. Response modulation may influence the affective decision 
making. 
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Figure 9.5: Silicon Coppélia is the integration of CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM. 
 
 
9.6. Implementation  
 
In this section, we discuss the implementation of Silicon Coppélia, focusing on the 
variables mentioned in the previous sections, and the agents’ belief system, which 
lead the agent to ‘experience’ joy, distress, hope, fear, anger, guilt, and surprise.  
 
9.6.1 Encoding phase 
 
According to I-PEFiCADM, an agent perceives another agent in terms of ethics 
(good/bad), aesthetics (beautiful/ugly), affordances (aid/obstacle) and realism (cf. 
Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
Each agent has a value for ‘designed beautiful / ugly’. This is a value the designer 
expects to raise in the user, or in another agent, based on general principles of 
aesthetics. This  value  could  be  seen  as  the  mean  ‘score’  an  agent receives for 
its beauty / ugliness from all other agents. This designed value has a data-driven 
influence on how agents perceive the beauty of another agent.  The variable bias 
represents the concept-driven influence on how agents perceive other agents’ 
beauty. Depending on its value, a bias may increase or decrease an agent’s 
perception of another agent’s beauty. Note that ‘another agent’ could also be the 
agent itself. This is represented by the following formulas, given in mathematical 
format. In the formulas use in this document, Perceived(<Feat>, A1, A2) is agent A1’s 
perception of agent A2’s feature. Similarly, Bias(A1, A2, Beau) is agent A1’s bias in 
perceiving that feature. 
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Perceived(Beau, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Beau) * Designed(Beau, A2)  
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
When two agents meet for the first time, they will assign a perceived value in the 
range [0, 1] to each other’s features according to the formulas above. Bias in the 
range [0, 2] is multiplied with the designed value for the feature in the range [0, 1]. If 
agent A1 has a bias of 1 for, for instance, the beauty of agent A2, then A1 does not 
under- or overestimate the beauty of A2. If the bias is bigger than 1, then A1 is 
relatively positive about the beauty of agent A2. When the resulting value for the 
perceived feature is bigger than 1, it is set to 1, to prevent the formula from going out 
of range. Similar formulas are used for ethics, epistemics and intended affordances. 
To relate affordances to goals, the agent has goals it wants to achieve: desired goals. 
For example, an agent wants maintenance, power supply, and a knowledge base. 
The agent also has goals it wants to avoid: undesired goals. For example, a agent 
does not want to hurt its owner nor does it want to be destroyed. 
 
 
Perceived(Real, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unr, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Unr) *    Designed(Unr, A2) 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Good) * Designed(Good, A2) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Bad) *   Designed(Bad, A2) 
Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) = Bias(A1,A2, Aid) *     Designed(Aid, A2) 
Perceived(Obst, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Obst) * Designed(Obst, A2)  
 
 
9.6.2 Appraisal variables 
 
Our agents look at other agents and users in terms of goal achievement. Agents 
have beliefs about goal-states in the world being true [0, 1] and about states 
facilitating or inhibiting other states [-1, 1] (-1: strong inhibition, 1: strong facilitation, 0: 
neutral). The likelihood of accomplishing a goal-state [-1, 1] (-1: Inhibit a goal state, 0: 
mean an event would not contribute to a goal state, but does not necessarily inhibit it, 
1: facilitate a goal state ) via another agent is calculated from the already-
accomplished sub goals, which are states that facilitate or inhibit the goal-state, 
increasing or decreasing the likelihood of accomplishing the goal-state, respectively. 
All beliefs about the states being true are multiplied with the beliefs about the states 
facilitating or inhibiting the goal-state, according to algorithm A: 
 
1. Sort the values in two lists: facilitation[0→1] and inhibition [0→-1]. 
2. For both lists, start at 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the 
next value in the list until EOF.  
3. Likelihood = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with proportional 
weights (#pos/#tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg/#tot) for the list 
of negative values.  
 
Each facilitating sub goal that is achieved increases the perceived likelihood of 
reaching the goal-state, but the more sub goals are achieved, the less impact each 
has on the perceived likelihood (cf. Allen, 1934).  
Agents also have beliefs that actions of others affect world-states [-1, 1], (-1: 
strong inhibition, 1: strong facilitation, 0: neutral). If an agent observes someone 
performing an action and believes this facilitates a certain world-state, the agent 
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changes its beliefs that the agent performing the action is responsible for establishing 
that world-state.  This is done according to formula F (see also Pontier & Siddiqui, 
2009b): 
 
 
 
IF  obs(A1, A2, Performs, Action) 
AND  belief(Action, Facilitates, Goal-State) > 0 
` → belief(A2, Responsible, Goal-State)k+1 =  belief(A2, Responsible, Goal-state)k  +  
mfbel_resp * belief(Action, Facilitates, Goal-State) * (1 – belief(A2, Responsible, Goal-State)k). 
 
 
In formulas of the form F, mf<variable> [0, 1] is a modification factor that determines how 
quickly the variable is updated (here, believed responsibility). This modification factor 
is multiplied with the impact value, which is in factbelief(action, facilitates, goal). Multiplying 
with limiter (1-old_belief) regulates going out of range, keeping an agent’s beliefs 
from extremely high or low values. 
Agents have beliefs about agents being praiseworthy [-1, 1], where -1 is 
blameworthy, 0 is neutral, and 1 is praiseworthy. If Coppélia believes a goal should 
have been achieved that in fact has not, she blames or praises Franz or her father 
who she believes are responsible for (not) achieving the goal. This is done according 
to formula F with as impact value belief(A1, A2, Responsible, Goal-State) * ambition_level(Goal-
State). If Franz (A1) beliefs that Dr. Coppélius (A2) is responsible for facilitating a 
desired goal-state or for preventing an undesired goal-state, Franz will increase his 
perceived praiseworthiness of Coppélius. In the reverse case, Franz will decrease his 
perceived praiseworthiness of Coppélius (and thereby increase his perceived 
blameworthiness). 
 
9.6.3 Calculating expected utilities 
 
In the system, the agents can perform actions to reach their goals. The system 
contains a library of goals, and each agent has a level of ambition for each goal. 
There are goals the agent wants to reach, and goals that the agent wants to avoid, all 
with several levels of importance. The levels of ambition the agent attaches to the 
goals are represented by a real value between [-1, 1], where a negative value means 
that the goal is undesired and a positive value means that the goal is desired. A 
bigger value means the goal is more important for the agent. 
The agents can perform actions to reach their goals. The system contains a library 
of actions from which the agents can choose. The agent has a belief about each 
action that it will inhibit or facilitate a certain goal. Its estimation of the facilitation of 
the goal by the action is represented by a real value between [-1, 1], -1 being full 
inhibition, 1 being full facilitation. The following formulas are used to calculate the 
expected utilities of actions and features. 
 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Goal) = Belief(facilitates(Action, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
ExpectedUtility(Feature, Goal) = Belief(facilitates(Feature, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
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The expected utilities of features or possible actions are calculated by looking at the 
goal-states it influences. If an action or a feature is believed to facilitate a desired 
goal or inhibits an undesired goal, this will increase its expected utility. If it inhibits a 
desired goal, or facilitates an undesired goal, this will decrease its expected utility.  
Given the level of ambition for a goal and the believed facilitation of a goal by an 
action towards another agent, the agent calculates the expected utility of performing 
that action towards that agent regarding that goal by multiplying the believed 
facilitation of the goal with the level of ambition for the goal.  
A feature or action can have multiple expected utilities to several goals. Algorithm 
A calculates from all expected utilities of a feature the general expected utility as 
generalized across goals that are believed to be impacted by that feature. The 
general expected utilities of actions generate action tendencies in the agent with the 
same value.  
Instead of discrete classification as positive approach, negative approach, change, 
or avoidance (Hoorn et al., 2008), actions have a continuous level of positivity and 
negativity. This allows for differentiating between constructive critique (positive 
change) and quibbling (negative change). To calculate general positivity and general 
negativity in the action tendencies, all action tendencies are multiplied with the 
positivity of the action and the negativity of the action in two separate lists. Algorithm 
A is performed to both these lists to calculate the general positivity and negativity of 
the action tendencies of the agent. 
 
9.6.4 Similarity 
 
For an agent to perceive its similarity with another agent, it needs to perceive the 
features of the self. Agents perceive their own features the same way they perceive 
the aesthetics and epistemics of other agents. Only this time, the bias is the bias in 
self-perception, instead of in the perception of another agent 
 
 
 
 Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) = Bias(A1, A1, Feature) *  Designed(Feature, A1)  
 
 
Similarity is perceived according to the differences between the agent’s perception of 
its own features and its perception of the features of the other agent: 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 1-(Σ(βsim←feat*abs(Perceived(Feat,A1,A2)-Perceived(Feat,A1,A1)))  
Dissimilarity(A1, A2) = Σ(βds←feat * abs(Perceived(Feat,A1,A2) - Perceived(Feat,A1,A1)))  
 
To  calculate  the  dissimilarity  between  two  agents,  the differences  between  the  
perceived  values  for  its  own features, and those perceived for the other agent are 
taken. These differences are all added, with a certain (regression) weight 
b.  Similarity is calculated in a similar manner, but with different weights, and the sum 
of all differences is subtracted of 1. 
 
9.6.5 Relevance, valence, involvement and distance 
 
The  formulas  in  this  paragraph  were  designed  using generalized  linear  
models (Nelder  &  Wedderburn,  1972; McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). Hoorn (2008) 
shows that the calculated dependent variable (e.g., relevance) is fed by a number 
of contributing variables. Each contributing variable has a certain main effect on 
the dependent variable. The size of this main effect is represented by a 
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(regression) weight β the same way as for calculating similarity.  When  two 
variables interact, the interaction effect on the dependent variable  is  calculated  
by  multiplying  the  product  of  the values  of  these  two  variables  with  a  
certain  regression weight,  which  accounts  for  the  interaction  effect  on  the 
dependent variable. When the interaction is over-additive, the weight will be 
positive, and when it is under-additive, the weight will be negative. 
The formula for the calculation of a variable A that is dependent on the 
variables B, C, and D, of which C and D interact, would be: A = βB*B + βC*C + 
βD*D + βCD*C*D. In this formula, βB, βC, and βD are the (regression) weights for the 
main effect of variables B, C, and D respectively, and βCD is the (regression) 
weight for the interaction effect of C and D. Hereby, βC is only that contribution 
from C that is controlled for D, and βD is the contribution of D that is controlled for 
C, and βCD is the contributation from C and D as an interaction effect. All chosen 
values for the β weights are based on the theories the model is based on, such as 
the found effect sizes in the empirical studies leading to I-PEFiC. 
In Hoorn et al. (2008), the action tendencies of each class have a direct effect on 
involvement (Inv) and distance (Dis), whereas here, the general positivity and 
negativity of action tendencies have an effect on involvement and distance via 
relevance (Rel) and valence (Val). If Coppélia has high expected utility for launching 
negative approach actions at Franz (beat him), this results in high general negativity 
of the action tendencies. This increases the negative valence that Coppélia 
experiences towards Franz, leading to an increase in distance and a decrease in 
involvement.   
General action tendencies (GAT) are in the range [-1, 1] but are transformed to the 
range [0, 1] in these formulas by adding 1 and dividing the result by 2. All effects of 
variables on each other are summarized in Table 9.1.  
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Table 9.1: The effects of variables on each other. In this table, (+) stands for positive, 
and (-) for negative. DSim stands for Dissimilarity. 
 Rel Irr (+)Val (-)Val Inv Dis 
Beauty     x x 
Ugly      x x 
Realistic      x x 
Unrealisti
c  
    x x 
Good x x x x   
Bad  x x x x   
(+)GAT x x x x   
(-)GAT x x x x   
Aid      x x 
Obstacle      x x 
(+)Val     x x 
(-)Val     x x 
(+)Val*Si
m 
    x x 
(-
)Val*Sim 
    x x 
(+)Val*D
Sim 
    x x 
(-
)Val*DSim 
    x x 
(+)Val*B
eauty 
    x x 
(-
)Val*Beauty 
    x x 
(+)Val*U
gly 
    x x 
(-
)Val*Ugly 
    x x 
Rel     x x 
Irr     x x 
Rel*Sim     x x 
Irr*Sim     x x 
Rel*DSi
m 
    x x 
Irr*DSim     x x 
Rel*Beau
ty 
    x x 
Irr*Beaut
y 
    x x 
Rel*Ugly     x x 
Irr*Ugly     x x 
 
Algorithm A computes the use intentions that, for example, Coppélia has with Franz, 
using the expected utilities of all Franz’ features and the actions that she can perform 
to him. If Franz facilitates desired or inhibits undesired goal-states he will raise 
positive use intentions in Coppélia, and vice versa. 
Her expected satisfaction is calculated by trading involvement (I) for distance (D), 
and taking a weighed mean of the involvement-distance trade-off (IDT) and the use 
intentions (UI) as described in Hoorn et al. (2008). When she does this for multiple 
agents, the agent with the highest expected satisfaction will be selected. Once an 
agent is selected, an action is searched, using: 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(A1, Action, A2) =  
weu * Action_Tendency +  
wpos * (1 - abs(positivity – biasI * Involvement)) +  
wneg* (1 - abs(negativity – biasD * Distance)) 
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While looking for the strongest action tendency, the agent’s positivity level seeks to 
come close to the level of (biased) involvement, the negativity level to (biased) 
distance. Shifts in weight can adjust the importance of positivity, negativity, and 
expected utility for selecting an action: The biases account for individual defaults 
(being a positively or negatively oriented person), which is a type of response 
modulation. 
 
9.6.6. Effects on emotions 
 
Believed likelihood that (un)desired world-states will occur underlie hope and fear. 
For all world-states with a believed likelihood, hope to achieve goals is calculated as: 
 
IF f >= likelihood → hope_for_goal = -0.25 * (cos(1/f * π * likelihood(goal)) -1.5) * 
ambition(goal) 
IF f < likelihood → hope_for_goal = -0.25 * (cos(1/(1-f) * π * (1-likelihood(goal))))-1.5) 
* ambition(goal) 
 
Here, f is a shaping parameter (0, 1) that positions the top of the hope curve. The 
value of f may differ per individual, representing ‘fatalism’ or ‘pessimism’: The top of 
the likelihood/hope-curve is always where likelihood = f. Thus, for f close to 1, the top 
is situated at the right (representing hope only in cases of high probability); for f close 
to 0, the top is left (representing hope even in cases of low probability). In our 
simulations, f was set at 0.5. We chose a smooth instead of a linear function, 
because this matches human emotion curves (Bosse & Zwanenburg, 2009). 
Furthermore, a higher ambition simply leads to higher hopes (standard in the 
literature). Algorithm A is performed to the resulting values for hope_for_goal. Instead 
of step 3, however, hope is the outcome of the positive values list and fear is the 
absolute outcome of the negative values list.  
If a world-state becomes true or false, the levels of joy and distress are calculated 
by formula F with ambition_level(World-State) or ambition_level(World-State) as impact value.  
For instance, if a world-state becomes true, ambition_level(World-State)   determines   joy   
and -ambition_level(World-State) distress. A desired world-state that becomes true 
increases joy and decreases distress. An undesired world-state becoming true does 
the reverse.  
This rule is applied also to world-states that facilitate other world-states, with 
belief(State, Facilitates, Goal-State) * ambition_level(Goal-State) or a negation of this multiplication 
as impact value. This way, achieving sub goals of desired world-states increases joy 
and decreases distress. Obstructive sub goals (world-states that inhibit goal-states) 
do the opposite. If a world-state becomes true, the agent’s level of surprise moves 
towards the believed unlikelihood of this world-state happening, using: 
 
 
SurpriseK+1 = pSurp * Surprisek + (1-psurp)*(1–likelihood) 
 
 
Here, psurp is a persistency factor, determining the slowness of adjustment of 
surprise. If an agent beliefs that a goal-state should have been reached, but it has 
not, this will increase its surprise according to F with likelihood(Goal-State) as impact 
value. For all agents, the decay of surprise was set at 0.95 at each time step.   
F also determined the level of anger [0, 1] with other agents, with belief(A2, Responsible, 
Goal-State) * ambition_level(A1, Goal-State) as impact value. If goal-states should have been 
achieved already, the agent gets angrier at those who are believed to be responsible 
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and less angry at those who were helpful. If goal-states are undesired, the reverse 
happens. The decay factor of anger was set at 0.95 at each time step.   
Algorithm A calculates the general level of anger from all levels of anger of one 
agent to another. Because there is only a list of positive values, step 3 becomes 
superfluous and the general level of anger simply is the outcome of step 2. Anger at 
self determines the value of guilt.  
In Bosse et al. (2007b), all agents have a desired level of intensity for each type of 
emotion. This is usually high for positive emotions (joy, hope) and low for negative 
emotions (anger, guilt). The overall mood is calculated by taking a weighed sum of 
the differences between the desired level and the actual level of emotion for all 
emotions simulated and subtracting this from 1: 
 
   Mood = 1-(Σ(βEmotion * abs(actual(Emotion) – desired(Emotion)) 
 
9.6.7. Emotion regulation strategies 
 
Agents can perform situation selection and situation modification by affectively 
selecting situations and sub situations with the highest expected satisfaction. 
Attentional deployment shifts the focus of attention. Agents have beliefs that certain 
features cause emotions. If Coppélia focuses on Franz’ dancing skills and her joy 
increases, this will increase her belief that Franz’ dancing skills caused that emotion, 
using F with (Emotion(t) – Emotion(t-1)) * Attention(Feature) as impact value. 
Emotion(t), then, is a level of emotion at a certain time point. Using the belief that a 
feature Feat causes an emotion E, an agent can shift attention Att as an emotion 
regulation strategy using: 
 
 
Att(Feat)k+1=Att(Feat)k–belief(Feat,causes,E)*(E–desired(E)) 
 
This rule regulates that if Coppélia believes that Franz causes an emotion, she will 
pay more attention to him if she wants to increase that emotion, and less attention if 
she wants to down-regulate that emotion.  
At each time step, relevance of features can also cause attention shifts by taking 
the absolute value of the general expected utility of a feature: 
 
 
Att(Feat)k+1=patt * Att(Feat)k + (1 - patt) * Relevance(Feat) 
 
 
Here, patt is a persistency factor, predicating the slowness of adjusting the attention. 
At each time step, the sum of the levels of attention is normalized to 1.  
Cognitive change is implicitly performed by changing beliefs during the simulation 
(e.g., beliefs that actions facilitate goal-states, beliefs about the likelihood of goal-
states, the praiseworthiness of others). These belief changes indirectly influence the 
agents’ mood. Cognitive change can also be performed explicitly by changing the 
causal interpretation of past events, a form of emotion-focused coping. Suppose 
Franz feels guilty for not achieving the desired goal-state of being loyal (i.e., the level 
of guilt is above threshold), either because he performed an action that inhibited 
loyalty (court Swanilde), or did not perform an action that facilitated it (walk away 
from Swanilde). Then he can decrease his belief that an action (e.g., sleeping with 
Swanilde) had an influence on achieving the goal of being loyal by multiplying it with 
a modification factor, which is set at 0.8 for the current simulations.  
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9.7. Simulations 
 
We implemented Silicon Coppélia in Javascript and performed simulation 
experiments under different parameter settings. We expected that using this model, a 
wider variety of behavior could be simulated than each of the three models it is based 
on.  She is the concoction of sinister Doctor Coppélius, who made her so human-like 
that a young man named Franz was prepared to denounce his fiancée Swanilda for 
her. 
Each experiment concerned the mechanic doll Coppélia, her creator Dr. 
Coppélius, and a young man, Franz, that is in a love affair with the doll. Coppélia and 
Franz are in a room. Franz is deliberating whether to allow or forbid Coppelia from 
going to a party. The possible world-states (i.e., the goals and subgoals the agents 
could have during the simulation) were ‘Coppélia is having fun’, ‘Coppélia is safe’, 
and ‘Franz is happy’. The scenario was that there is a dance party going on and the 
possible actions that were inserted in the system were: Going to the party, allowing 
someone to go to the party, allowing someone to go to the party with some 
restrictions (e.g., be home early and not get kissed), and denying someone to go to 
the party. The results of the experiments are described below. Note that we 
sometimes used unrealistic settings to show how the model works.  
 
Baseline condition  
An initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for the 
remaining experiments. In this condition, all parameters were set to 0, and the biases 
in perceiving features were set to the neutral value of 1. The desired levels of 
emotion were set to 0.8 for hope, 0.3 for fear, 0.9 for joy, 0.1 for distress, 0.4 for 
surprise, 0.1 for anger and 0.1 for guilt for all agents. The positivity and negativity of 
actions were defined according to Table 9.2:  
 
 
Table 9.2: Positivity and negativity of actions  
Action Positivity Negativity 
Allow to go to the party 0.8 0.2 
Allow to go with restrictions 0.6 0.4 
Deny to go to the party 0.2 0.8 
Go to party 0.9 0.1 
 
The complete parameter settings for the baseline condition can be found in (Pontier 
& Siddiqui, 2009b). This led to all emotions, perceived feature values, beliefs, 
expected utilities, action tendencies and general positivity and negativity in the action 
tendencies being 0. Because all the agents were exactly the same, the perceived 
similarity was 1 and dissimilarity was 0 for all agents. For all agents, the perceived 
relevance was 0.73, irrelevance was 0.28, and positive valence as well as negative 
valence was 0.29. The perceived involvement was 0.20, and the perceived distance 
was 0.12, leading to an involvement-distance tradeoff of 0.18. All use intentions were 
0, together with the involvement-distance tradeoff leading to an expected satisfaction 
of 0.24 for all agents. All expected satisfactions for going to the party with another 
agent were 0.38, while all the expected satisfactions for the other actions the agents 
could perform were 0.40. The resulting mood level for all the agents was 0.62. 
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Experiment 1: Franz gets angry 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Time plot of changing variables in experiment 1. In the time plots of 
the experiments, F = Franz, D = Coppélius, C = Coppélia). 
 
In this experiment, Franz observed that Dr. Coppélius allowed Coppélia to go to a 
nightly dance party. Franz wanted his prospective bride to be safe (ambition level set 
to 1) and believed that allowing Coppélia to go to the party strongly inhibited this goal 
(belief set to -1). The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 9.6. 
Franz’ belief led to a negative expected utility for allowing Coppélia to go to the 
party with respect to the goal of safeguarding his loved one, which led to a negative 
action tendency for this action. This resulted in Franz having negative use intentions 
towards Coppélia.  
Compared to the baseline experiment, this decreased Franz’ expected satisfaction of 
performing an action towards Coppélia, and the expected satisfaction of allowing 
Coppélia to go to the party. 
Because Franz observed that Dr. Coppélius allowed his creation to go to the party 
at such a late hour and because Franz believed that this inhibited the goal of his 
girlfriend being safe, Franz held Dr. Coppélius responsible for Coppélia not being 
safe. Because Franz wanted Coppélia to be safe, he thought Dr. Coppélius was to 
blame and he increased his bias of perceiving the badness of Dr. Coppélius and 
decreased the bias of perceiving the goodness of the inventor. (However, because 
the designed values for good and bad were set to 0 for all agents, the perceived 
goodness and badness did not change in this experiment). Franz got angry with Dr. 
Coppélius. Because of this, his general anger level increased.  Thereby, his anger 
level moved further away from his desired level of anger, which causes a decrease in 
mood.  
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Experiment 2: Coppélia’s belief that states lead to other states 
    
   
Figure 9.7: Time plot of changing variables in experiment 2. 
 
In this experiment, dancing doll Coppélia wanted Franz to be happy (ambition level 
set to 1). She thought that if she were safe and was having fun, this would make 
Franz feel happy (both states were made sub goals of the state ‘Franz is happy’ with 
value 1). Due to the external event at time point 1, a music band marching into the 
street, Coppélia was having fun. At time point 2, Coppélia came home safely, which 
resulted in Franz being happy at time point 3. The results of this experiment are 
shown in Figure 9.7. 
At time point 1, because she was having fun, Coppélia believed that Franz might 
become happy. Because of this, she had hope for Franz becoming happy, which led 
to an increased level of general hope. Also, because Coppélia was having fun and 
none of the agents had any expectations that this would happen, their level of 
surprise increased. This increased the mood of Franz and Coppélia. 
At time point 2, because she was having fun and was safe, Coppélia believed that 
Franz might become happy with a likelihood of 0.75. Because of this higher 
likelihood, she was pretty confident that Franz would become happy and therefore, 
her hope for Franz to become happy decreased, which also caused her general level 
of hope to decrease.  Also, because Coppélia was safe and none of the agents had 
any expectations that this would happen, their level of surprise increased . This led to 
an increase of mood for Franz. Because Coppélia’s hope decreased, this slightly 
decreased her mood.  
At time point 3, Franz was even more surprised because he was happy. Coppélia, 
however, was already expecting him to become happy, so her level of surprise 
decreased. Because being happy was a desired goal of Coppélia, her level of joy 
increased, which elevated her mood. 
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Experiment 3: Franz’ involvement with Coppélia overrides his rationality 
 
Figure 9.8: Changes in variables in experiment 3 compared to the baseline experiment. 
 
In this experiment, Coppélia was a good, beautiful, realistic agent (designed features 
set to 1). Franz wanted her to be safe (ambition level set to 1) and assumed that 
denying her to go to the late-night party facilitated this goal (belief set to 1). This led 
Franz to having an expected utility of 1 for forbidding Coppélia to go to the party with 
respect to the goal of her being safe and an action tendency of 0.5 for this action. 
Because of this, the general positivity and negativity in his action tendencies were 
respectively 0.03 and 0.10, and his Use Intentions were 0.25. The results of this 
experiment are shown in Figure 9.8. 
Due to the changed designed features compared to the baseline condition, the 
perceived similarity and relevance of Franz and Coppélia for each other decreased. 
Similarly, both the positive and the negative valence of Franz towards Coppélia 
increased.  
This led Coppélia to having a decreased involvement towards Franz. The 
involvement and distance of Franz towards Coppélia both increased. Because of this, 
the output value of the involvement-distance trade-off of Coppélia towards Franz 
decreased, whereas Franz increased his value of the involvement-distance trade-off 
towards Coppélia.  
The expected satisfaction of Franz for performing an action towards Coppélia 
increased. Whereas the expected satisfaction of denying Coppélia to go to the party 
decreased for Dr. Coppélius; for Franz, the expected satisfaction of performing this 
action increased, because of the high expected utility of this action. However, due to 
the increase in involvement, the expected satisfaction of allowing Coppélia to go to 
the party with restrictions increased to an even higher level. Therefore, Franz ended 
up allowing Coppélia to go to the midnight dance party with restrictions, where 
rationally he would have chosen to forbid her to go, because that action had a much 
higher expected utility for Franz, than the action he actually performed. 
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Experiment 4: Coppélius and Franz disagree 
 
 
Figure 9.9: Time plot of changing variables in experiment 4. In the time plots of 
the experiments, Goal-1 = Coppélia is safe). 
 
In this experiment, Coppélia was designed to be a beautiful agent (designed value 
set to 1). Compared to the baseline experiment, this led both Franz and Coppélius to 
increase their attention to the beauty of their loved one, and therefore slightly 
decrease their attention to other features in the world. The results of this experiment 
are shown in Figure 9.9. 
Franz and Coppélius wanted Coppélia to have fun and to be safe (ambition level 
set to 1). Dr. Coppélius believed that his creation being beautiful facilitated the goal of 
her having fun (value set to 1). Franz, however, believed that this inhibited the goal of 
his girlfriend being safe (value set to -1). This led Franz to perceive a negative 
expected utility for the beauty of his lover regarding her being safe, which also 
caused a negative general expected utility for her beauty. Dr. Coppélius, however, 
perceived a positive expected utility for the beauty of his creation regarding the goal 
of Coppélia having fun, also causing a positive general expected utility for her beauty. 
Further, Franz believed that allowing his girl to go to the party inhibited the goal of 
Coppélia being safe (value set to -1), and forbidding her to go to the party facilitated 
his girlfriend being safe. Coppélius believed, however, that allowing Coppélia to go to 
the party facilitated the goal of her having fun (value set to 1), whereas forbidding 
Coppélia to go to the party inhibited this goal (value set to -1).  
This led Franz to have a negative expected utility for allowing Coppélia to go to the 
party regarding her safety, and he generated a negative action tendency for this 
action. He had a positive expected utility for forbidding his loved one to go to the 
party in view of her safety, and for this action he generated a positive action 
tendency.  
For Dr. Coppélius, however, this led to a positive expected utility for allowing 
Coppélia to go to the party regarding her having fun, and generated a positive action 
tendency for this action. It also generated a negative expected utility for forbidding 
Coppélia to go to the party regarding her having fun, and he generated a negative 
action tendency for this action. This led both men to have a general positivity in 
action tendencies of 0.125, and a general negativity in action tendencies of -0.125. 
Because Franz and Coppélius perceived their treasure as more beautiful than 
themselves, compared to the baseline experiment, their perceived similarity with 
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Coppélia, and the perceived dissimilarity increased. This also increased their 
perceived positive valence towards Coppélia, and decreased their perceived negative 
valence towards her. This increased their involvement with their loved one, and 
decreased their distance. This led both men to have an increased involvement-
distance tradeoff towards Coppélia. Franz had decreased intentions to interact with 
Coppélia, while Coppélius had increased use intentions. This led Franz to have a 
smaller expected satisfaction than Coppélius for interacting with Coppélia. 
Compared to the baseline experiment, Franz decreased his expected satisfaction 
of allowing Coppélia to go to the party, and increased his expected satisfaction of 
forbidding Coppélia to go to the party. Dr. Coppélius increased his expected 
satisfaction of allowing Coppélia to go to the party, and decreased his expected 
satisfaction of forbidding her to go to the party. The expected satisfactions of the 
other two possible actions to perform to their loved one increased for both men.  
This led Franz to forbid his girlfriend to go to the party, and Dr. Coppélius to allow 
his concoction to go. Therefore, Franz believed that Coppélius was responsible for 
inhibiting Coppélia’s safety, whereas he held himself responsible for facilitating this 
goal. Dr. Coppélius, on his turn, held Franz responsible for inhibiting the goal of 
Coppélia having fun, whereas he held himself responsible for facilitating this goal.  
Because both men kept on performing the same action, the next timestep these 
values were increased. Further, because Coppélius believed his creation should be 
having fun starting from this timepoint, while this was not the case, he blamed his 
would-be son-in-law for keeping Coppélia from having fun, whereas he praised 
himself for trying to make her have fun. Because of this, he got a bit angry at Franz, 
causing his general level of anger to increase. 
Further, because he focused relatively much of his attention to the beauty of his 
creation while increasing his level of anger, Dr. Coppélius increased the belief that 
beauty causes anger, whereas this belief increased remarkably less for the other 
features. 
 
Experiment 5: Coppélius regulates his emotions 
For this experiment, the same parameter settings as in experiment 4 were used. This 
time, however, Dr. Coppélius believed that allowing Coppélia to go to the party with 
some restrictions facilitated all goals inserted into the system. The results of this 
experiment are shown in Figure 9.10. 
The belief that allowing Coppélia to the party with some restrictions facilitated all 
goals, lead Coppélius to have a positive expected utility for this action regarding both 
the goals of Coppélia having fun and being safe. Therefore, he generated a tendency 
of 0.75 for this action. This increased his general positivity in action tendencies, 
which increased his perceived relevance of Coppélia, and decreased his perceived 
irrelevance of her. Further, it increased his perceived positive valence towards 
Coppélia. Because of this, his involvement with Coppélia increased, and his distance 
towards her decreased.  
This caused an increase of involvement-distance tradeoff. His intentions to interact 
with his creation were increased. This led to an increased expected satisfaction for 
interacting with Coppélia. 
Compared to experiment 4, Dr. Coppélius increased his expected satisfaction of 
allowing Coppélia to go to the party, and performed this action. This caused him to 
belief he was responsible for facilitating all goals inserted into the system. Also, Franz 
did not see Coppélius anymore as inhibiting his girlfriend having fun, because Franz 
did not have any beliefs about allowing Coppélia to go to the party with some 
restrictions.  
Because Dr. Coppélius kept performing the same action, the next timestep these 
values were increased. Further, Dr. Coppélius believed that Coppélia should be 
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having fun, while this was not the case. Because he did not allow her to go to the 
party without restrictions while he believed this would facilitate Coppélia having fun, 
Dr. Coppélius regulated his emotions. As an emotion-regulation strategy, he 
decreased the belief ‘allowing Coppélia to go to the party without restrictions will lead 
her to having fun’.  
 
 
Figure 9.10: Time plot of changing variables in experiment 5. In this time plot, 
Goal_0 = Coppélia is having fun, Goal_2 = Franz is happy, and Feature_2 = beauty). 
 
 
9.8. Conclusion  
 
We presented an implementation of Silicon Coppélia, which is a combination of 
CoMERG (Bosse et al., 2007b), I-PEFiCADM (Hoorn et al., 2008), and a simplified 
version of EMA (Gratch and Marsella, 2006; 2009). In this model, the agents have 
goal-related beliefs that lead to emotions. More specifically, the agents have beliefs 
about the responsibility of other agents for (not) achieving goal-states, and about 
praiseworthiness based on this responsibility. The agents also have beliefs about the 
likelihood of achieving goal-states. These beliefs were based on other beliefs that 
were also inserted into the system. The beliefs together with the other variables in the 
system affected the seven emotions that were experienced by the agents: joy, 
distress, hope, fear, anger, guilt and surprise. These emotions were aggregated into 
an overall mood. Further, certain emotion-regulation strategies were added to the 
system based on Bosse et al. (2007b), and Gratch and Marsella (2006, 2009).  
Simulation of the behavior of Silicon Coppélia showed that in Experiment 1, Franz 
became cross with Dr. Coppélius, because in his view, the inventor performed an 
action (allowing Coppélia to go to a dance party) that was in conflict with Franz’ goals 
(Coppélia being safe). In Experiment 2, changes in the world led Coppélia to have 
beliefs about the likelihood of other world-states becoming true. This caused her to 
experience hope, and later in the simulation joy when the expected and desired goal-
state became true. Further, all the agents experienced surprise when world-states 
unexpectedly became true. In Experiment 3, due to involvement with Coppélia, Franz 
made the affective decision to allow his girlfriend to go to the midnight party, where 
rationally, he would have forbidden her to go. In Experiment 4, Franz and Dr. 
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Coppélius disagreed on what was best for their loved one, and therefore Coppélius 
becomes a bit angry at Franz, as he believed That Franz kept Coppélia from having 
fun. In Experiment 5, Coppélius did not perform an action of which he believed it 
would help to reach his goals, because he saw a better option. As an emotion-
regulation strategy, later in the simulation he decreased the belief that this action 
would have helped. 
Previous experiments showed that CoMERG (Bosse et al., 2007b), I-PEFiCADM 
(Hoorn et al., 2008) and EMA (Gratch and Marsella, 2006; 2009) are not able to 
simulate this kind of behavior on their own. CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM cannot 
simulate emotions or belief-changes based on beliefs about the responsibility of other 
agents and the likelihood of goal-states happening (Experiment 1, 2, 4 and 5). EMA 
is not capable of making irrational decisions when appropriate (Experiment 3). 
Therefore, we may conclude that the simulation experiments confirmed that Silicon 
Coppélia shows richer affective behavior than the other models.  
We have conducted an initial study which indicates that an agent equipped with 
the combined model can behave emotionally believable (Pontier et al., 2010). 
However, one fallacy of our approach obviously is that ‘richer’ does not 
necessarily mean ‘better’. As often in computational modeling, all other things being 
equal, the simplest solution is the best. Thus, the combined model of affect should 
only contain those variables of which it is certain that they have an added value. User 
studies will have to point out whether this is the case. Therefore, we plan to perform 
systematic tests to assess whether in the eyes of the user Silicon Coppélia indeed 
results in more human-like affective behavior than the three sub models do 
separately. 
As soon as the model has been validated in user studies, we will start exploring 
the possibilities to apply it to real humans instead of agents; i.e., to develop a robot 
that can communicate affectively with humans in a more natural way, with a mind of 
its own, in pursuit of its own goals, and acting emotionally intelligent. 
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Chapter 10: An affective agent playing tic-tac-
toe as part of a healing environment16 
 
Abstract  
 
There is a growing belief that the environment plays an important role in the healing process 
of patients, supported by empirical findings. Previous research showed that psychological 
stress caused by loneliness can be reduced by artificial companions. As a pilot application for 
this purpose, this paper presents an affective agent playing tic-tac-toe with the user. 
Experimenting with a number of agents under different parameter settings shows the agent is 
able to show human-like emotional behavior, and can make decisions based on rationality as 
well as on affective influences. After discussing the application with clinical experts and 
making improvements where needed, the application can be tested in a clinical setting in 
future research. 
 
10.1.   Introduction 
 
Many people do not like the atmosphere in hospitals. Since two decades, there is a growing 
belief that not only the health care itself, but also the environment affects the healing process 
of the patients. This has increased the interest in healing environments. The role of the 
environment in the healing process is a growing concern among health care providers, 
environmental psychologists, consultants and architects. Among them the consensus is 
growing that not only the level of care, but also the design of the health care facility affects the 
wellness of its patients (Devlin & Ameill, 2003). 
Researchers are finding that making changes and additions to the physical and social 
environment of the health care facility, thereby taking the patient into account, can positively 
influence patients’ outcomes (e.g., (Banks et al., 2008; Davidsion, 1994; Nakajima et al., 
2001; Ulrich, 1984; Verderber & Reuman, 2006). Moreover, health care professionals are 
finding that changes in design can enhance recovery in patients, and reduce the length of 
their stay in the hospital (Lempbrecht, 1996). On the other hand, researchers are also finding 
that unfamiliar environments in clinics, hospitals, and nursing homes can produce 
psychological stress that can negatively affect healing and wellness. Poor design has even 
been linked to negative effects on the patient, such as anxiety, delirium, elevated blood 
pressure levels, and an increased intake of pain drugs (Ulrich, 1991). 
One factor that can be reduced by a healing environment is psychosocial stress. An 
important predictor of psychosocial stress is loneliness (Hawkli et al., 2006). Loneliness is a 
common problem frequently encountered in the elderly in long-term care facilities. Many 
people that are staying in a long-term care facility lack social interaction. Artificial toys can be 
used to reduce loneliness. Previous research showed that animal-shaped toys can be useful 
as a tool for occupational therapy (e.g., Nakajima et al., 2001; Wasa & Shibata, 2006; 2009). 
Robot animal therapy has been widely investigated. For example, Dautenhahn and Robins 
(2005; 2009) used mobile robots and dolls respectively to treat autistic children. Wada and 
Shibata (2009) developed Paro, a robot shaped like a baby-seal that interacts with users to 
encourage positive mental effects. Interaction with Paro has been shown to improve users’ 
moods, making them more active and communicative with each other and caregivers. 
Research groups have used Paro for therapy at eldercare facilities and with those having 
Alzheimer’s disease (Kidd et al., 2006; Marti et al., 2006). Banks et al. (2008) showed that 
                                                           
16 This chapter has previously been published as  Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F., A virtual therapist that 
responds empathically to your answers. In: Prendinger, H., Lester, J., and Ishizuka, M. (eds.), 
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA’08, 2008, pp. 417-425.  
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animal-assisted therapy with an AIBO dog helped just as good for reducing loneliness as 
therapy with a living dog. In their paper they indicate that AIBO was not used to its full 
capacity and that if more options were used, its effects might be further enhanced. 
Over the past decade, a lot of novel work on computational models of emotion in virtual 
agents can be observed. Nevertheless, compared to human affective complexity, current 
emotion models of virtual agents are still quite simple. If an artificial companion demonstrates 
human-like emotional behavior, this might increase its ability to reduce loneliness of patients 
in a long-term care facility, as part of a healing environment. 
In our paper, we present a virtual agent that could be seen as a pilot application for this 
purpose. The artificial companion is an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe, 
equipped with Silicon Coppélia (see Chapter 9), an integration of three affect-related models 
as proposed in (Bosse et al., 2010). Because it is equipped with these affect-related models, 
it can show human-like emotional behavior. Therefore, it might be a useful to serve as an 
artificial interaction partner for patients in a long-term care facility. 
 
10.2. The application 
 
The application presented in this paper is an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe 
against the user. The object of tic-tac-toe is to get three in a row on a three by three game 
board. You play on a three by three game board. Players alternate placing X’s and O’s on the 
game board until one of the players has three in a row, or all nine squares on the board are 
filled, which means the game ends in a tie. For creating the virtual agent, we used Haptek’s 
peopleputty software. Through this program we created the face of the virtual agent. The 
agent simulates 5 emotions: joy, distress, hope, fear and surprise, which can be expressed 
with either a low or a high intensity.  
We created 32 (25) different emotional states using peopleputty; one for each possible 
combination of two levels of intensity of the five emotions simulated by the agent. We created 
a webpage for the application, on which the virtual agent was embedded as a Haptek player. 
We used JavaScript, a scripting language, in combination with scripting commands provided 
by the Haptek software, to control the Haptek player within a web browser. 
Figure 10.1 shows the resulting website. In this figure, the agent, playing O’s, just lost a 
game, and therefore looks sad. The website shows in the top left the agent which the user 
plays against. If the agent speaks a message, this is additionally shown in a textbox that is 
shown below the agent. Below this textbox, the ambition levels of the agent for winning and 
losing, and the importance of the current game for the agent are shown. Right next to this, the 
level of involvement and distance from the agent towards the user are shown. Right next to 
the textbox, the predictions of the agent about the expected next move and the outcome of 
the game are shown. Above this, just below the tic-tac-toe board, the user can enter its bet, 
and there is a ‘play again’ button which the user can click on to play a new game with the 
inserted amount of money as bet. Additionally, there is a hint button, which makes the agent 
give a hint to the user about in which square to make a move. Further, there is a ‘game help’ 
button. If the user clicks this button, the agent will explain the rules of the game. 
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Figure 10.1: The website with the tic-tac-toe application. 
 
Because the purpose of this paper is to show how the application works, the affective state is 
not only shown by means of a facial expression of the agent, but the emotion variables are 
also shown numerically on the top right. If the application would be designed to be used by 
human users, these numerical values would not be shown, and only the facial expression 
would be visible to the user. Below the affective state in numbers, the amount of money that 
is currently played for (current bet), the amount of money of the user (your money), and the 
amount of money of the agent (agent money) are shown. There is also a ‘reset bets’ button, 
which resets the bets to the starting values. Below this, the number of games won by the 
user, the number of games won by the agent, and the number of ties is shown.  
The tic-tac-toe board is on the top center of the website, right next to the agent. The user 
can make a move by clicking on one of the squares, on which the agent will react by 
performing its own move. After each move of the human user, the agent speaks a message, 
which is additionally displayed in the text-area below its face, depending on the emotional 
state of the agent. If the game has finished, the amount of money bet for will be added to the 
winner, and subtracted from the loser. The agent speaks a message, depending on the 
outcome of the game, and its emotional state. The user can enter a new bet and click the 
‘play again’ button to play another game. 
 
10.2.1.   The models incorporated in the agent 
 
This virtual agent presented in this paper was constructed by incorporating Silicon Coppélia 
(Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009), an integration of three affect-related models into an existing virtual 
agent that can play tic-tac-toe (Zwanenburg, 2009). The three models that were integrated 
into Silicon Coppélia as suggested in (Bosse et al., 2010) were:  
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1. EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2006; 2009), a model to create agents that exhibit and cope with 
(negative) affect based on Smith & Lazarus’ theory of emotion (1990). A graphical 
representation of EMA is shown in Figure 10.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: A graphical representation of EMA. 
 
 
2. CoMERG (the Cognitive Model for Emotion Regulation based on Gross) (see Chapter 2), 
which can simulate different emotion regulation strategies explained by Gross (2001) using a 
set of logical rules and difference equations. Figure 10.3 shows a graphical representation of 
the emotion regulation model by Gross. 
 
 
Figure 10.3: A graphical representation of the emotion regulation model by Gross 
 
 
3. I-PEFiCADM (Hoorn et al., 2008), a model for building agents that can trade rational for 
affective choices based on the concern-driven theory of Frijda (1986). A graphical 
representation of I-PEFiCADM is shown in Figure 10.4. 
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Figure 10.4:  A graphical representation of I-PEFiCADM. Curved arrows indicate interactions. 
 
 
Integrating these models enabled agents in simulation experiments to show richer interaction 
than they could with any of the models alone. Using the combined model, they could simulate 
emotions based on beliefs about states in the world, and how these states affect their goals. 
The model was also used to simulate affective decision making processes, in which decisions 
are made not only based on rationality, but also on affective influences, enabling the agent to 
make irrational decisions where appropriate. Further, emotion regulation strategies can be 
applied by the agent, to regulate its (simulated) emotions (Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009). 
Figure 10.5 shows a graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia. On the far left of this 
figure, we see a virtual agent. The agent develops state predicates about her opponent. The 
agent acquires personal meaning for her opponent because she compares the features of her 
opponent with her own personal goals, beliefs, and concerns. This establishes her relevance 
and valence to her opponent. While relevance determines the intensity of affect, valence 
governs its direction. The agent can also take perspectives and look at others through the 
eyes of another person or agent.  
When the initial appraisal process is completed, the agent is ready to affectively respond to 
her opponent. Relevance and valence form an appraisal frame that feeds into her 
involvement and distance towards her opponent. Inside, the agent will ‘experience’ several 
(perhaps ambiguous) emotions.  
During affective decision making, the agent selects the move in the game that promises the 
highest expected satisfaction. The performed action leads to a new situation, and after her 
opponent also made his/her move, the model loops until the game has finished. 
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 Figure 10.5: A graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia. 
 
10.2.2. Determining which action to take 
 
Table 10.1: Designed values for perceiving the features of the human user.  
Feature Designed value of human user 
Good 0.6 
Bad 0.2 
Beautiful 0.5 
Ugly 0.3 
Realistic 0.9 
Unrealistic 0.1 
Intended Aid 0.7 
Intended Obstacle 0.4 
 
In Silicon Coppélia (Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009), the agents perceive each other’s features 
according to I-PEFiC (Van Vugt et al., 2009), by multiplying a designed value (a value the 
designer expects to raise in another agent), and a bias for perceiving this feature. For this 
application, as starting values, all biases were set to the neutral value of 1 for the agent. The 
designed values of the human user were set as can be found in Table 10.1. These values 
were chosen arbitrarily, and in an application with real users they should be reconsidered 
together with an expert. 
In Silicon Coppélia, the agents also have beliefs that features of other agents affect certain 
goal-states in the world. For this application, the possible goal-states are ‘agent wins’ and 
‘human wins’. The beliefs about features facilitating these goal-states were set as can be 
seen in Table 10.2: 
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Table 10.2: Designed values for perceiving the features of the human user.  
Feature or Action Facilitates ‘agent wins’ Facilitates ‘human wins’ 
Good 0.5 -0.5 
Bad -0.5 0.5 
Beautiful 0.1 0.1 
Ugly 0.1 0.1 
Realistic 0.1 0.1 
Unrealistic 0.1 0.1 
Intended Aid 0.7 -0.7 
Intended Obstacle -0.7 0.7 
 
The agent also has beliefs about actions facilitating goal-states. As there are nine squares on 
the board, there are nine possible actions for the agent: putting an O in each possible place. 
In Silicon Coppélia, the agents have beliefs that action facilitate goal-states in the range [-1, 
1], where -1 means the agent beliefs the action strongly inhibits the goal-state, and 1 means 
the agent beliefs the action strongly facilitates the goal-state. 
Each turn, the beliefs that actions facilitate goal-states are calculated based on a heuristic 
that estimates the chances of winning when a certain move is made. If the agent can make 
three O’s in a row, the belief that performing this action facilitates ‘agent wins’ is set to 1, and 
the belief that this facilitates ‘human wins’ is set to -1. If the human user has two X’s in a row, 
and the third square in this row is still empty, the agent will belief that putting an O on this 
square facilitates ‘agent wins’ with a value of 0.9, and inhibits ‘human wins’ with a value of -
0.9. If a square is already occupied, the belief that putting an O on this square facilitates a 
goal is set to 0 for both goals, as it is an illegal move. If none of these rules apply for a 
square, the belief that putting an O on the middle square (B2) facilitates ‘agent wins’ is set to 
0.5, and that it facilitates ‘human wins’ to -0.5. Similarly, the belief that putting an O on corner 
squares (A1, A3, C1 and C3) facilitates ‘agent wins’ is set to 0.3 and for ‘human wins’ this is 
set to -0.3. Finally, the belief that putting an O on the remaining squares (A2, B1, B3 and C2) 
facilitates ‘agent wins’ is set to 0.1 and for ‘human wins’ this is set to -0.1. For actions which 
facilitate desired goals, and inhibit undesired goals (i.e., actions with a high expected utility, 
generalized over multiple goals), strong action tendencies are calculated [19]. 
In Silicon Coppélia, each action has a level of positivity and a level of negativity. In this 
application, the level of negativity of each action is defined as the belief of the agent that the 
action facilitates winning the game. The level of negativity of the action is defined as 1 minus 
this belief.  
Using these variables, the affective decision-making of Silicon Coppélia [19] is used to 
determine the action of the agent. The expected satisfaction is calculated using the following 
formula, and the action with the highest level of expected satisfaction is picked. 
 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(Action) =  
wat * Action_Tendency +  
wpos * (1 - abs(positivity – biasI * Involvement)) +  
wneg * (1 - abs(negativity – biasD * Distance)) 
 
The agent will search for the action with the level of positivity that is closest to the level of 
(biased) involvement towards the user, the level of negativity closest to the level of (biased) 
distance towards the user, and the strongest action tendency. The importance of positivity, 
negativity and action tendency for selecting an action can be adjusted by changing the 
weights (wpos, wneg, and wat respectively). If an agent wants to perform more positive actions, 
it can, for example, increase its bias for involvement, and decrease its bias for distance. This 
way, the agent will prefer more positive and less negative actions. 
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Note that this way, the agent can also deliberately lose by setting a high ambition level for the 
goal ‘human wins’, or because the agent is too involved with the user to try to win each game. 
The agent can also determine its ambition level for winning on the outcomes of the previous 
games, and the amount of money that is played for. For example, it can try to win the game if 
it has less money than the human user, and deliberately try to lose if it has more money than 
the human user. The agent can also determine the importance of each game, by dividing the 
amount that is played for by the total amount of money the agent has left. This importance 
can then be the deviation from 0 in the ambition level. 
 
10.2.3. Calculating the emotions of the agent 
 
The agent simulates some emotions while playing the game, based on the actions that are 
being performed by the user, the perceived likelihood of winning and losing, and the outcome 
of the game. Hope and fear are calculated each time the agent has made its move and the 
human user is on turn. The hope and fear of the agent are based on the perceived likelihood 
it will win or lose the game. If the human user is on turn and can make a winning move, it 
estimates the likelihood for losing 0.8, the likelihood for a tie 0.1, and the likelihood for winning 
0.1. If the agent could make a winning move if it would be on turn (but it cannot, because the 
human user is), it will estimate its likelihood for winning 0.5, the likelihood for a tie 0.4 and its 
likelihood for losing 0.1. Otherwise, the likelihood for winning and losing are both estimated 
0.3 by the agent and the likelihood for a tie is estimated 0.4. 
The found likelihoods are used in the following function to calculate the hope for a goal. 
This function is similar to the function described in [5]. 
 
 
IF f >= likelihood THEN hope_for_goal =  
-0,25 * ( cos( 1 / f * π * likelihood(goal) ) -1,5) * ambition_level(goal) 
 
IF f < likelihood THEN hope_for_goal =  
-0.25 * ( cos( 1 / (1-f) * π * (1-likelihood(goal)) ) -1.5) * ambition_level(goal) 
 
 
These functions differ from most approaches present in the literature, since their top is not 
situated at the point where the likelihood is 0. In these functions, f is a shaping parameter (in 
the domain [0, 1]) that can be used to manipulate the location of the top of the hope curve. 
The value of this parameter may differ per individual, and represents ‘fatalism’ (or 
‘pessimism’): the top of the likelihood/hope-curve is always situated at the point where 
likelihood = f. Thus, for an f close to 1, the top of the curve is situated to the extreme right 
(representing persons that only ‘dare’ to hope for events with high probabilities). Similarly, for 
an f close to 0, the top of the curve is situated to the extreme left (representing persons that 
already start hoping for events with low probabilities). In this paper, f is set at 0.5. We chose a 
smooth function instead of a linear function, because this function best matches the emotion 
curves found in humans. Furthermore, a higher ambition level simply leads to a higher hope 
(which is standard in the literature). If the ambition level is negative (i.e., the goal is 
undesired), the outcome of hope_for_goal will be a negative value. 
The following algorithm is performed to the found values for hope_for_goal 
 
 
(1) Sort the values in two lists: [0→1] and [0→-1] 
(2) Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
(3) Hope = Outcome positive list. Fear = abs(Outcome negative list). 
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The values are sorted in a list with positive hope_for_goal’s (i.e., hope for desired goals), and 
negative hope_for_goal’s (i.e., fear for undesired goals). For both the lists, 0 is the starting 
point, and the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list (where the next value 
is the value closest to 0 that is left in the list) is picked until the end of the list is reached. The 
new level of hope for the agent is the outcome of the positive list, and the new level of fear for 
the agent is the absolute value of the outcome of the negative list. 
The joy and distress of the agent are based on reaching or not reaching desired or 
undesired goal-states. If a goal-state becomes true (i.e., the agent wins or the human user 
wins), the levels of joy and distress are calculated by performing the following formulas: 
 
IF ambition_level(goal) >= 0 THEN: 
new_joy  = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition_level(goal) * (1-old_joy) 
new_distress  = old_distress + mf_distress * -ambition_level(goal) * old_distress 
 
IF ambition_level(goal) < 0 THEN: 
new_joy  = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition_level(goal) * old_joy 
new_distress       = old_distress + mf_distress * -ambition_level(goal)*(1-old_distress) 
 
 
In this formula, mf_joy and mf_distress are modification factors that determine how quickly joy 
and distress change if the agent wins or loses the game. In this paper, the values were both 
set at 1. These modification factors are multiplied with the impact value, which is 
ambition_level(goal) for joy and -ambition_level(goal) for distress. This way, if a desired goal 
is reached, this will increase joy and decrease distress, and reaching an undesired goal will 
decrease joy and increase distress. Multiplying with limiter (1-old_joy) for joy and old_distress 
for distress if the goal is desired manages the formula does not go out of range. Further, it 
manages that if an agent’s level of joy or distress approaches an extreme value, it will be 
harder to push it further to the extreme, and easier to get it back to a less extreme value.  If 
the reached goal is undesired, old_joy is used as limiter for joy and (1-old_distress) as limiter 
for distress, because the values of joy and distress will move in the opposite direction as 
when the goal is desired. 
The level of surprise is calculated in a similar manner as in (Bosse & Zwanenburg, 2009). 
To calculate the level of surprise during the game, the agent generates expectations about 
which move the user will make. If a square is free, that square gets a point. If the user can 
make three in a row, or prevent the agent from making three in a row the next turn, the square 
of that move gets 1 extra point. If the user has one X in a row, and the remaining squares of 
that row are free, those squares get 0.5 point. After all the squares have got their points, the 
sum of all points of the squares is normalized to 1. The resulting values for each square are 
the predicted likelihoods of the human making a move on that square. If the user makes a 
move on a certain square, the level of surprise for the agent is 1 – likelihood(move). If the 
game finishes, the level of surprise for the agent is 1 minus the perceived likelihood that the 
game would end that way. 
After each move of the human user, the agent speaks a message, depending on the level 
of surprise. In the system, there is a small database of messages, labeled with certain 
emotion intensities. If the level of surprise is very low, it will show that it expected this move, 
with a message like ‘I thought you would do that’ or ‘A predictable move’. On the other hand, 
if the agent is very surprised by the move of the user, it will speak a more surprised message, 
like ‘That move surprised me!’ or ‘You are full of surprises.’ 
All five emotions inserted in the system (joy, distress, hope, fear and surprise) are 
simulated in parallel. If the level of joy, distress or surprise is below 0.5, a low intensity of the 
emotion is shown by the agent. If the level of joy, distress, or surpise is greater or equal than 
0.5, a high intensity of the emotion is shown by the agent. Because playing the tic-tac-toe 
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game rarely leads to extreme values of hope and fear in the agent, for hope and fear this 
boundary is set to 0.25. 
After each game has ended, the level of satisfaction for the agent is calculated in the range 
[-1, 1]. If the agent wins, the level of satisfaction will be the ambition level for ‘agent wins’. 
Similarly, if the human user wins, the level of satisfaction will be the ambition level for ‘human 
wins’. If the game ends in a tie, the importance of the game is calculated by dividing the 
amount that is played for by the total amount of money of the agent. The satisfaction of the 
agent after a tied game is then calculated by multiplying the importance of the game with 0.5. 
Also a level of relief is calculated for the agent after each game, in the range [-1, 1], by 
multiplying the level of satisfaction with the level of surprise. Further, a message is displayed, 
based on the outcome of the game and the level of satisfaction and relief, the agent speaks a 
message in a similar way as after each move. If the agent wins, and the level of relief is low, 
and the level of satisfaction is low, it will display a neutral message like ‘I win’. If the level of 
satisfaction is higher, it will display a more enthusiastic message like ‘Superb match for me!’ If 
the level of relief is higher, it speaks this relief with a message like ‘I won, that is such a huge 
relief’. If the agent loses, and has a relatively neutral level of satisfaction close to 0, it will 
display a message like ‘You won’. If the agent is very dissatisfied, with a value close to -1, it 
will speak a more dramatic message, like ‘No! I lost everything!’ If the game ends in a tie, the 
agent speaks a neutral message like ‘We tied’. If the agent’s ambition was to win, and it wins, 
it will show a happy facial expression. If it loses, it will look sad. If the agent’s ambition was to 
lose, and it wins, it shows a sad facial expression. If its ambition was to lose and it loses, the 
facial expression will be happy. 
 
10.3. Results 
 
To test the application, the behavior of the agent has been tested under various parameter 
settings. All agents experimented with can be found at [30]. 
 
Agent 1: The agent tries to win 
The ambition level for winning of agent 1 is set to 1, and its ambition level for losing is -1. The 
weight of the affective influences in the decision making process is set to 0. Under these 
parameter settings, the agent will always try to win. Because in tic-tac-toe it is impossible to 
lose if you play it right and you do not want to lose, it is impossible to win of the agent. The 
best game outcome that can be achieved is a draw.  
If the agent wins, it will increase its joy and decrease its distress. If the agent loses, it will 
decrease its joy and increase its distress. If you make a move the agent does not expect, or 
the game ends otherwise than expected, it will be surprised. The expectations of the agent 
can be seen on the website. If the agent thinks it is likely that it will win, it will have a relatively 
high level of hope, and if it thinks it is likely that it will lose, it will have a relatively high level of 
fear. 
 
Agent 2: The agent deliberately tries to lose 
Agent 2 has an ambition level for winning of -1, and an ambition level for losing of 1. This 
means for the agent, winning is an undesired goal, and losing is a desired goal. The weight of 
the affective influences in the decision making process have set to 0, so the agent will always 
try to lose. The only way to let the agent win is to make sure you don’t make three in a row, 
and with the last move of the agent, it can do nothing else than make the winning move. 
Because the agent wants to lose, it will increase its level of joy and decrease its level of 
distress when it loses. If it wins, it will decrease its level of joy, and increase its level of 
distress. 
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Agent 3: The agent decides whether it wants to win based on its money 
For agent 3, the ambition level for winning and losing is dependent on its amount of money 
compared to the amount of money of the human. If the agent has more money than the 
human, it will have an ambition level for winning of -1*importance and an ambition level for 
losing of 1*importance. If the amount of money of the agent is less or equal than that of the 
human, the agent will have an ambition level for winning of 1*importance and an ambition 
level for losing of -1*importance. The weight of the affective influences of the agent is set to 0. 
This causes the agent to try to win, unless it already has more money than the human user. If 
the agent has the ambition to win and it does, it will decrease its joy, and decrease its 
distress, and if it loses it will decrease its joy and increase its distress. However, if the agent 
has the ambition to lose, and it wins, it will decrease its joy and increase its distress, and vice 
versa if it loses. How big the increases and decreases of joy and distress are, depends on the 
importance of the game. 
 
Agent 4: The agent is too involved with the user to win 
Agent 4 is very involved with its user. It is programmed to perceive its user as good, beautiful, 
realistic, and intending to aid (designed values set to 1). It is also programmed to perceive its 
user as not bad, not ugly, not unrealistic, and not intending to obstruct. This causes the agent 
to be very involved with the user with a value of 0.85, and not much at a distance towards the 
user, with a value of 0.08 at the start of the simulation. The ambition level of the agent to win 
is defined as the importance of the game, and the ambition level to lose as the negation of 
this importance. The weight of rational influences in the decision-making process is set to 0. 
This makes the agent want to perform actions towards the user with a high level of positivity, 
and a low level of negativity. Because actions to win the game have a relatively low level of 
positivity and a high level of negativity, the agent will perform actions that facilitate losing the 
game. Because this agent always has a positive ambition to win and a negative ambition to 
lose, winning will always increase its level of joy, and decrease its level of distress, and losing 
will always decrease its level of joy, and increase its level of distress. How big this increase or 
decrease is, is dependent on the importance of the game. 
 
Agent 5: The agent is balanced, and wins sometimes, and loses sometimes 
Agent 5 perceives the user with values as can be seen in Table 1. This leads the agent to be 
involved with the user with a value of 0.63, and to be at a distance with the user with a value 
of 0.26 at the start of the simulation. The ambition level of the agent to win is defined as the 
importance of the game, and the ambition level to lose as the negation of this importance. 
The rational influences in the decision-making process are set to 0.8, and the influences of 
positivity and negativity of action are both set to 0.1. Despite having a higher ambition to win 
than to lose under all circumstances, the agent will be too involved with the user to try to win 
in a game for a small amount of money. However, if the agent’s money is almost gone, or the 
game is about a lot of money, the agent finds the game so important that it will do its best to 
try to win. 
Similarly to agent 4, if agent 5 wins, this will increase joy and decrease distress, and vice 
versa if it loses. 
 
10.4. Discussion 
 
This study presents an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe. Because it is equipped 
with Silicon Coppélia (see Chapter 9), an integration of three affect-related models as 
suggested in (Bosse et al., 2010), it can show human-like emotional behavior. 
We created five different agents, each with different parameter settings, to test the behavior 
under various conditions. We manipulated the ambition levels of the agent, and thereby 
created agent 1, an agent that always tries to win, and agent 2, an agent that always 
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deliberately tries to lose. Agent 3 determines its ambition level for winning and losing on 
whether it has more money than the user or not. If the user has more money than the agent, it 
will deliberately try to lose, but otherwise it will try to win. Agent 4 bases its decisions in the 
game on emotions, and because it is designed to be very involved with the user, it will 
perform actions that facilitate the user winning the game. Agent 5 bases its decisions partly 
on emotions, and partly on rationality. Agent 5 always has more ambition to win than to lose. 
How big this difference in ambition is, is dependent on the amount of money that is played for. 
This results in the agent trying to win if the agent plays for a big amount of money, or when its 
money is almost gone. However, if the game is only about a small amount of money, the 
agent will be too involved with the user to try to win. Based on whether the agent reaches its 
goals (winning and losing when the agent has ambitions to win or lose), the likelihood of these 
goals, and the expectedness of the move of the user and the outcome of a game, the 
emotions joy, distress, hope, fear and surprise are simulated and shown by the agent by 
means of facial expressions. 
This virtual agent presented in this paper should be seen as a pilot application. Many 
improvements can still be made, such as giving feedback in a more sophisticated manner. 
Before it can be tested in a clinical setting, we should first discuss with experts where the 
application could be improved. We should also discuss with them what type of behavior the 
agent should show under which conditions, and adjust the parameter settings to meet these 
requirements. After that, user studies should indicate under which parameter settings 
participants find the agent most human-like. However, experimenting with a number of 
agents, each with different parameter settings indicates that a realistic affective agent playing 
tic-tac-toe can be created. 
Previous research already showed that interacting with a robot pet could decrease 
loneliness in patients staying in a long-term care facility. An artificial interaction partner that 
can show human-like emotional behavior might even have a greater beneficial effect on 
decreasing loneliness in patients. In future research, we intend to perform user studies to 
show whether this really is the case. 
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Chapter 11: Speed dating with an affective 
virtual agent - developing a testbed for 
emotion models17 
 
Abstract 
 
In earlier studies, user involvement with an embodied software agent and willingness 
to use that agent were partially determined by the aesthetics of the design and the 
moral fiber of the character. We used these empirical results to model agents that in 
their turn would build up affect for their users much the same way as humans do for 
agents. Through simulations, we tested these models for internal consistency and 
were successful in establishing the relationships among the factors as suggested by 
the earlier user studies. This paper reports on the first confrontation of our agent 
system with real users to check whether users recognize that our agents function in 
similar ways as humans do. Through a structured questionnaire, users informed us 
whether our agents evaluated the user’s aesthetics and moral stance while building 
up a level of involvement with the user and a degree of willingness to interact with the 
user again. 
 
11.1   Introduction  
 
In prior work, we described how certain dimensions of synthetic character design 
were perceived by users and how they responded to them (Van Vugt et al., 2009). A 
series of user studies resulted into an empirically validated framework for the study of 
user-agent interaction with a special focus on the explanation of user engagement 
and use intentions. We put together results of various studies so as to clarify the 
individual contributions of agent’s affordances, ethics, aesthetics, facial similarity, and 
realism to the use intentions and engagement of the human user. The interactions 
between these agent features and their contribution to human user’s perception of 
agents were summarized in a schema called Interactively Perceiving and 
Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-PEFiC). To date, this framework has a heuristic 
value because the extracted guidelines are important for anyone who designs virtual 
characters. 
The evidence-based guidelines of I-PEFiC strengthen (e.g., ‘beauty leads to 
involvement’) and demystify (‘ethics is more important than realism’) certain views 
regarding synthetic character design, giving them experimental support. For example, 
not only a system’s interaction possibilities have a direct effect on the willingness to 
use an agent but the ethical behavior of the agent as a personality does so too. 
Moreover, moral behaviors of the agent will be checked for relevance to user’s goals 
and concerns and through that side-track, exert indirect effects on use intentions as 
well. 
In a simulation study (Hoorn et al., 2008), we were capable of formalizing the I-
PEFiC framework and make it the basic mechanism of how agents and robots build 
                                                           
17 This chapter has previously been published as Pontier, M.A., Siddiqui, G.F., and Hoorn, J. 
(2010). Speed Dating with an Affective Virtual Agent - Developing a Testbed for Emotion 
Models In: J. Allbeck et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on 
Intelligent Virtual Agents, IVA'10, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6356, pp. 91-103. 
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up affect for their human users. In addition, we designed a special module for 
affective decision making (ADM) which made it possible for the agent to select 
actions for or against its user. 
When we compared I-PEFiCADM to EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2006; 2009) and 
CoMERG (Bosse et al., 2007), we found out that the models are complementary to 
each other. For instance, CoMERG covers a wide variety of emotion regulation 
strategies. EMA, on the other hand, contains very sophisticated mechanisms for both 
appraisal and coping, and generating specific emotions based on this appraisal. 
Therefore, we concluded it would make sense to integrate them (Bosse et al., 2010).  
We integrated the three models into Silicon Coppélia (Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009), 
and performed simulation experiments to test the behavior of the model. The robotic 
behavior based on Silicon Coppélia was consistent with the theories the model is 
based on, and seemed compelling intuitively. However, we tested our models using 
agent’s interacting with each other, not with a real user. 
In order to be able to do so, we developed a speed dating application as a testbed 
for emotion models. In this application, the user interacts with a virtual human on a 
website. We chose the emotionally laden setting of the speed date because that 
would make it easy to ask the user what the invisible counterpart would think of them, 
ethically, aesthetically, and whether they believed the other would want to make an 
appointment with them, etc.  
This testbed served for the first confrontation of Silicon Coppélia with actual users. 
To make it fit the speed dating domain, we made some changes to Silicon Coppélia, 
which are described in section 11.3. We implemented this changed model in the 
virtual human, thereby enabling it to behave emotionally human-like. 
We focused on five factors of Silicon Coppélia that are particularly of interest to a 
speed-date situation: Good looks (factor Aesthetics), moral behavior (factor Ethics), 
relevance to personal concerns (Relevance), feeling involved (Involvement), and 
willingness to meet again (Use Intentions). We wondered whether users would 
recognize that agents were making ethical and aesthetic assessments and that these 
assessments were affecting the agent’s level of involvement with them as a dating 
partner as well as the agent’s intentions to use (i.e., meet) them again either in 
another dating session or in real life. Therefore, with our speed-dating application in 
which the agent was represented by an embodied avatar, we wished to test the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H1:  Users recognize a direct positive effect of agent-assessed Aesthetics on the 
agent’s Involvement with the user 
 
H2:  Agent-assessed Ethics of the user has a positive direct effect on Use 
Intentions of the agent to meet the user again 
 
H3:  Relevance of user behavior to agent concerns has a mediating effect on the 
relation between agent-assessed Ethics and Use Intentions (see H2) 
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11.2. Models incorporated in the agent 
 
Figure 11.1: Integration of CoMERG, EMA and I-PEFiCADM in Silicon Coppélia. 
 
As suggested in (Bosse et al., 2010), three models were integrated into Silicon 
Coppélia: EMA (Gratch & Marsella, 2006; 2009), CoMERG (Bosse et al., 2007), and 
I-PEFiCADM (Hoorn et al., 2008). For this study, we implemented Silicon Coppélia into 
a speed dating agent. Some changes were made to the model to make it fit the 
speed dating domain. This section will shortly describe Silicon Coppélia, thereby 
focusing on the parts where changes were made. More detailed descriptions of 
Silicon Coppélia and the models it is based on can be found in (Bosse et al., 2007; 
2010, Gratch & Marsella, 2006; 2009; Hoorn et al., 2008; Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009). 
Figure 11.1 shows Silicon Coppélia in a graphical format. 
Silicon Coppélia consists of a loop with a situation as input, and actions as output, 
leading to a new situation. In this loop there are three phases: the encoding, the 
comparison and the response phase.  
In the encoding phase, the agent receives others in terms of ethics (good vs. bad), 
affordances (aid vs. obstacle), aesthetics (beautiful vs. ugly), and epistemics (realistic 
vs. unrealistic). The agent can be biased in this perception process. The agent has 
desires with a certain strength for reaching or preventing goal-states that are defined 
in the system.  
In the comparison phase, the agent uses beliefs that actions facilitate or inhibit 
these desired or undesired goal-states to calculate a general expected utility of each 
action. Further, the perceived features in others, and certain appraisal variables, such 
as the belief that someone is responsible for reaching or not reaching a goal-state, 
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are appraised for relevance (relevant or irrelevant) and valence to the agent’s goals 
(positive or negative outcome expectancies).  
In the response phase of the model, this leads to feelings of involvement and 
distance towards the other, and to use intentions: the agent’s willingness to employ 
the other as a tool to achieve its own goals. Note that with response both overt 
(behavioral) and covert (experiential) responses are meant in this phase. Emotions 
such as hope, joy and distress are generated using appraisal variables like the 
perceived likelihood of goal-states. The agent uses an affective decision making 
module to calculate the expected satisfaction of possible actions. In this module, 
affective influences and rational influences are combined in the decision making 
process. Involvement and distance represent the affective influences, while use 
intentions and general expected utility represent the more rational influences. When 
the agent picks and performs an action, a new situation emerges, and the model 
starts at the first phase again. 
 
11.3. The speed-date application 
 
We designed a speed date application in which users could interact with a virtual 
human, named Tom, to get acquainted and make an appointment. The dating partner 
was performed by our software agent based on Silicon Coppélia, and represented by 
an avatar created in Haptek’s PeoplePutty software. 
During the speed date, partners could converse about seven topics: (1) Family, (2) 
Sports, (3) Appearance, (4) Hobbies, (5) Music, (6) Food, and (7) Relationships. For 
each topic, the dating partners went through an interaction tree with responses that 
they could select from a dropdown box. To give an idea of what the interaction trees 
look like, we put the tree for the topic relationships online as an appendix. 
The agent is capable of simulating five emotions: hope, fear, joy, distress, and anger, 
which were expressed through the face of the avatar with either a low or a high 
intensity (depending on little or much relevance of user choices to agent’s goals and 
concerns). Like this, we created 32 (25) different emotional states in PeoplePutty; one 
for each possible combination of two levels of intensity of the five simulated 
emotions. 
We created a Web page for the application (Figure 11.2), in which the virtual agent 
was embedded as a Haptek player. We used JavaScript, a scripting language, in 
combination with scripting commands provided by the Haptek software, to control the 
Haptek player within the Web browser. In the middle of the Web site, the affective 
conversational agent was shown, communicating messages through a voice 
synthesizer and additionally shown in a text area right above the avatar. Figure 11.2 
shows that the avatar looks mildly angry in response to the user’s reply “Well, that’s 
none of your business”. When the ‘start speed date’ button above the text area was 
pressed, the agent introduced itself and started by asking the user a question. The 
user selected an answer from the dropdown box below the agent. Then the agent 
responded and so on until the interaction-tree was traversed. When a topic was 
done, the user could select a new topic or let the agent pick one. When all topics 
were completed, the message “the speed dating session is over” was displayed and 
the user was asked to fill out the questionnaire. 
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Figure 11.2: The speed-dating application. 
 
11.3.1. Determining which responses to select 
 
In the speed dating application, the agent perceives the user according to I-PEFiCADM 
(Hoorn et al., 2008). It had beliefs that features of the user influenced certain goal-
states in the world. For our speed-date setting, the possible goal-states are ‘get a 
date’, ‘be honest’, and ‘connecting well’ on each of the conversation topics. The 
agent has beliefs in the range [-1, 1] about the facilitation of these goal-states by 
each possible response. Further, the agent attaches a general level of positivity and 
negativity to each response. 
During the speed date, the agent updates the assessed goodness of the human 
user according to the positivity it perceives in the user’s responses. It updates the 
agent-assessed badness on the basis of the negativity it perceives in the user’s 
responses. The ethical values are updated according to the following formulae: 
 
 
New_Perc(Good) = βeth * Old_Perc(Good) + (1-βeth) * Perc(Positivity_Response) 
New_Perc(Bad) = βeth * Old_Perc(Bad) + (1-βeth) * Perc(Negativity_Response) 
 
In these formulae, the persistency factor βeth is the proportion of the old perceptions 
that is taken into account to determine the new perceptions. The remaining part of 
the perceptions is determined by the positivity and negativity in the response of the 
human user. 
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The agent establishes beliefs about the beauty of the human user in the domain [0, 
1], based on user responses during the conversation topic ‘appearance’. The agent 
updates the assessed beauty and ugliness of the user, using the following formulae. 
In these formulae, βaesth serves as the persistency factor, and 
Perc(Beauty_Response) represents the perceived beauty of the user based on the 
user’s response. 
 
New_Perc(Beauty) = βaesth * Old_Perc(Beauty) + (1-βaesth) * Perc(Beauty_Response) 
New_Perc(Ugly) = βaesth * Old_Perc(Ugly) + (1-βaesth) * (1-Perc(Beauty_Response)) 
 
I-PEFiCADM has an affective decision module in which rational and affective 
dimensions are combined to make an affective decision. To determine the rational 
dimensions, the general expected utility (GEU) with respect to the goals is calculated. 
The agent also calculates the GEU of the actions of the human participant regarding 
the agent’s own goals. The agent uses this to determine the perceived affordances of 
the participant in terms of being an aid or an obstacle in achieving the agent’s goals, 
using the following formulae: 
 
IF  GEU_action(Human_Action) > 0 
THEN New_Perc(Aid) = Old_Perc(Aid) + αaff * GEU(Human_Action)  * (1-
Old_Perc(Aid)) 
New_Perc(Obst) = Old_Perc(Obst) - αaff * GEU(Human_Action)  * 
Old_Perc(Obst) 
 
IF  GEU_action(Human_Action) < 0 
THEN New_Perc(Aid) = Old_Perc(Aid) + αaff * GEU(Human_Action)  * 
Old_Perc(Aid) 
New_Perc(Obst)  = Old_Perc(Obst) - αaff * GEU(Human_Action)  * (1-
Old_Perc(Obst)) 
 
In these formulae, αaff is a modification factor that determines how quickly the 
variable was updated. This modification factor is multiplied with the impact value 
GEU(Human_Action).  Multiplying with a limiter (in the case of the first formula this is 
(1-Old_Perception(Aid))) avoids that the formula goes out of range. It also manages 
that if an agent’s assessments approach an extreme value, it will be harder to push it 
further to the extreme and easier to move it back to a less extreme value. 
Our speed-dating agent is capable of developing a bias [0, 2] in the assessment of 
the moral fiber of the user. This bias is initiated at a neutral value of 1. In [17], the 
believed responsibility of oneself and others for reaching certain goal states is 
calculated. This believed responsibility is used to calculate a bias in perceiving the 
ethics of the human user, using the formulae presented next. Note that these 
formulae have the same form (with a modification factor, an impact value, and a 
limiter) as those for calculating the perceived aid and obstacle described earlier: 
 
IF Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal) * Ambition(Goal) > 0 
THEN New_Bias(Good) = Old_Bias(Good) - αb-eth * Ambition(Goal) * 
Old_Bias(Good) 
New_Bias(Bad) = Old_Bias(Bad) + αb-eth * Ambition(Goal) * (2 - 
Old_Bias(Bad)) 
 
  161 
IF Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal) * Ambition(Goal) < 0 
THEN New_Bias(Good) = Old_Bias(Good) + αb-eth * -Ambition(Goal) * 
Old_Bias(Good) 
New_Bias(Bad) = Old_Bias(Bad) - αb-eth * -Ambition(Goal) * (2 - 
Old_Bias(Bad)) 
 
Using these variables, the agent determines its response. The agent-assessed 
ethics, aesthetics, realism, and affordances of the user lead, while matching these 
aspects with the goals of the agent, to ‘feelings’ of Involvement and Distance towards 
the human user and a general expected utility of each action, as described in  
(Pontier & Siddiqui, 2009). Each time, the agent can select its response from a 
number of options. The expected satisfaction of each possible response is calculated 
based on the Involvement and Distance towards the user and the general expected 
utility of the response, using the following formula: 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(Action) =  weu * GEU(Action) +  
    wpos * (1 - abs(positivity – biasI * Involvement)) +  
    wneg * (1 - abs(negativity – biasD * Distance)) 
 
The agent searches for an action with the level of positivity that comes closest to the 
level of (biased) involvement, with the level of negativity closest to the level of 
(biased) distance, and with the strongest action tendency.   
 
11.3.2. Determining which emotions to express 
 
During the speed date, the agent simulates a series of emotions, based on the 
responses given by the user. Hope and fear are calculated each time the user gives 
an answer. Hope and fear of the agent are based on the perceived likelihood that the 
agent will get a follow-up date. The likelihoods are used in the following function to 
calculate the hope for achieving a goal. This function is similar to the function 
described in (Bosse & Zwanenburg, 2009). 
 
IF  f >= likelihood  
THEN  hope_for_goal = -0,25 * ( cos( 1 / f * π * likelihood(goal) ) -1,5) * 
ambition(goal) 
 
IF  f < likelihood  
THEN  hope_for_goal = -0.25 * ( cos( 1 / (1-f) * π * (1-likelihood(goal)) ) -1.5) * 
ambition(goal) 
 
In these functions, f is a shaping parameter (in the domain [0, 1]) that can be used to 
manipulate the location of the top of the hope curve. The value of this parameter may 
differ per individual, and represents ‘fatalism’ (or ‘pessimism’): The top of the 
likelihood/hope-curve is always situated at the point where likelihood = f. Thus, for an 
f close to 1, the top of the curve is situated to the extreme right (representing persons 
that only ‘dare’ to hope for events that are likely to happen). Similarly, for an f close to 
0, the top of the curve is situated to the extreme left (representing persons that 
already start hoping for very unlikely events). In our current study, f was set at 0.5. 
We created a smooth function instead of a linear function, because this matches the 
emotion curves found for humans the best. Further, a higher ambition level leads to 
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higher hopes. If the ambition level is negative (i.e., the goal is undesired), the 
outcome of hope_for_goal will be a negative value. 
The following algorithm is executed on the found values for hope_for_goal: 
 
1. Sort the values in two lists: [0→1] and [0→-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in 
the list.  Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and 
the positive list. 
3. Hope = Outcome positive list. Fear = abs(Outcome negative list). 
 
The values are sorted in a list with positive hope_for_goal’s (i.e., hope for desired 
goals), and negative hope_for_goal’s (i.e., fear for undesired goals). For both the 
lists, 0 is the starting point and the mean of the value you have and the next value in 
the list (where the next value is the value closest to 0 that is left in the list) is picked 
until the end of the list is reached. The new level of hope for the agent is the outcome 
of the positive list and the new level of fear for the agent is the absolute value of the 
outcome of the negative list. 
The joy and distress of the agent are based on reaching or not reaching desired or 
undesired goal-states. If a goal-state becomes true (i.e., the agent matches well with 
the user on a certain conversation topic), the levels of joy and distress are calculated 
by performing the following formulae: 
 
IF  (ambition (goal) * belief(goal) ) > 0  
THEN new_joy = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition(goal) * belief(goal)  * (1-old_joy) 
new_distress = old_distress + mf_distress* -ambition(goal) * 
belief(goal)*old_distress 
 
IF  (ambition (goal) * belief (goal) ) < 0  
THEN new_joy = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition(goal) * belief(goal)* old_joy 
new_distress = old_distress+mf_distress*-ambition(goal)*belief(goal)*(1-
old_distress) 
 
In these formulae, mf_joy and mf_distress are modification factors that determine 
how quickly joy and distress are changed if the agent reaches a certain goal-state. In 
this paper, the values were both set to 1. These modification factors are multiplied 
with the impact value, which is ambition(goal) for joy and -ambition(goal) for distress. 
This way, if a desired goal is achieved, joy is increased and distress is decreased. 
Conversely, achieving an undesired goal decreases joy and increases distress. 
Multiplying with limiter (1-old_joy) for joy and old_distress for distress if the goal is 
desired, keeps the formula from going out of range and drives possible extreme 
values of joy and distress back to a milder level. If the achieved goal-state is 
undesired, old_joy is used as limiter for joy and (1-old_distress) as a limiter for 
distress, because the values of joy and distress will move into the opposite direction 
of when the goal is desired. 
The anger of the agent is calculated using the believed responsibility of the human 
user for the success of the speed date: 
 
IF  Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) > 0 
THEN Anger(Agent) = old_anger + mfanger * (-Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal)) 
* Ambition(Goal) *    (1 - old_anger) 
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IF  Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) < 0 
THEN Anger(Agent) = old_anger + mfanger * (-Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal)) 
* Ambition(Goal) *   old_anger 
 
To calculate the level of the agent’s anger with the user in the range [0, 1], the above 
formula is used, with Belief(Human_Responsible, Goal) * Ambition(Goal) as impact 
value. This way, if an agent believes a desired goal state should have been reached, 
but it has not, the agent will become angrier with the user who the agent holds 
responsible for not achieving the desired goal state. The agent will become less 
angry with the user who is believed to have tried helping to reach the desired goal 
state. The reverse happens, when the goal state is undesired. Because people do 
not stay angry forever, anger is multiplied with a decay factor at each time step.   
All five emotions implemented into the system (i.e., hope, fear, joy, distress, and 
anger) are simulated in parallel (see [20]). If the level of joy, distress, or anger is 
below 0.5, a low intensity of the emotion was facially expressed by the agent. If the 
level of joy, distress, or surprise was greater or equal than 0.5, a high intensity of the 
emotion was expressed by the agent. Because within the given parameter settings, 
hope and fear rarely reached extreme values, this boundary was set to 0.25 for hope 
and fear. 
 
11.4. Experiment 
 
To examine the hypotheses H1-3, a user study was performed in which users 
diagnosed the cognitive mechanisms by which their robotic dating partner came to an 
assessment of and affective attitude towards its user. 
 
11.4.1. Participants 
 
A total of 18 participants ranging in age from 18 to 24 years (M = 19.17, SD = 1.86) 
volunteered for course credits. All participants were Dutch female students of VU 
University Amsterdam (Communication Science Program). We confronted female 
participants with male agents, because the ability to describe emotional feelings as 
clearly as possible was considered a prerequisite to assess the agent’s affective 
performance. Previous research suggests that women are better equipped to do an 
emotional assessment of others [2]. Participants were asked to rate their experience 
in dating and computer-mediated communication on a scale from 1 to 7 and 
appeared to be reasonably experienced in dating (M = 4.00, SD = 1.72) and 
communicated frequently via a computer (M = 5.50, SD = 1.04). 
 
11.4.2. Procedure 
 
Preceding the experiment, the participants were told a cover story that they were 
participating in a speed-dating session with a male participant, named Tom, who was 
at another location. After a session of about 10 minutes, the participants filled out a 
questionnaire of 94 items. At the end of the experiment, the participants were 
thanked for their participation and were debriefed that the avatar they communicated 
with represented not a real human but a computer-generated agent used to test our 
affect generation and regulation software. 
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11.4.3. Measurements 
 
We developed a 94-item questionnaire in Dutch in which the dependent variables of 
H1-3 were incorporated.  All items were in the form of statements of the type “I think 
that Tom finds me attractive” measured on a 7-point Likert-type rating scale, which 
ranged from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (7). Negatively phrased items were 
reverse-coded before entering the analysis. 
Ethics measured in how far the participants perceived the agent as good or bad, 
using the four items ‘trustworthy’, ‘credible’, ‘malicious’ and ‘mean’. The scale 
appeared to be reliable (Cronbach’s α = .83). Aesthetics measured in how far the 
participant perceived the agent as beautiful or ugly, using the four items ‘attractive’, 
‘good-looking’, ‘ugly’ and ‘bad-looking’. The scale appeared to be very reliable 
(Cronbach’s α = .94). Relevance was measured by three items indicating how 
important or useless the user was in ‘creating a good atmosphere’ and in ‘completing 
each other during conversation’. This scale appeared to be very reliable (Cronbach’s 
α = .88). Use Intentions were measured with four items. These were ‘happy to have 
met’, ‘wanting to meet in another context’, ‘sad to have met’ and ‘wanting to get rid 
of’. The scale appeared to be very reliable (Cronbach’s α = .90). Involvement was 
measured with four items, which were ‘appeal’, ‘good feeling’, ‘feeling connected’ and 
‘feeling engaged’. Also this scale appeared to be very reliable (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
The remaining items referred to sociodemographic variables or were derived from 
questionnaires dedicated to other emotion regulation models [10], [19], [20] so to 
assess the psychometric quality of the items, which was on the whole quite 
disappointing. The results of the pre-test of these additional items fall beyond the 
scope of the present paper and will be reported elsewhere. 
 
11.5.   Analysis and results 
 
The items on each scale were averaged for each participant and the grand mean 
scale values across participants were used in a series of linear regressions to explore 
the hypotheses H1-3. 
H1 predicted that users would see that the agent assessed their looks (factor 
Aesthetics), which was then used by the agent to determine a level of Involvement 
with the user. The direct relation between agent-assessed Aesthetics (M = 4.10, SD 
= 1.32) and Involvement (M = 2.46, SD = 1.24) was analyzed using linear regression. 
H1 was confirmed in that Aesthetics predicted Involvement (R2 = .708, r(16) = .85, p 
< .01) indicating a significant positive relation between the two variables. Therefore, 
H1 could be confirmed. 
H2 and H3 were tested in unison, stating that there should be direct effects of agent-
assessed Ethics of the user on Use Intentions (H2) complemented by indirect effects 
of Ethics through the Relevance of the user to agent’s goals and concerns (H3). We 
performed a Sobel-test [18] to investigate the effects of Ethics (M = 4.10, SD = .92) 
on Use Intentions (M = 3.65, SD = 1.24) and the predicted mediating role of 
Relevance (M = 4.08, SD =.92). Ethics served as the independent variable, 
Relevance as the mediator, and Use Intentions as the dependent variable. The 
results showed a significant direct effect of Ethics on Use Intentions (Sobel z = .88, 
t(16) = 2.51, p < .05), supporting H2. However, no significant direct effects were 
found between Ethics and Relevance or Relevance and Use Intentions. The 
predicted indirect effect of Ethics through Relevance was not significant either (Sobel 
z = 28, p = .24), so that H3 was rejected. 
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11.6. Discussion 
 
We developed a speed-dating application, in which a human user could communicate 
with an affective agent via multiple-choice questions on a website. Because of the 
emotionally laden setting of a speed date, this application serves well as a testbed for 
emotion models. Many emotion models work with (interrelated) goals. In this 
application, already some goals and their relation has been pre-defined. Further, 
using the Haptek software, the agent can easily be modified, for example by 
changing the appearance, the voice, and the types and intensities of facial 
expressions shown by the agent. 
In a previous study, various emotion models, such as (Dias & Paiva, 2005; Reilly, 
1996), were validated by comparing human self-reported emotion intensities while 
playing a game with predictions of the emotion models (Gratch & Marsella, 2009). 
However, this did not involve letting humans judge the behavior generated by the 
models as a validation method. 
In the current study, we used the application to test Silicon Coppélia (Pontier & 
Siddiqui, 2009), an affect generation and regulation system that builds up an affective 
attitude of the agent towards its user, and makes decisions based on rational as well 
affective influences. In a user study with young females, we assessed in how far 
users recognized that a male agent, named Tom, was responding according to the 
predictions by Silicon Coppélia, described in the introduction. 
H1 was confirmed in that female users recognized a direct positive effect of Tom’s 
assessed aesthetics of the female user on Tom’s involvement with her. Put 
differently, females recognized that when Tom found them attractive, he became 
more involved in terms of having ‘good feelings’ about them and ‘feeling connected’. 
Note that Tom did not explicitly express these affective states but that the female 
users were under the impression that this is how Tom felt about them. By confirming 
H1, we found the mirror-image of a well-established empirical finding (Van Vugt et al., 
2009) that users become more involved with an embodied agent when they find it 
aesthetically more pleasing. We now have confirmation that on this aspect, our 
software behaves in a human-like fashion. 
H2 was confirmed in that the female users recognized that Tom assessed their 
moral fiber and that this had a direct and positive effect on Tom’s intentions to use (or 
better meet) the user again, either in another dating session or offline. In other words, 
female users saw that Tom was more inclined to meet them again when he thought 
they were more ‘credible’ and ‘trustworthy’. Again, the confirmation of H2 is the mirror 
image of earlier findings (Van Vugt et al., 2009), indicating that our software 
assesses humans like humans assess embodied software agents. 
H3 was refuted in the sense that ethical aspects of the female user were not 
played through relevance to Tom’s goals in order to evoke effects on Tom’s use 
intentions. Female users only saw the direct effects of Tom’s ethical assessment on 
how he felt about them (H2). The absence of the mediating effect of relevance shows 
the limitations of our software in authentically simulating human-like affective 
behavior. Mimicking indirect affective mechanisms seem to be a bridge too far. For 
now. 
There are two problems to crack if we want to explain the absence of the effect of 
relevance as a mediating variable. First, it might be that the items were not indicating 
relevance as a concept well enough, although they were psychometrically congruent. 
However, this might mean that although the items measured the same, it was not 
relevance to the agent’s goals and concerns that they measured. Thus, better 
concept analysis and pre-testing of items should improve the contents of the 
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relevance scale. Second, it might be that the behavioral representation of relevance 
in the interaction options was not expressed well enough. This would take a round of 
redesign and user testing to see whether there is a way to surpass a certain 
threshold of recognition. 
Future research with human users, however, should not only focus on ethics, 
aesthetics, involvement and use intentions. Although important, they are flanked by 
other factors such as realism and affordances (Van Vugt et al., 2009). Further, it is 
not yet assessed whether models such as EMA (Gratch & Marsella, 2006; 2009) or 
Gross (2001) have added value for producing affective behavior that is recognizable 
for humans. 
The application is generic in the sense that (emotion) models can easily be 
connected to the agent. After connecting, the agent bases its behavior (i.e., speech 
acts, facial expressions, etc.) on these models. Thereby, if the models are correct, it 
should be able to simulate behavior that is perceived as emotionally human-like by 
humans. By implementing several (versions of) models into the agent, multiple test-
conditions can be created to compare the different models. 
Also, the application can easily be adjusted to let a human control the speed 
dating agent, which enables doing Wizard of Oz studies (Landauer, 1987). In future 
research, we plan to compare the performance of models such as I-PEFiCADM, EMA, 
and Gross with a Wizard of Oz condition of human-human interaction, which allows 
for making stronger claims to the behavioral fidelity of an agent’s affective response 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 12: Dating a man is like dating a robot, 
     except for emotional structure 
 
Abstract 
 
The current paper employs an enriched Turing test to compare the affective 
performance of a virtual human as controlled by our software to the same virtual 
human as controlled by a human confederate in a Wizard of Oz condition during a 
speed-dating experiment. In both conditions, participants were told they were dealing 
with a robot. Results revealed that participants did not detect differences in the 
emotional behavior of the virtual human and in the way he supposedly perceived the 
participants. However, participants did recognize different cognitive structures 
between humans and software. When a human controlled the agent, the structure of 
affect was more similar to the structure recognized in humans. The way our software 
dealt with humans did not fully resemble the way humans dealt with agents, but 
additional evidence is needed. As is, our software can be used for designing 
believable virtual humans or humanoid robots and can partly reproduce human 
affective structures, although the evidence could improve on robustness. 
 
12.1. Introduction 
 
In science-fiction, computers often evoke social responses from other characters 
(e.g., Hal in 2001: A Space Odyssey, the Replicants in Blade Runner, C3P0 and 
R2D2 in Star Wars, Data in Star Trek, the Terminator in the Terminator films, 
etcetera). Likewise, audience members respond socially toward such virtual 
characters, machines, and computers (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Scientific research 
has found empirical evidence for such real social responses to fictional, actually non-
existent creatures. Humans, even experienced computer users, are inclined to treat 
their computers as largely natural and social and they tend to interact in affective 
ways with their computers (e.g., Brave & Nass, 2002; Reeves & Nass, 1996). For 
example, people can feel pleased by the flattery of a computer, even though the 
flatterer is a piece of communication hardware. Furthermore, people are polite to 
computers, just as they are polite to humans (Nass & Moon, 1996b). In contrast, 
people can also feel offended by an impolite computer, as is illustrated by a virtual 
human who suddenly disappears from the screen without saying or waving goodbye 
(Nass & Moon, 1996b). From another area of research, convincing evidence for this 
phenomenon has been found by Williams et al. (2000). Participants feel highly 
excluded and report intense negative feelings after not having received the (virtual) 
ball while playing the so-called Cyberball-game in the ostracism condition, even when 
they are told the computer was scripted to do so.  
In mediated interpersonal communication, basic social cues exhibited via a medium 
make people tend to respond socially towards the medium.  For example, people talk 
to pictures of people on a television screen as if they were physically present 
(Lemish, 1982). Thereby, they ignore the mediated nature of the communication 
experience in a counter-logical way (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Already in the Turing-
Test (Turing, 1950), computer-mediated interpersonal communication was compared 
to human-computer interaction by interrogators. Most of the studies that provide 
evidence for humans responding to machines as social entities replicate social 
psychology findings concerning human-human interaction in a human-computer 
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interaction context. Many effects found in human-human interaction can be replicated 
in human-computer interaction. For example, users recognize a computer's 
"personality" as submissive or dominant and respond more favorably to one with a 
personality similar to their own (Nass et al., 1995; Nass & Moon, 1996a). 
Furthermore, computers labeled as teammates are believed more easily (Nass & 
Moon, 1996b). 
In the present study, we will use an enriched Turing test for testing whether we 
can reproduce human behavior, as found in psychology and human-computer 
interaction studies, in a computer. Thereby, the present study integrates theorizing 
related to the Turing test and interacting with human-like robots. Increasingly, robots 
are designed as socially interactive robots (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn, 2003) 
or simply social robots (Breazeal, 2003). Robots are not only technological 
supplementary tools for labor-intensive or hazardous tasks anymore. Robots 
increasingly become part of our daily lives, fulfilling roles as, for example, pets, 
nurses, office assistants, tour guides, teachers, and even emotional companions 
(e.g., Sony’s AIBO robot dog, or MIT’s Kismet) (Peng et al., 2006). A salient aspect of 
humanness in robots is expressing emotionality. However, compared to human 
affective complexity, affective behavior of contemporary software agents and robots 
is still quite simple. In anticipation of emotionally more productive interactions 
between user and agent, we looked at various models of human affect-generation 
and affect-regulation, to study how affective behavior of embodied agents can be 
improved.  
Turing tests thus far, have not yet tested to what extent individuals are able to 
discern whether affective behavior stems from a machine or from a human in a 
computer-mediated conversation. Therefore, in the present study, we utilize 
previously implemented theories of human emotional intelligence (Hoorn et al., 2011) 
to make a virtual human simulate emotional intelligence while communicating with its 
human users.  We perform an advanced Turing test to compare the emotional 
intelligence of an embodied agent equipped with our software to the performance of 
the same agent as controlled by a human. 
The famous Turing test initially started the discussion about the potential of 
computers to mimic humans that continues today (Oppy et al., 2011). Turing 
developed this test to test machine intelligence. The idea of how to perform the 
Turing test has changed over time (e.g., see Karelis, 1986; Shanon, 1989). However, 
usually the test includes a human interrogator, a human respondent, and a machine 
respondent. The task of the interrogator is to determine which respondent is the 
human and which is the machine. To do this, the interrogator must hold a 
conversation with each of the two respondents. If no more than 70% of a series of 
interrogators distinguishes the machine from the human respondent, the machine 
passes the test and is declared to exhibit intelligence (Corman & Kuhn, 2005). The 
basic set-up for the Turing test is schematically shown in Figure 12.1: 
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Figure 12.1: The basic set-up for the Turing test (taken from Dougherty et al., 
2006) 
 
In our study, we apply the Turing test for testing to what extent the emotional 
behavior produced by our software matches human emotional behavior. Therefore, 
as a test domain, we opted for a speed-date application, because we expected this 
domain to be especially useful for testing emotional behavior. In the speed-dating 
setting, participants were confronted with their virtual interaction partner Tom, either 
controlled by our software or by a human confederate. The participants were asked 
to analyze the emotional and cognitive structure behind Tom’s behavior according to 
an emotional behavior model based on previous research regarding virtual 
encounters and named Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn et al., 2011). 
The Turing test has fueled a great deal of controversy. Some authors have hailed 
Turing’s paper (Turing, 1950) as the birth of the study of artificial intelligence, 
whereas others have dismissed the test as irrelevant and badly designed (Dougherty 
et al., 2006). There is no consensus about the difficulty of the test. Some think that 
the Turing test is not sufficiently demanding, whereas others think it is far too difficult 
to produce a system that can pass the test. However, lack of consensus does not 
mean the Turing test is not a useful research tool. As Oscar Wilde (1890) once 
remarked: “Diversity of opinion about a work of art shows that the work is new, 
complex, and vital. When critics disagree the artist is in accord with himself.” 
The debate about the difficulty of passing the Turing test is probably related to the 
target that is set to pass the test. In the traditional Turing test, interrogators interact 
with the respondents in a text-based interface. Some believe that, by making a 
judgment based only on text-based interaction, The Turing test sets a too narrow 
target to provide an appropriate goal for research (Oppy et al., 2011). Because of this 
narrow target, ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966), which was quite an unintelligent program, 
already seemed intelligent for extended periods of time to ordinary observers. 
Scholars who think the Turing test sets a too narrow target to provide a useful 
research goal usually suppose that the Turing test needs to be extended in various 
ways in order to provide an appropriate goal (Oppy et al., 2011). Therefore, in the 
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present study we made some extensions and modifications to broaden the target of 
the Turing test. 
Barberi (1992) describes the Ultimate Turing test, in which all sensual stimulations 
of the interrogator are produced by the computer. Thereby, the interrogator is allowed 
to base its decision not only on written words, but also on spoken speech, non-verbal 
cues and body movement. In the present study, therefore, we not only used text on 
the screen, but we enriched it with a virtual human, named Tom. The responses of 
Tom are not only shown in text, but are also expressed in verbal communication. 
Furthermore, we enriched Tom with affect-laden communication, because in 
mediated interpersonal communication and media psychology emotions play a 
salient role and cover an important area of research (Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008). 
Modern technologies increasingly allow emotions to be communicated in 
sophisticated ways through electronic devices and screens, both between people 
being physically apart from each other (computer-mediated communication) and 
between people and computers (human-computer interaction).  In accordance with 
these developments, Tom can express his emotions using facial expressions. By 
enriching the testing environment as described above, we are moving towards the 
Ultimate Turing test described by Barberi (1992).  
 
In contrast to related research, in which participants are usually asked how they 
perceive a ‘machine’ (stimulus), we asked participants how they thought the 
‘machine’ (i.e., the virtual human Tom) perceived them. Given the speed-dating 
setting, this made sense. Additionally, we asked the participants about the emotions 
and the decision-making behavior they perceived in Tom. Thus, the participants 
served to assess the emotional behavior of the virtual human, as well as the 
perceptions of the virtual human leading to that emotional behavior. This way, we 
could check the differences between our software and a human confederate in 
producing emotional behavior. By checking the relations between the perceived 
perceptions, emotions and decision-making behavior of Tom, we could as well 
analyze the differences in the cognitive structure responsible for that behavior, as 
perceived by the conversation partners in our software versus a human confederate. 
Furthermore, in a Turing test, participants are routinely asked whether they think 
the interaction partner is a human or a robot. According to Hayes and Ford (1995), 
however, this limits the testing ability of the Turing test because it can then only test 
for either full success or failure. That is, if a computer fails to seem human in 10% of 
its responses, it would most likely fail the Turing test. Furthermore, explicitly 
instructing the participants to judge whether the virtual human is controlled by a 
human or by a computer may cause them to focus only on signs that would provide 
evidence on this issue. For the present study, this would be particularly undesirable 
because we use the participants also to measure the emotional behavior of the virtual 
human.  Therefore, in the present study, the participants do not explicitly answer the 
‘traditional Turing test’-question. Instead, we check whether we find differences in the 
perceptions of participants interacting with Tom controlled by our software versus 
participants interacting with Tom as controlled by a human confederate. 
 
The above described considerations for our study’s design are further supported by 
studies in the field of computer-mediated communication. Various studies suggested 
that a lack of nonverbal cues impairs its ability to foster impression formation and 
management (Walther, 2006). According to media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 
1986), face-to-face contact is the richest of the communication media because of the 
simultaneity of cues it projects. According to this theory, richer methods of 
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communication (i.e., communication with a higher degree of emotional, normative, or 
attitudinal cues present) are more effective.  
Social information processing theory (Walther, 1992) acknowledges that online 
interpersonal relationship development might require more time to develop than 
traditional face-to-face relationships due to the lack of richness of information. 
However, according to this theory, people seek out and interpret cues that serve as 
substitutes for nonverbal communication (Walther & Parks, 2002). It is not clear 
whether face-to-face communication is necessarily superior to computer-mediated 
communication (Rhoads, 2010). Rich communication is not necessarily dependent on 
a rich medium (Van der Kleij et al., 2009). According to the hyperpersonal model of 
computer-mediated communication, users exploit the technological aspects of 
computer-mediated communication to enhance messages they construct to manage 
impressions and facilitate desired relationships (Walther, 1996). Moreover, once 
established, online personal relationships demonstrate the same relational 
dimensions and qualities as face-to-face relationships (Walther, 1992).  
These theoretical considerations have important implications for our study. We 
updated and elaborated the Turing test by enriching the communication environment 
with the possibility to communicate via nonverbal cues, whereas we limited the 
interaction possibilities, by letting the ECA and the participants communicate via 
multiple choice responses. We hypothesized that, because of the emotionally laden 
setting combined with the possibility to communicate via nonverbal cues, which 
should increase the ability to foster impression formation, in the present study, we 
would find some differences between the behaviors of Tom as controlled by our 
software versus those of Tom as controlled by a human confederate. However, a lack 
of finding differences would support the design of our humanoid computational model 
of affect generation and regulation which we named Silicon Coppélia (see below). In 
either case, our study further contributes and updates the classic Turing test. 
 
About Silicon Coppélia 
 
Then about the software that will compete against human performance in the 
enriched Turing test. Previous work described how certain dimensions of the design 
of virtual characters were perceived by users and how they responded to them (Van 
Vugt et al., 2009). A series of user studies resulted in an empirically validated 
framework for the study of user-character interaction with a special focus on the 
explanation of user engagement and use intentions. This framework was 
summarized in a schema called Interactively Perceiving and Experiencing Fictional 
Characters (I-PEFiC). In a simulation study (Bosse et al., 2008), we have formalized 
the I-PEFiC framework and made it the basic mechanism of how virtual characters 
and robots build up affect for their human users. In addition, we designed a special 
module for affective decision-making (ADM) that made it possible for the virtual 
character to select actions in favor or against its user, hence I-PEFiCADM (Hoorn et 
al., 2008). 
To advance I-PEFiCADM into the area of emotion regulation even more, we also 
included other models of affect. Gratch & Marsella (2006; 2009) focused on different 
aspects of emotion generation, regulation, and affective processes. They formalized 
the theory of Emotion and Adaptation of Smith and Lazarus (1990) into EMA, to 
create agents that cope with negative affect. The emotion-regulation theory of Gross 
(2001) inspired Bosse, Pontier, & Treur (2007) to develop CoMERG (the Cognitive 
Model for Emotion Regulation based on Gross).  
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Together, the three approaches cover a large part of appraisal-based emotion 
theory (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1990) and all three boil 
down to appraisal models of emotion (Bosse et al., 2010). We therefore decided to 
integrate the three models of affect into one computational model that we called 
Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn et al., 2011). Figure 12.2 drafts Silicon Coppélia in a 
graphical format. 
Silicon Coppélia is software consisting of a loop with a particular situation as input, 
and actions as output, leading to a new situation. In this loop there are three phases: 
the encoding, the comparison and the response phase. The virtual human is 
programmed in such a way, that it follows the perception and appraisal paths as 
given in Figure 12.2 and explained below. In doing so, it seems as if the virtual 
human perceives its interaction partner (whether human or synthetic). 
 
 
Figure 12.2: Graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn et al., 2011). 
 
In the encoding phase, the virtual human ‘perceives’ another character (i.e., the 
respondent in this study) in terms of Ethics (good vs. bad), Affordances (aid vs. 
obstacle), Aesthetics (beautiful vs. ugly), and Realism (realistic vs. unrealistic). The 
virtual human can be biased in its perception process. Because previous research 
(e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2009) indicated Ethics and Affordances were far more 
important than Aesthetics and Realism, in the current paper we focus only on those 
two factors in the encoding phase.  
In the comparison phase, the virtual human retrieves beliefs about actions that 
facilitate or inhibit the desired or undesired goal-states. This is to calculate a general 
expected utility of each action. The virtual human also determine certain appraisal 
variables, such as the belief that someone is responsible for accomplishing goal-
states or not. These variables and the perceived features of others are related to the 
virtual human’s goals and concerns, to appraise them for their level of Relevance 
(relevant or irrelevant) and Valence (positive or negative outcome expectancies). 
In the response phase of the model, the results of the comparison phase lead to 
processes of Involvement with, and Distance toward the other, and to the emergence 
of certain Use Intentions: the virtual human’s willingness to employ the other as a tool 
to achieve its own goals. Note that both overt (behavioral) and covert (experiential) 
responses can be executed in this phase. Emotions such as hope, joy, and anger are 
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generated using appraisal variables (e.g., the perceived responsibility of others, and 
likelihood of goal-states). Finally, the virtual human applies an affective decision-
making module to calculate the expected satisfaction of possible actions. In this 
module, affective influences and rational influences are combined in the decision-
making process. Involvement and Distance represent the affective influences in the 
decision-making process, whereas Use Intentions and general expected utility 
represent the more rational influences. When the virtual human selects and performs 
an action, a new situation emerges, and the model loops back to the first phase. 
In previous research (Hoorn et al., 2011), we performed simulation experiments to 
test the behavior of virtual characters based on Silicon Coppélia. Results showed that 
the character’s behavior as generated by the software was consistent with the 
underlying theories, and seemed intuitively compelling. However, these tests were 
performed with virtual humans that interacted with other virtual humans, not with real 
users. Thus, we did not know whether the virtual human’s emotional behavior made 
sense to human beings. Therefore, we developed a speed-date application as a test 
bed for cognitive models of affect (Pontier et al., 2010). A pilot study showed that the 
speed-date application can be used to make users recognize at least certain forms of 
human affective behavior in Tom. These promising results motivated us to perform 
the current follow-up study, in which we use the test bed to ecologically validate 
Silicon Coppélia. 
 
12.2. Method 
 
12.2.1. Participants 
 
A total of 54 Dutch female heterosexual students ranging from 18-26 years of age 
(M=20.07, SD=1.88) volunteered for course credits or money (5 Euros). We chose to 
confront female participants with a male virtual human, because we expected that the 
limitations in behavior of the virtual human would be more acceptable for a male 
virtual human than for a female one. Previous research suggests that men usually 
have more limited forms of emotional interaction (Barrett et al., 1998; Brody & Hall, 
2008; Hall, 1984; Snell et al., 1988; Snell et al., 1989). In addition, women are usually 
better equipped to do an emotional assessment of others (Barrett et al., 1998; Hess 
et al., 2000; Levenson & Ruef, 1992; Roland et al., 1992; Thayer & Johnsen, 2000). 
The emotionally laden setting of the speed-date simplified asking the user what the 
embodied virtual human would think of them, ethically, aesthetically, and whether 
they believed Tom would want to see her again, etcetera. 
 
12.2.2. Experimental design 
 
The participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions: Tom as 
controlled by the software Silicon Coppélia versus Tom as controlled by a human 
confederate who was blind for the study’s purpose yet trained to handle him (i.e., the 
Wizard of Oz condition; WOz). We tested the effects of the between-factor Control-
type (Silicon Coppélia versus WOz) on the within-factors Emotions (5 Emotions: 
Hope, Fear, Joy, Sadness, Anger), Perceptions (8 Perceptions: Ethics, Affordances, 
Similarity, Relevance, Valence, Involvement, Distance, Use Intentions) and decision-
making behavior (2 Decision-Making Behaviors: Situation Selection, Affective 
Decisision Making). 
In order to control for possible unintended effects of idiosyncrasies of the human 
confederates, we assigned two confederates to the WOz-condition following identical 
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scripts. We assumed to collapse the later two versions of the human confederate 
conditions and thus included equal numbers of participants in both experimental 
conditions (n = 27 each). Thus, our experimental design represented an advanced 
kind of Turing test in which cognitive-affective structures between conditions could be 
compared.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that in a traditional Turing test participants are 
unaware of whether they interact with a computer or not, whereas we reversed the 
test in this respect. That is, all our participants were told they were interacting with a 
virtual human, irrespective of who controlled the avatar (software or a human 
confederate). This is important for the participants to understand the limitations in 
behavior and conversation of Tom and, thus, to avoid rejection of their ‘dating 
partner’ on the basis of his limited interaction possibilities.  
 
12.2.3. Materials: Tom and the speed-date application 
 
We designed a speed-date application in which users interacted with a virtual human 
named Tom, to get acquainted and possibly make a next appointment. Tom was 
represented by an avatar created in Haptek’s PeoplePutty software (Haptek, Inc.) as 
illustrated in Figure 12.3. Tom was capable of simulating five emotions: hope, fear, 
joy, distress, and anger which he expressed through his face with either a low or a 
high intensity. As such, we created 32 (25) different emotional states in PeoplePutty; 
one for each possible combination of two levels of intensity of the five simulated 
emotions. The level of intensity depended on the level of relevance of user responses 
to Tom’s goals and concerns. For example, if the user gave many responses which 
made Tom think she was obstructing his goal of having a successful speed-date, he 
would have become sad and angry. 
We used JavaScript, a scripting language (Javascript), in combination with 
scripting commands provided by the Haptek software (Haptek, Inc.) to control Tom’s 
behavior within the Web browser. In the middle of the Website, Tom was prominently 
featured and communicated messages through a voice synthesizer (e.g., “Do you 
have many hobbies?”) while his text was also readable on top of the site. The 
participant’s text was displayed at the bottom of the site. For example, Figure 12.3 
shows that Tom looks upset in response to the user’s reply “Well, that’s none of your 
business”.  
During the speed-date session, participants could converse about seven topics: 
(1) Family, (2) Sports, (3) Appearance, (4) Hobbies, (5) Music, (6) Food, and (7) 
Relationships. Because we focus on emotional behavior and affective decision-
making, and not on the production and interpretation of natural language, we limited 
the communication to multiple choice questions and answers. For each topic, the 
dating partners went through an interaction tree with responses that they could select 
from a dropdown box. An impression of how the interaction trees looked like is 
illustrated for the tree for topic (7) Relationships in part E of the appendix of Chapter 
12. 
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Figure 12.3: Tom in the study’s speed-date application. 
 
When the ‘start speed-date’ button above the text area was pressed, Tom introduced 
himself and started the conversation by asking the user a question. The user could 
select an answer from the dropdown box below Tom (options were limited for 
standardization and comparison purposes). Then Tom responded. The conversation 
continued until the interaction-tree was traversed. When a topic was done, the 
participant could select a new topic or let Tom select one. When all topics were 
completed, a message appeared: “the speed-dating session is over” followed by a 
questionnaire.  
In the speed-date application, Tom ‘perceived’ the participant following the above 
described patterns of Silicon Coppélia (Van Vugt et al., 2009). Tom was designed 
with certain ‘beliefs’ that specific features of a participant could affect certain goal-
states. For our speed-date setting, the possible goal-states were ‘get a date’, ‘be 
honest’, and ‘connecting well’ on each of the conversation topics. Tom’s beliefs were 
designed such that facilitation of these goal-states could be reached by each possible 
response. Furthermore, Tom ‘attached’ a general level of positivity and negativity 
toward the user to each response in the domain [0, 1]. For example, Tom attached a 
positivity level of 0.1, and a negativity level of 0.9 to the response "That is none of 
your business, you just pick another topic.” 
During the speed-date, Tom’s ‘perceptions’ of the participant were continuously 
updated based on the participant’s responses during the speed-date, as described in 
(Pontier et al., 2010). Thus, Tom ‘assessed’ the participant’s Ethics, Aesthetics, 
Realism, and Affordances while matching these appraisals with his goals in respect 
to the levels of Involvement and Distance (toward the participant) and an expected 
utility of each action. Each turn, Tom could select his response from a number of 
options. The expected satisfaction of each possible response was calculated based 
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on the Involvement and Distance appraisals and the expected utility of the response, 
using the following formula: 
 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(Action) =  weu * GEU(Action) +  
    wpos * (1 - abs(positivity – biasI * Involvement)) +  
    wneg * (1 - abs(negativity – biasD * Distance)) 
 
 
To reach Tom’s goals, he was equipped with search strings to choose actions with 
positivity levels that came closest to the desired levels of Involvement, and negativity 
levels closest to the desired level of Distance, as well as achieving the highest 
expected utility (GEU).  
During the speed-date, Tom ‘expressed’ a variety of emotions depending on the 
participant’s responses. Hope and fear were calculated in response to each answer. 
Hope and fear of Tom were based on the perceived likelihood of a follow-up date. 
Levels of Tom’s joy and distress were based on achieving desired or undesired goal-
states. Tom’s anger was calculated using the assumed responsibility of the 
participant for the success or failure of the speed-date. Details on how this was 
calculated can be found in (Pontier et al., 2010). Each of the five emotions were 
implemented into the software and simulated in parallel. If the level of emotion was 
below a set boundary, a low intensity of the emotion was facially expressed by Tom. 
If the level of emotion was greater or equal than the boundary, Tom ‘expressed’ a 
high intensity of the emotion.  
 
12.2.4. Procedure 
 
Upon arrival in our laboratory, participants were asked to take place behind a 
computer. They were instructed to do a speed-date session with an avatar. In the 
WOz-condition, the human confederate controlling the avatar was hidden behind a 
wall (i.e., invisible for the participants). After finishing the 10 minute speed-dating 
session, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire on the computer. After 
the experiment, participants in the WOz-condition were told that they were actually 
dating an avatar controlled by a human confederate. 
 
12.2.5. Measures 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 97 Likert-type items, each followed by a 6-point rating 
scale (0 = totally disagree; 1 = disagree; 2 = slightly disagree; 3 = slightly agree; 4 = 
agree; 5 = totally agree). The complete questionnaire can be found in part A of the 
appendix of Chapter 12 and covered 15 measurement scales as described below per 
construct. A scale analysis was performed, in which items were removed until an 
optimal Cronbach’s alpha was found with a minimum scale length of three items. A 
factor analysis was also performed, to check divergent validity (see appendix, part B). 
Emotions were measured (after Wallbot & Scherer, 1989) by five measurement 
scales, each indicating one of five emotions: Joy (5 items, α = .93), Anger (4 items, α 
= .84), Hope (3 items, α = .76), Fear (3 items, α = .81), and Sadness (4 items, α = 
.84), assessing the perceived intensity of emotions.  
Perceptions were measured by eight measurement scales, each indicating one of 
eight perceptions according to the I-PEFiC model (Van Vugt et al., 2009). However, 
because of the different application domain (i.e. speed-dating) and because the 
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questions were now about assessing how Tom perceived the participant, and not 
about how the participant perceived Tom, we found it important to check the 
consistency of these scales again. We removed two participants from the Ethics 
scale, because their ratings for the items ‘Tom was trustworthy’ and ‘Tom was 
credible’ were extremely inconsistent: they had a difference in rating of at least 4. We 
concluded they interpreted these questions not as we meant them to. Although the 
resulting scale for Ethics is weak, previous studies showed that the Ethics scale 
usually is consistently reliable, and an important theoretical factor. Therefore, we 
decided to maintain the Ethics scale despite its weak measurement quality. In all, the 
analyses resulted in the following eight scales: Ethics (3 items, α = .61), Affordances 
(3 items, α = .88), Similarity (5 items, α = .66), Relevance (5 items, α = .93), Valence 
(8 items, α = .93), Involvement (4 items, α = .75), Distance (3 items, α = .82), and 
Use Intentions (9 items, α = .95).  
Decision-Making Behavior consisted of the two scales Situation Selection (3 items, 
α = .84) and Affective-Decision Making (3 items, α = .84). Situation Selection was 
measured through a scale with items such as ‘Tom kept on talking about the same 
thing’ and ‘Tom changed the subject’. Affective Decision-Making consisted of a scale 
with items such as ‘Tom followed his intuition’ and ‘Tom made rational choices’.   
 
12.2.6. Statistical Analyses  
 
We performed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the grand mean 
agreement to statements, to test whether the participants perceived differences 
between Tom as controlled by software versus Tom as controlled by a human 
confederate. Furthermore, we performed separate paired t-tests for related groups of 
variables. Additionally, we checked for standardized regression weights with Amos 
16.0 (Arbuckle, 2007). To test for mediation, we used Monte Carlo bootstrapping to 
acquire the 95% confidence intervals (Selig & Preacher, 2008). However, the limited 
number of participants did not allow for a full-fledged fitting of the model. 
 
12.3. Results  
 
12.3.1. Experience in computer-mediated communication and online dating 
 
Based on participants’ ratings of their experience in dating and computer-mediated 
communication, it appeared that participants communicated frequently via a 
computer (M = 4.02, SD = 1.00; scale range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree)). However, they had limited to no experience in online dating (M = .33, SD = 
.80). 
 
12.3.2. Emotions 
 
Because we are interested in how the emotional behavior of Tom had been 
perceived by the participants, we first looked at the possible differences in five 
emotions.  
To analyze the differences in perceived emotions as expressed by Tom, yet 
between Tom controlled by Silicon Coppélia versus the Human confederates, we 
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collapsed Human1 and Human2 into Human confederate.18 Subsequently, we 
performed a 2x5 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) of the between-factor 
Control-type (2: Silicon Coppélia vs. Human confederate) and the within-factor 
Emotion (5: Joy, Sadness, Hope, Fear, Anger) on the intensities of the Emotion 
scales. The main effect of Control-type on Perceived intensities was not significant 
(F(2, 51) < 1), whereas the main effect of the five different emotions on perceived 
intensities was significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .032, F(5, 47) = 289.45, p < .001, η2p = 
.97). The interaction between Control-type and Emotions was not significant (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .86, F(5, 48) = 1.595, p < .179). Ethics almost reached significance (p < 
.083; all other p’s > .20). More detailed results can be found in part D of the appendix 
of Chapter 12. In conclusion, while participants perceived differences between 
emotions in Tom, they did not perceive differences between the software-controlled 
and human-controlled versions of Tom. 
Because the main effect of Control-type on the Emotion scales was not significant, 
this might mean that no effects of emotion occurred within a condition. To check 
whether emotional behavior was perceived at all by the participants, we performed a 
one-sample t-test with 0 as the test value, equaling no emotions perceived. Results 
showed that all emotion scales differed significantly from 0, the smallest t-value being 
(t(2, 51) = 8.777, p < .001) for Anger. Thus, effects of Emotion did occur. More detailed 
results can be found in part C of the Appendix. 
In addition, the significant main effect of the Emotion factor on Perceived 
intensities suggested that there were systematic differences in perceiving emotions in 
Tom, which we analyzed by paired samples t-tests for all pairs of emotions. Out of 
the 10 possible pairs, 6 pairs differed significantly. The 4 pairs that did not differ 
significantly were Joy and Hope (p < .444), Fear and Sadness (p < .054), Fear and 
Anger (p < .908), and Sadness and Anger (p < .06).  
Joy (M = 3.05, SD = 1.03) and Hope (M = 2.96, SD = .82) were both recognized 
relatively much in Tom, whereas Fear (M = 1.04, SD = .80), Sadness (M = .84, SD = 
.66) and Anger (M = 1.02, SD = .86) were only recognized a little bit in Tom.  
In other words, the t-tests showed that in all conditions emotions were recognized 
in Tom by the participants, but that according to the MANOVA, they were seen as 
similar in intensity in the human- and software-controlled conditions alike. 
 
12.3.3. Perceptions 
 
Because we are interested in the perceptions responsible for the emotional behavior 
of Tom, we then looked at the scales of the eight perceptions leading to Tom’s 
emotional behavior. 
To analyze the differences in assumed perceptions of Tom between Silicon 
Coppélia and the Human confederate, we performed a 2x8 MANOVA of the between-
factor Control-type (2: Silicon Coppélia vs. Human confederate) and the within-factor 
of Perception (8: Ethics, Affordances, Relevance, Valence, Similarity, Involvement, 
Distance, Use Intentions) on the intensities of the Perception scales. The main effect 
of Control-type on Perceived intensities was not significant (F(2, 51) < 1), whereas the 
main effect of the Perception factor on Perceived intensities was significant (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .009, F(8, 45) = 637.61, p < .001, η2p = .99). The interaction between 
Control-type and Perception was not significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .85, F(8, 45) < 1, all 
p’s > .185). In conclusion, while participants perceived differences between 
                                                           
18A separate analysis tested for possible differences between Human1 and Human2. However, 
no differences have been found on the main variables of interest  
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perceptions in Tom, they did not perceive differences between the software-
controlled and human-controlled versions of Tom. 
Because the main effect of Control-type to Perception scales was not significant, 
this might mean that there was no effect of perception at all within a condition. To 
check whether the perceptions of Tom were perceived by the participants, we 
performed a one-sample t-test with 0 as the test value, equaling no perceptions 
perceived. Results showed that all perception scales differed significantly from 0. The 
smallest t-value was found for Distance (t(2, 51) = 15.865, p < .001). Thus, effects of 
Perception did occur. More detailed results can be found in part C of the appendix of 
Chapter 12. 
In addition, the significant main effect of the Perception factor on Perceived 
intensities suggested that there were systematic differences in perceiving perceptions 
in Tom, which we analyzed by paired samples t-tests for all pairs of perceptions. Out 
of the 28 thereby originated pairs, 23 pairs differed significantly. The pair that differed 
the most were Ethics and Distance (t(51) = 13.59, p < .001). 
The participants rated Tom’s perceptions of their Ethics (M = 3.86, SD = .68) and 
their Affordances (M = 3.78, SD = .81) the highest. The participants rated Tom’s 
perceptions of feeling distant towards them (M = 1.77, SD = .93) the lowest.  
In other words, the t-tests showed that perceptions were indeed recognized in all 
conditions, but that according to the MANOVA they were seen as similar in human- 
and software-controlled conditions alike. 
 
12.3.4. Decision-Making Behavior  
 
To analyze the differences in perceived decision-making behavior in the two Control-
types, we performed a 2x2 MANOVA of the between-factor Control-type (2: Silicon 
Coppélia vs. Human confederate) and the within-factor of Decision-Making Behavior 
(2: Affective decision making, Situation selection) on the intensities of the Decision-
Making Behavior scales. The main effect of Control-type on Perceived decisions was 
not significant (F(2, 51) < 1), whereas the main effect of Decision-Making Behavior on 
Perceived decisions was small, but significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .11, F(2, 51) = 
198.126, p < .031, η2p = .89). The interaction between Control-type and Decision-
Making Behavior was not significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F(2, 51) < 1). In conclusion, 
while participants perceived differences between decision-making behaviors in Tom, 
they did not perceive differences between the software-controlled and human-
controlled versions of Tom. 
Because the main effect of Control-type on Decision-Making Behavior was not 
significant, this might mean that there was no effect of Decision-Making Behavior at 
all within a condition. To check whether Decision-Making Behavior was perceived at 
all by the participants, we performed a one-sample t-test with 0 as the test value, 
equaling no Decision-Making Behavior perceived. Results showed that Situation 
selection (t(2, 51) = 14.562, p < .001) and Affective decision-making (t(2, 51) = 15.518, p 
< .001) both differed significantly from 0. Thus, effects of Decision-Making Behavior 
did occur. More detailed results can be found in part C of the appendix of Chapter 12. 
In other words, the t-tests showed that Decision-Making Behavior was recognized 
in all conditions, and the MANOVA showed that participants saw similar Decision-
Making Behavior in human and robot controlled conditions alike. 
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12.3.5. Cognitive-Affective Structure 
 
From the results described above, we can conclude that, within the limited domain 
that was used for this speed-dating experiment, the participants did not perceive 
different emotion expression, decision-making behavior, or differences in cognitive-
affective variables between Tom as controlled by Silicon Coppélia versus Human 
confederates.  The next step, then, was to find out whether the participants 
recognized the same cognitive structure in Tom as controlled by Silicon Coppélia as 
in Tom controlled by Human confederates. 
We drew the basics of the resulting model in Amos 16.0 (Arbuckle, 2007) and tested 
whether the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1, Figure 1.2. (after Van Vugt et al., 
2009) regarding the underlying cognitive-affective structure as implied in the I-PEFiC 
model could be matched the regression weights found in the Silicon Coppélia and the 
Wizard of Oz conditions. Because in this experiment, Similarity was not a 
manipulated variable, as in (Van Vugt et al., 2009), but perceived on the interaction 
during the speed-date, we additionally hypothesized that Similarity would be affected 
by the perceived Ethics and Affordances. The results are shown in Figure 12.4. Note 
that the number of participants was too small for a reliable model fit. More detailed 
information can be found in part D of the appendix of Chapter 12. 
In the Silicon Coppélia condition, we found a negative regression weight of 
Affordances on Similarity. In other words, the participants thought that if Tom 
perceived them as clumsy, he also perceived them as being similar to each other. 
Ethics had a positive regression weight on Similarity. Together with the negative 
regression weight of Affordances, this can be interpreted as the participants having 
the idea that Tom thought ‘even if we are both clumsy, we have good intentions’. 
Valence had a positive regression weight on Involvement. Thus, if the participants 
thought Tom had positive expectations of them, they also thought he would feel 
involved with them. 
Relevance had a negative regression weight on Distance. Additionally, the 
interaction of Similarity and Relevance had a regression weight on Distance. Finally 
the higher ortder interaction of Ethics, Similarity and Relevance had a regression 
weight on Distance. Thus, if the participants thought Tom perceived them as relevant, 
they believed him to be less distant. This effect was strengthened if they thought Tom 
perceived them as similar, which was in its turn strengthened by their moral 
goodness. 
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Figure 12.4: Significant standardized regression weights (p < .05) found in the 
Silicon Coppélia condition shown in graphical format. Solid arrows represent main 
regression weights. Non-solid arrows represent interactions. The thickness of the 
arrows is proportional to the estimate of the size of the regression weights. 
 
 
Similarity had a negative regression weight on Use Intentions. So if the participants 
thought Tom felt they were similar (because they were clumsy but with good 
intentions) they thought he did not want to see them again, because they both were 
so clumsy.  
Furthermore, the interaction of Similarity and Valence had a positive regression 
weight on Use Intentions. Additionally, the higher order interaction of Ethics, 
Similarity and Valence had a regression weight on Use Intentions. So if the 
participants thought Tom perceived them as similar, and they thought he had good 
expectations, these expectations canceled out the negative regression weight of 
Similarity on Use Intentions, especially if moral goodness was involved. 
For the human-controlled Wizard of Oz condition, we also drew the resulting 
model in Amos. Again, results should be taken with care because fit statistics are 
missing. The regression weights found are shown in Figure 12.5 (see part D in the 
appendix of Chapter 12 for more details). 
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Figure 12.5: Significant relations (p < .05) found in the Wizard of Oz condition 
shown in graphical format. Solid arrows represent main regression weights. Dashed 
arrows represent indirect regression weights (i.e., mediations by Relevance and 
Valence originating from Ethics and Affordances). The thickness of the arrows is 
proportional to the size of the regression weights. 
 
 
In the Wizard of Oz condition, Affordances had a positive regression weight on 
Relevance. Furthermore, Relevance mediated regression weights of Affordances on 
Involvement and Distance. Thus, if the participants thought Tom perceived them as 
useful, they also thought he perceived them as more relevant, making him feel more 
involved and less distant towards them. 
Furthermore, Affordances were found to have a positive regression weight on 
Valence. Valence also mediated a positive regression weight of Affordances on Use 
Intentions, and a negative regression weight on Distance. Thus, if the participants 
thought Tom perceived them as useful, they thought he would have high 
expectations of them, making him feel less distant and more eager to meet again. 
Ethics had a positive regression weight on Valence, which, in its turn, had a 
positive regression weight on Use Intentions. Furthermore, Valence mediated an 
indirect positive regression weight of Ethics on Use Intentions and Involvement, and 
a negative regression weight of Ethics on Distance. So if the participants thought 
Tom perceived them as morally good, they thought he would have high expectations, 
making him feel more involved and less distant towards them, and more eager to 
meet again. 
Similarity had a positive regression weight on Involvement, and a negative regression 
weight on Distance. Thus, if the participants thought Tom perceived them as more 
similar, they thought he would feel more involved and less distant towards them. 
 
Comparing the significant relations found in the Silicon Coppélia condition and the 
Wizard of Oz condition, we can prudently conclude that the participants attributed 
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some differences in the cognitive structure that produced the perceptions and 
emotions of Tom controlled by a human confederate versus our software. Yet, these 
ideas are based on correlations based on regression weights only because model fit 
statistics would lack the necessary power. 
 
12.4. Discussion 
 
The goal of the present study was to test whether in an adjusted Turing test the 
emotional behavior produced by our software named Silicon Coppélia could be 
distinguished from the emotional behavior produced by a human. Therefore, we 
conducted an experiment in which a virtual human, named Tom as controlled by our 
software (Hoorn et al., 2011), based on a cognitive model of perception, affect 
generation, affect regulation and affective decision-making, could be distinguished 
from Tom as controlled by a human confederate. Participants performed a speed-
dating session with Tom and were asked afterwards how they thought Tom perceived 
the participant during the speed-date, instead of answering whether Tom is controlled 
by a human or a robot. The participants did not know that in one condition a human 
was controlling Tom, whereas in the other condition, Tom was equipped with Silicon 
Coppélia. This can be seen as a continuous version of the traditional Turing test. By 
making the response options of the Turing continuous, we overcome the limited 
testing ability of the Turing test as expressed by Hayes & Ford (1995). By making the 
adjustments as described above, we enriched and elaborated the classic Turing Test. 
The results showed that, even in this enriched version of the Turing test, in which 
Tom could give verbal, as well as nonverbal cues, participants did not experience 
differences between Tom as controlled by Silicon Coppélia versus Tom as controlled 
by a human confederate for the single occurrence and isolated effects of the 
perceptions, emotions and decision-making behavior. Not that they did not have any 
effect; the effects just did not differ. Thus, within the boundaries of limited interaction 
possibilities (i.e., multiple choice questions and answers), the participants 
experienced that the human confederate versus our software perceived their moral 
fiber similarly, their relevance similarly, and so on. The participants rated the human 
confederate and our software as equally eager to meet them again, and as exhibiting 
equal ways to select a situation and make affective decisions. Also, the emotions the 
participants perceived in Tom during the speed-date session did not differ between 
conditions. Emotion effects could be observed by the participants, but these effects 
were similar for a human controlled virtual human and software controlled virtual 
human alike. This finding may be seen as a nice result for the engineer who wants to 
use these models for application development. After all, on all measured facets, 
participants did not experience any difference between behavior in Tom generated by 
a human, and behavior in Tom generated by our software. Furthermore, the emotions 
that were observed by the participants in our software controlling Tom did not differ 
from those observed in the human confederates controlling Tom. This supports our 
design of Silicon Coppélia. 
However, when we looked at the relations between the variables, by reproducing 
the I-PEFiC model in Amos, and looking at the significant regression weights found 
there, participants did seem to perceive differences in the cognitive structure that 
produced the perceptions and emotions of Tom controlled by a human versus our 
software. This observation is qualified by the fact that a proper model fit was not 
allowed by the limited number of participants. This may be bad news for the cognitive 
scientist trying to reproduce human affective functioning. Although it is not explicitly 
recognized by the participants, they do implicitly seem to recognize some differences 
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between the cognitive-affective structure responsible for the behavior produced by 
our software and the cognitive-affective structure responsible for the behavior 
produced by the human confederates. However, to draw definitive conclusions on 
this, a future study with a larger number of participants should be performed, to 
enable an acceptable model fit. We can conclude, then, that we are closing in on a 
humanoid simulation of affect, but that we are not fully there yet, and need to sample 
more data to do more reliable statistics. The ecological validation of the computation 
affect model Silicon Coppélia partly succeeded, but not completely, and the evidence 
is still weak. 
 
Interestingly, the relations found in human perception of virtual humans (Van Vugt et 
al., 2009) can be reproduced in humans assessing the perceptions of a virtual human 
controlled by a human. The present study indicates that, even in an experiment with 
limited interaction possibilities (i.e., multiple choice questions and answers, and facial 
expressions), and little time available to develop a relationship (i.e., ten minutes), 
humans seem to recognize mechanisms behind human perception better in an ECA 
controlled by a human confederate than an ECA as controlled by our software. The 
upshot is that in affective expression, this difference seems to be absent. 
This is hopeful for designing virtual humans. Apperently, it is possible to recognize 
human behavior in something that is told to be artificial, and to implicitly distinguish it 
from behavior generated by the same artificial thing controlled by a computational 
model, despite the limited interaction possibilities. This indicates that for designing a 
virtual other that is believably emotionally human-like, or communicating with another 
person mediated by technology such as the avatar in the present study, the 
interaction possibilities may be not as important as previously thought, as long as 
there is the possibility to communicate affective states (cf. Van der Kleij, 2009; 
Walther & Parks, 2002; Walther 2006). However, more research is needed to give a 
definite answer about this. 
Participants perceived the same intensities of five emotions in Tom, no matter 
whether it was controlled by a human or our software. Furthermore, they did not 
assess the perceptions of Tom as controlled by a human differently than those of 
Tom as controlled by our software. However, we also found the first traces of 
evidence that participants did implicitly recognize a difference in the cognitive 
structure that was responsible for those perceptions. In other words, the participants 
did not see a difference between the loose components of affective expression and 
decision-making, but we have some evidence that they did see that what drove to 
those expressions and decisions was different for humans than for robots, even 
though they were unaware of dealing with a human. This indicates that emotional 
intelligence may be recognized even in a severely restrained type of people (i.e., 
humans playing a robot). 
In the Wizard of Oz condition, where the human controlled Tom, significant 
regression weights of perceived Ethics and Affordances on Relevance and Valence 
were found as predicted by previous research (Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
However, in the Silicon Coppélia condition, Ethics and Affordances only had a 
regression weight on Similarity, and interactions with Similarity. In this condition, 
Similarity played an important role: the interaction of Similarity and Valence 
interacted had a regression weigt on Use Intentions, and the interaction of Similarity 
and Relevance had a regression weight on Distance. Furthermore, Similarity had a 
regression weight on Use Intentions.  
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In the Wizard of Oz condition, however, Similarity played a smaller role. It only had a 
small regression weight on Involvement and Distance. Here, an important mediating 
role of Relevance and Valence in the effects of Affordances and Ethics on 
Involvement, Distance and Use Intentions was found, as predicted by previous 
research. 
All in all, the effects found in the condition where a human controlled Tom are 
roughly as hypothesized in Chapter 1, Figure 1.2., based on previous research on 
humans perceiving virtual humans (Van Vugt et al., 2009). Looking at which 
significant regression weights were found, there are mainly differences in the 
regression weights where Similarity is involved. 
The fact that regression weights concerning Similarity were different from previous 
studies (e.g., Van Vugt et al., 2009) is not so surprising, because the type of 
Similarity that was measured differs between the two studies. In Van Vugt et al., 
Similarity was designed by morphing the face of the virtual human with the face of the 
participants, who appeared to only perceive this unconsciously. In the current study, 
however, Similarity was not manipulated in the experiment, and consciously 
perceived by the participants. Furthermore, the application domain could play an 
important role here. Similarity plays a large role in dating, and it is a well-known 
finding (e.g., Al-Natour et al., De Bruine, 2002; Li et al., 2007; Ratan & Bailenson, 
2007; Van Vugt et al., 2010) that Similarity attracts, which may explain the effects 
found on Involvement and Distance. 
 
A novel element in this study was that, instead of being asked how they perceive the 
stimulus, in this experiment, participants were asked to respond on their imagination 
of how the stimulus (i.e., Tom) perceived them. To our knowledge there does not 
exist previous research in which participants were asked to assess the perceptions of 
an artificial other. It is a nice finding, that the scales of I-PEFiC (Van Vugt et al., 
2009), which were originally used to ask how participants perceived an interactive 
virtual human, could be used quite well in a reversed mode (i.e., to ask participants 
how they thought Tom perceived them). However, for Ethics and Similarity the 
measurement scales were found to be rather weak. This probably is the result of the 
speed-date setting chosen for the experiment. The participants may have interpreted 
the statement ‘Tom is credible’ as Tom postulating a credible character in the sense 
of being human-like, but not necessarily as Tom being credible in the sense of 
correct information. Instigated by the domain of previous studies (e.g., van Vugt et 
al., 2009), the indicative items for measuring good ethics may be focusing too much 
on providing trustworthy information only, which is actually just a small subset of 
being morally good. Moreover, Tom sometimes exhibited some rude behavior (e.g., 
making remarks like “that’s none of your business!”), which the participants may have 
interpreted as mean, but not necessarily as evil. Furthermore, for the Similarity scale, 
some items, such as “Tom was comparing himself to me”, seem to rather indicate the 
process of comparing similarity, than the actual perception of being similar. In future 
studies, the formulation of the scales should be adjusted to prevent 
misunderstandings like the ones described above from happening.  
In future research, we will test an extended version of the current model using a 
toy chimpanzee (see Figure 12.6) that play a simple tic-tac-toe game with the user. 
The chimpanzee will be able to trade rational choices to win the game for affective 
choices to let the human opponent win if she is nice to him. For doing this, we have 
equipped  toy chimps with several sensors so users can touch and pet the chimp to 
show affection. These inputs will be used to control the affect of the chimp towards 
the user and provides an inspirational test bed for our model simulations. 
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In all, results showed that participants did not experience any differences between 
Silicon Coppélia and a human confederate controlling Tom for the single occurrence 
and isolated effects of the variables measured by the questionnaire. However, by 
looking at the cognitive structure responsible for those effects, we found that implicitly 
the participants did experience differences between man and machine although the 
evidence should be made stronger. Perhaps in the future, Silicon Coppélia may 
reproduce human behavior such that human users cannot notice the difference 
anymore. Once this happens, we still do not claim that a computer can be called 
emotionally intelligent if it passes our adjusted Turing test (cf. Searle’s Chinese Room 
argument, 1981). We do claim, however, that the computer then simulates emotional 
intelligence, be it within the domain of our experimental set-up. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.6: The toy chimpanzee robot (Hasbro) we plan to equip with Silicon 
Coppélia in future research. 
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Part 5: Discussion 
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Chapter 13: Discussion 
 
 
13.1. Summary and interpretation of results 
 
Part 1 of this dissertation gave the background for doing the research that has been 
done in this PhD project. Further, the theories we used for doing this research were 
shortly explained, and a short introduction on the chapters in Parts 2, 3 and 4 was 
given. 
Part 2 focused on the development of CoMERG, the Computational model of 
Emotion Regulation based on Gross’ theory.  CoMERG integrates both quantitative, 
dynamical aspects (such as levels of emotional response) and qualitative aspects 
(such as decisions to regulate emotion). The model is adaptive, and provides the 
possibility to simulate a simplification of an emotion regulation process, including 
effects of events such as therapies and traumas, as illustrated in the simulation 
experiments described in Chapter 2. The patterns produced by the model were found 
to be consistent with Gross’ descriptions of examples of human regulation processes 
(Gross, 1998, 2001).  
In Chapter 3, a virtual environment was created, which included a number of 
ECAs that were equipped with CoMERG. To test the behavior of the model in a 
prototyping phase, the simulations were visualized in a graphical environment. The 
resulting movies provided a first indication that the emotion regulation strategies as 
described by Gross were implemented successfully.  
In Chapter 4, we fitted the reappraisal-specific components of the CoMERG to 
empirical data. By applying parameter tuning techniques, optimal fits of the model 
were found against the (averaged) patterns of the skin conductance data. The errors 
that were found turned out to be relatively low. Moreover, they were compared to the 
errors produced by a baseline variant of the model where the adaptive cycle was 
removed, and were found substantially lower. This provides evidence that adding the 
adaptation cycle improves the existing theory. 
By implementing Gross’ theory (see Chapter 2) and testing it against empirical 
data (see Chapter 4), this research project has contributed to the insight we have in 
the process of emotion regulation. Gross informally described a number of emotion 
regulation strategies, and how they can influence the level of emotion. We translated 
these relations into mathematical formulas, which describe the relation in more detail 
(e.g., whether the willingness to regulate one’s emotion increases the quickness of 
changing one’s behavior linearly or quadratic). Furthermore, we added a number of 
variables (e.g., the above described willingness to regulate one’s emotion) to create a 
working computational model. By doing this, we refined Gross’ theory into a more 
detailed version. Additionally, as it does not seem very plausible to have one set of 
‘ideal’, innate characteristics applicable in various contexts, we added adaptation to 
changing circumstances to the emotion regulation model. The adaptive model 
includes mechanisms to assess and adapt the degrees of flexibility of the emotion 
regulation process over longer periods. Experiments showed that the model with 
adaptation fits the empirical data better. Although this is obviously not an exhaustive 
proof for the correctness of the model, it is an important indication that reappraisal as 
performed by humans may indeed be an adaptive process, as has been postulated 
by current informal models of reappraisal (Kalisch, 2009). 
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Although the process of emotion regulation is widely investigated in the literature 
(e.g., Gross, 1998, 2001; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1994), not so many 
contributions address the possibility of developing a computational model. What has 
been developed so far either addresses some very specific aspects of the process at 
a more detailed (neurological) level (e.g., Thayer and Lane, 2000), or aims at 
incorporating emotions into software agents, in which case they focus more on 
emotion elicitation (appraisal) than on emotion regulation (e.g., Armony et al., 1997; 
Bates, 1994; Velasquez, 1997). Part 2 of this dissertation can be seen as a first step 
in an attempt to build a bridge between both directions. It formalizes an existing 
theory about emotion regulation using a high-level modeling language, but still in 
enough detail to be able to generate useful simulations. As such, it has similarities 
with the work of Marsella and Gratch (2003), who propose an approach to 
incorporate both appraisal and coping behavior into virtual humans. 
 
Part 3 of this dissertation focused on the development of I-PEFiCADM, a 
computational model of perceiving and experiencing fictional characters, and using 
these perceptions to make decisions based on rational as well as affective input. In 
Chapter 6, the theoretical account of involvement-distance trade-offs (Van Vugt et al., 
2009) was translated into a simulation model. Two main results were established. 
First, simulation experiments showed that the model turned out to be adequate for 
simulating the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on 
satisfaction. Second, it was found that positive features can increase the level of 
distance, and that negative features can increase involvement. This is explained by 
the fact that the factor levels do not directly influence involvement and distance, but 
merely indirectly via the factors of similarity, relevance and valence. Although this 
finding may be counterintuitive, it corresponds to empirical evidence by, for instance, 
Van Vugt, Hoorn et al., (2006); Van Vugt, Konijn et al., (2006). 
With formalizing I-PEFiC, we refined all the informally described relations of the 
model into more detailed mathematical formulas. The fact that simulation results 
produced using this more detailed theory correspond to empirical evidence, indicates 
that the refined theory is correct, and thereby improves the existing theory. This gives 
rise to more specific hypotheses for future research. For example, on how the effect 
of a small change in perceived ethics on involvement compares to the effect of a 
large change in ethics, and how this compares to the effects of similar changes in 
affordances. 
In Chapter 7, the computational I-PEFiC model (see Chapter 6) was extended with 
goal-directed judgment formation (Hoorn et al., 2007) and overt actions to achieve 
affective decision making, hence I-PEFICADM. This way, the rather passive, covert 
responses dealt with by the I-PEFiC theory were extended with an account of more 
active and overt responses. Moreover, the ECAs had the availability over goals to 
establish beliefs about how certain actions would sustain or obstruct them. Simulation 
experiments were performed to test the behavior of this model. The hypothesis was 
that users or other agents were used as a means for the ECA to achieve goals and 
that the calculated valence to those means would make the robot select one of 
possibly five actions: positive approach, negative approach, avoid, change, or do 
nothing. Our experiments showed that indeed this was the case and that robots could 
combine rational decisions with affective decisions. Thus far, ECAs and software 
systems were taken as instruments for humans to achieve human goals, without the 
robots having a ‘mind of their own.’ 
In Chapter 8, we extended the resulting model of affective decision making in such 
a way that the agents change their (simulated) perceptions and beliefs about other 
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agents if actions are taken. Furthermore, the extension manages that the agents can 
simulate specific emotions, such as anger. We performed simulation experiments to 
show how the actions affect the agents. These results are as would have been 
expected from the theory (Hoorn et al., 2007; Van Vugt et al., 2006; Van Vugt, 2008). 
This indicates that the developed extensions refine the existing theory. After all, in the 
original theory there were no relations specified on how actions of others would 
change one’s perceptions and beliefs, and how this influences specific emotions such 
as anger. 
 
To this point, we had two logically consistent models, but these models were still 
separate pieces as it were. The connection was not worked out in detail yet. 
Moreover, especially I-PEFiCADM needed a more extensive form of validation. 
Therefore, Part 4 of this dissertation focused on integrating the models into the 
elaborate computational model Silicon Coppélia and on the ecological validation of 
the integration. 
In Chapter 9, we made the connections fit and were able to present an 
implementation of Silicon Coppélia, which is a combination of CoMERG (see Part 2 
of this dissertation), I-PEFiCADM (see Part 3 of this dissertation), and a simplified 
version of EMA (Marsella & Gratch, 2009). In the integrated model, the agents 
simulate goal-related beliefs that lead to emotions. More specifically, the agents 
simulate beliefs about the responsibility of other agents for (not) achieving goal-
states, and about praiseworthiness based on this responsibility. The agents also 
simulate beliefs about the likelihood of achieving goal-states. These beliefs were 
based on beliefs that certain states in the world are true, and beliefs that certain 
states affect other states in the world. The beliefs, together with the other variables in 
the system, affected the seven emotions that were ‘experienced’ by the agents: joy, 
distress, hope, fear, anger, guilt, and surprise. These emotions were aggregated into 
an overall mood. Furthermore, ECAs equipped with the system are capable of 
performing certain emotion-regulation strategies, based on CoMERG and EMA. 
Simulation experiments showed that Silicon Coppélia could simulate richer 
affective behavior than CoMERG, I-PEFiCADM and EMA could do, each on their own. 
CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM cannot simulate emotions or belief-changes based on 
beliefs about the responsibility of other agents and the likelihood of goal-states 
happening, whereas EMA is not capable of making irrational decisions when 
appropriate. This provides evidence that with integrating the existing theories, we 
created a new theory that offers a picture that is more complete. 
Chapter 10 presents an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe. Because it 
is equipped with Silicon Coppélia, it can show human-like emotional behavior. Based 
on whether the agent reaches its goals (winning and losing when the agent has 
ambitions to win or lose), the likelihood of these goals, and the expectedness of the 
move of the user and the outcome of a game, the emotions joy, distress, hope, fear, 
and surprise are simulated and shown by the agent by means of facial expressions. 
We created five different agents, each with different parameter settings, to test the 
behavior under various conditions 
In Chapter 11, we developed a speed-dating application, in which a human user 
could communicate with an affective agent via multiple-choice questions on a 
website. Because of the emotionally laden setting of a speed date, this application 
serves well as a test bed for emotion models. We equipped the virtual speed-dating 
partner, named Tom, with Silicon Coppélia. As an advanced, implicit version of a 
Turing Test (Turing, 1964), we let participants perform a speed-dating session with 
Tom in Chapter 12, and asked them how they thought Tom perceived them during 
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the speed-date. What the participants did not know, was that in one condition, a 
human was controlling Tom, whereas in the other condition, Tom was equipped with 
Silicon Coppélia. A novel element in this experiment was that participants were asked 
to imagine how an agent perceives them. To our knowledge, there is no previous 
research in which participants were asked to assess the perceptions of an artificial 
other. 
We looked at previous research about human cognitive processes, such as 
human perception mechanisms, emotion generation and emotion regulation 
mechanisms (e.g., Gross, 2001; Marsella & Gratch, 2009; Van Vugt et al., 2009). By 
doing so, we looked at the way humans ‘work’ as if they were a machine with a ‘bio-
physical mind’, and used this knowledge to fabricate a ‘silicon mind’. When we 
incorporated this silicon mind in ECAs, it appeared to be a reasonably adequate 
simplification of the human bio-physical mind. Whether analyzing the mind of the 
ECA should be called mind-reading or attribution does not really matter in my point of 
view. It is only a matter of words, and one may call it however one feels like. Whether 
humans read the mind of the agent the same way as they read the mind of a real 
person is beyond the scope of this dissertation. If we want to make statements about 
that, we should compare the performance of a human mediated by the speed dating 
agent Tom to face-to-face communication. However, on basis of previous research 
(e.g., Reeves & Nass, 1996), we can state that it probably is a lot alike, as humans 
are inclined to see human qualities in non-human entities. 
The speed-dating experiment served as a first ecological validation of the model. 
Participants did not experience differences between the agent they were interacting 
with, as either controlled by Silicon Coppélia or by a human confederate, for the 
single occurrence of the experiment and isolated effects of the variables measured 
by the questionnaire. Not that they did not have any significant effect; the effects just 
did not significantly differ. Thus, within the boundaries of the limited interaction 
possibilities, the participants perceived that Tom as controlled by a human 
confederate and Tom as controlled by our software perceived their moral fiber as 
similar, their relevance as similar, and so on. The participants felt Tom as controlled 
by our software and Tom as controlled by a human confederate were equally eager 
to meet them again, and exhibited equal ways to select a situation and to make 
affective decisions. Also, the emotions the participants perceived in Tom during the 
speed-date session did not differ significantly between conditions. Emotions were 
observed by the participants, and these emotions were similar for a human controlled 
agent and software controlled agent. This is a nice finding for the engineer who wants 
to use these models to develop applications in which ECAs or robots interact with 
humans. After all, on all aspects measured for in the questionnaire, participants did 
not experience important differences between the expression of human behavior and 
behavior generated by our software. Furthermore, the emotions that were observed 
by the participants in Tom as generated by our software did not differ significantly 
from those observed in Tom as generated by a human confederate. 
One could say that humans are also ‘just machines’ of hydrocarbons instead of 
silicon, and that therefore, human emotions are also engineered. In a way, this is of 
course true. However, based on the results in this dissertation, we cannot make any 
statements about that. We can only state that using the simplification of a human 
looked at as a machine, which we created in this research project, participants 
cannot recognize a difference between a real human and our software controlling the 
ECA in the speed dating experiment. Based on the previous, we can conclude that 
we approach ‘the machine human’ rather well within this domain. 
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However, when we looked at the relations between the variables, it seemed that 
participants did perceive differences in the relations between the various perceptions 
of Tom controlled by a human versus our model. This shows that the cognitive 
structure implicitly recognized by the participants in Silicon Coppélia differed from the 
cognitive structure they implicitly recognized in Tom controlled by a human. This may 
be bad news for the cognitive scientist trying to reproduce human affective 
functioning. Although it is not explicitly recognized by the participants, they do 
implicitly recognize some differences in the cognitive structure of the model 
compared to human behavior but we are still in need of better evidence. 
With the results described above, this research project answers the question 
whether equipping virtual characters with a combination of the cognitive models as 
described above makes the agents show human-like behavior. Based on the fact that 
there are no differences found between a human and our model controlling Tom on 
the individual variables, but there are differences found in the cognitive structure 
behind these variables, we can conclude that we may be closing in on a humanoid 
simulation of affect, but that we are not there yet. We created a theory that explains 
human emotional behavior reasonably accurately. By adding more detail to existing 
theories, and integrating the improved theories in one model that explains more than 
the originals, we improved on the theory of emotion-psychology, media psychology 
and communication science. However, the accuracy and corrobration of explaining 
the cognitive structure behind this emotional behavior can still be improved. 
By equipping an ECA with Silicon Coppélia, and comparing its effects on humans 
with those of the same ECA controlled by a human confederate, we contributed to a 
more complete and accurate picture of the psychological processes evoked during 
mediated interpersonal and human-agent interactions. Thereby, we explored the 
mechanisms that explain the success or failure of embodied agents. Applying person 
perception as well as human-computer interaction principles to the embodied 
conversational agent domain helped us to better understand user responses to these 
agents. For example, our speed-dating experiment indicated that it is possible to 
recognize human behavior in something that is told to be artificial, and to implicitly 
distinguish it from behavior generated by the same artificial thing controlled by a 
cognitive model, despite very limited interaction possibilities. This indicates that for 
designing a virtual other that is believably emotionally human-like, the interaction 
possibilities may not be as important as thought previously. 
By creating computational models using existing theories and integrating them into 
one system, we elaborated existing emotion theories on which the models were 
based, in making them more detailed and more precise and providing a more 
complete picture. Experiments showed that these adapted theories can be used to 
reproduce human affective behavior in an ECA quite successfully. Furthermore, it 
indicates that for designing ECAs that are perceived as humans, it is important to 
make them appear emotionally intelligent. The new insights acquired in this research 
project can be used to make improvements to human-agent communication and 
interaction. If we do this successfully, we may conclude that the theories Silicon 
Coppélia is based on not only can explain human behavior, but they can also be 
used to reproduce human behavior in virtual humans.  
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Figure 13.1: AAP interacts with its user, while sitting in its habitat (e.g., stone, tire, 
chair, tree trunk, and fridge). Photo by Jannes Linders. Retrieved Oct. 10, 2009 from 
http://www.skor.nl/popup.php?id=1302&label=FIG01 
 
 
13.2. Future research 
 
In future research, we plan to determine the added value of the different parts we 
integrated into Silicon Coppélia. We plan to compare three versions of Silicon 
Coppélia: (1) Silicon Coppélia as presented in this dissertation, (2) Silicon Coppélia 
without Gross’ emotion regulation strategies, and (3) Silicon Coppélia without Gross’ 
emotion regulation strategies and without the generation of specific emotions taken 
from EMA. In order to do so, we will develop an improved test bed in which the 
behavior of all the individual models is required to make a robot behave emotionally 
intelligent. We expect that removing parts from Silicon Coppélia as described above 
will decrease user satisfaction with the robot. 
Inspired by Aernout Mik’s AAP, a life-size orangutan animatronics (see Figure 
13.1), which can play tic-tac-toe when it feels like, we plan to extend the pilot 
application in which an ECA also played tic-tac-toe (see Chapter 10). AAP was a 
social event, an extra character with a personality in the everyday environment of the 
Sint Maarten clinic, provoking empathy in the audience and sometimes a little 
anxiety. 
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Figure 13.2: The toy chimpanzee robot (Hasbro) we plan to equip with Silicon 
Coppélia in future research. 
 
The ECA in the tic-tac-toe application will be replaced by a toy chimpanzee robot 
(see Figure 13.2), which we will equip with several versions of Silicon Coppélia. This 
chimpanzee will then have a short interaction with the participant, using parts of the 
speed dating application, and play tic-tac-toe. The chimpanzee will be able to trade 
rational choices to win the game for affective choices to let the human opponent win 
if they are nice to him. For doing this, the toy chimps are equipped with several 
sensors so users can touch and pet the chimp to show affection. These inputs will be 
used to control the affect of the chimp towards the user. Additional to serving as a 
test bed, the resulting chimpanzee could be used as a virtual companion to improve 
the well-being of people that have to stay in a long-term care facility. 
 
13.3. Applications 
 
Modeling human behavior and reproducing it in artificial systems, such as the 
chimpanzees described above, can also be of great use in various other applications. 
One possibility is to design systems that in their behavior have certain aspects in 
common with humans. For example, they may have some forms of intelligence, show 
some types of emotions or even simulate consciousness. ECAs also fall into this 
category. ECAs that exhibit forms of emotional intelligence could be useful for a wide 
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variety of applications, such as (serious) digital games, tutor and advice systems, or 
coach and therapist systems.  
For example, Silicon Coppélia could be used to improve the emotional intelligence 
of a ‘virtual crook’ that could be used for police studies to practice situations in which 
the police officers should work on the emotions of the crook, for example questioning 
techniques (Hochschild, 1979; 1983). Another possible use of models of human 
processes is in software and/or hardware that interacts with a human and tries to 
understand this human’s states and processes and responds in an intelligent 
manner. Many ambient intelligence systems (e.g., Aarts, Harwig, and Schuurmans, 
2001) include devices that monitor elderly persons. In settings where humans have to 
interact intensively with automated systems, the system can combine the data 
gathered from these devices with an adjusted version of Silicon Coppélia to maintain 
a model of the emotional state of the user. This can enable the system to adapt the 
type of interaction to the user’s needs. 
 
13.3.1. Virtual storytelling 
 
That society becomes older and individuals more self-centered are two trends that 
contribute to the experience that, emotionally and socially, people become more 
isolated (Killeen, 1998). In reaction, scientists develop ECAs that act as friends for 
lonely individuals – as a kind of artificial parrot. Some of these ECAs generate fiction 
stories, in which the characters show realistic behavior and the user can influence the 
storyline. Virtual storytelling has become a hot topic in academic areas such as 
artificial intelligence, human-computer interaction and cognitive science. The industry 
also shows interest, with respect to game design and screen writing (Romano et al., 
2007). 
To develop virtual stories, a large variety of approaches have been proposed (e.g., 
Cavazza et al., 2002; Dautenhahn, 1998; Robertson & good, 2003; Theune et al., 
2003). A trend in these approaches is the movement from stories with a fixed, pre-
scripted storyline toward emergent narratives; i.e., stories in which only a number of 
characters and their personalities are fixed, rather than the precise script of the story 
(Aylett, 1999). In the latter type of storytelling, ideally, all the designer (or writer) has 
to do is to determine which (types of) characters will occur in the play, although 
usually it is still needed to roughly prescribe a course of events. Hence, advantages 
of emergent narratives are the reduced amount of work that has to be spent by the 
writer, and the non-deterministic and unpredictable behavior of the story. 
In parallel with the shift from fixed storylines to emergent narrative, there has been 
a development in the nature of the involved characters as well. Recently, the 
characters (or agents) that are present in virtual stories are transforming more and 
more from shallow agents to complex personalities with human-like properties such 
as emotions and theories of mind. To accomplish this, researchers have started to 
incorporate cognitive models within ECAs (e.g., Marsella et al., 2000; Paiva et al., 
2001).  
Silicon Coppélia can be seen as a next step into this direction. It enables ECAs to 
perceive and experience other characters in the virtual story, including the user. 
Based on these perceptions, the ECA can form feelings and involvement and 
distance toward the other characters. The ECA can combine these feelings with the 
more rationally formed intentions to ‘use’ the other characters to reach it goals, to 
make decisions on its own. The ECA can simulate emotions, and regulate them 
upwards as well as downwards using various emotion regulation strategies. 
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13.3.2. Self-help therapy 
 
ECAs telling stories are not only useful to make the elderly feel less lonely; virtual 
storytelling also proved to be useful for clinical experts in the treatment of behavior 
problems, family counseling, and training (e.g., Painter, Cook, & Silverman, 1999), 
acquisition of language and other sign systems (Schlosser & Lloyd, 1993), or in 
persuasive contexts (e.g., Lee & Leets, 2002). The motivation for developing robots 
that tell virtual stories may vary from pure entertainment (e.g., computer games) to 
educational purposes (e.g., training environments, teaching strategies) (Johnson et 
al., 2005), persuasion (e.g., science and health communication), or clinical therapy. 
In particular, ECAs can play a useful role in the interaction between human and 
computer in a Web context. One of the application areas foreseen is in self-help 
therapy, in which humans with psychological disorders are supported through 
applications available on the Internet and virtual communities of persons with similar 
problems. An ECA equipped with Silicon Coppélia can respond empathically toward 
the user. Together with expert knowledge, the ECA can use the model to behave 
emotionally intelligent and give ‘the right response at the right moment’. Additionally, 
as the model is based on human emotional structure, it can use adjusted versions of 
Silicon Coppélia for keeping a model of the emotional state of the user. Silicon 
Coppélia enables the ECA to perceive the user at different points in time. It can keep 
track of the changes in perceptions, and use this information in interaction with the 
user (e.g., giving compliments, or giving extra support in times of need). 
 
13.4. Ethical considerations 
 
Equipping ECAs and robots with emotional intelligence can support people’s 
wellbeing, for example, as a pet, a toy, as teacher, storyteller, coach, or therapist. In 
future research at the SELEMCA project (www.selemca.com), we will develop ECAs 
and ‘Caredroids’: humanoid care robots to improve the well-being of patients and 
care deliverers. These Caredroids will serve as coaches and lifestyle advisors, assist 
with filling in forms, provide entertainment, and match patients to care professionals 
and volunteers that fit their needs best. 
The Caredroids will communicate affectively with their users, and build up 
personal relationships with them. In order to do so, the Caredroids will need to have a 
sense of communication rules, social interaction and perception, and the appraisal of 
certain social situations. To this end, we will elaborate on the Ethics and Affordances 
modules of Silicon Coppélia. To improve the affordances of the Caredroids, we will 
equip them with care protocols and expert knowledge, so the users will see the 
Caredroids as experts, and trust on their advice. To deal with the responsibility of 
being seen as an expert, and improving the ethics of the Caredroids, they will be 
equipped with an ethical reasoner. Together with the care protocols, this will make 
the Caredroids behave ethically ‘right’ toward its users. The fact that its users may 
often be going through a rough period, and may often be emotionally vulnerable, 
makes this especially important. When the Caredroids detects a situation that is 
ethically complex, they should not overestimate their own capabilities to deal with the 
situation, but contact a human care deliverer to deal with the situation. 
Security is another important issue to consider. The Caredroids will handle 
sensitive personal data, such as the medical history of patients and information about 
the user’s personality, to be able to adapt to their needs. By developing Caredroids 
that offer this functionality, privacy becomes an even more important issue than it is 
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now. A huge amount of personal information of humans is already stored in 
databases that are often interconnected. This raises the need for high-end security. 
People may think that a non-human counselor is safe, but it is just another piece of 
software so that information can be used for good or ill. When ECAs or robots have 
the opportunity to monitor their user affectively, unauthorized people could be 
interested in this information as well. The information the robot keeps about its users 
should be stored in an extremely secure way, so it is inaccessible to third parties. 
Additionally, users should have the right and the possibility to access information that 
is stored about them, and ask for certain information to be changed if incorrect, or 
removed from the database if they desire to. 
 
The Caredroids that we will develop in the SELEMCA project will of course not be 
completely identical to humans. However, the Turing Test experiment (see Chapter 
12) showed that, within a limited domain, the agent was already barely 
indistinguishable from humans in operating an ECA on a range of aspects. In the 
future, similar experiments may indicate that the human who mimics the robot is 
taken for an android. So what if we make a robot that is indistinguishable from a 
healthy person? Will that improve our quality of life? 
It is important to realize that androids that communicate affectively, like all new 
developments, can be used for the good, but also for malicious purposes. When used 
for the wrong goals, or when errors are made in the design or production process, 
negative consequences may occur. Also, techniques that seem useful at first may 
have negative consequences to society as well that are easily overlooked. 
Currently, the first ECAs and robots are being built of which can be said humans 
build up relationships with them (e.g., robot pets that are used to prevent loneliness, 
such as in Wada & Shibata, 2006). It is expected that these human-robot 
relationships will get more personal over time. David Levy (2007) even predicts 
partner robots with which people will fall in love, have sex, and marry. What effects 
will it have on society if this happens? Will people have less interpersonal contact, 
because contact with robots is optimized to be enjoyable? Will you be able to return 
your partner-robot to the manufacturer if it loses interest? If it has its own goals, will it 
threaten to reject the user to reach them through manipulation? Androids that 
communicate affectively with the user have the potential to mislead people, if 
programmed that way. Androids could lie while perfectly showing fake emotions. Part 
of this problem could be prevented by building androids that love the user 
unconditionally. But then, will users mistreat it, or see it as a slave? And if so, how 
would this change the way we treat other humans? If mistreated, should robots be 
allowed to defend themselves? And if not, are there other circumstances under which 
they should?  
The first of the famous three laws of Asimov states that a robot may not injure a 
human being, or through inaction allow a human being to come to harm (Asimov, 
1976). However, this law has already been violated. There already exist robots that 
have the ability to kill people. Robots already exist that are especially developed to 
do so, such as the MQ-1 Predator drone aircrafts, armed with Hellfire missiles. These 
unmanned aerial vehicles have been used by the US and the Israeli army to kill 
militants as well as civilians (Galasco et al., 2009; Grier, 2009). Some people argue 
that the use of autonomous combat robots can make warfare more humane (Arkin, 
2009). However, the threshold of entry into warfare may be lowered, because it will 
be machines instead of human lives that are being risked.  
Furthermore, given that machines are developed that exhibit forms of 
consciousness (Holland, 2003), the possibility that we might be “dominated” by 
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machines, as we are warned for in many books and films, may become a genuine 
worry. Who is to say that they would not enslave or exterminate us? We should 
reflect on our research, and talk about the possible consequences, to ensure that the 
step we are making forward really is improving human life, and does not turn out to 
actually be a step into a pitfall!  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Er is een groeiende interesse in de ontwikkeling van embodied conversational agents 
(ECAs) en robots. Ze kunnen spelletjes interessanter maken, eenzame mensen 
gezelschap houden, online instructies aantrekkelijker maken en gebruikt worden voor 
coaching en zelf-help therapie. 
Tot nu toe werden ECAs en sociale robots met name ontwikkeld vanuit een 
technisch oogpunt.(e.g., ELIZA Weizenbaum, 1966). Het ontwikkelen van ECAs en 
robots is echter niet alleen een technische zaak. Theorieën en modellen van 
menselijk gedrag zijn belangrijk om communicatieregels, sociale interactie, perceptie 
en de beoordeling van bepaalde sociale situaties te verklaren. In gemedieerde 
interpersoonlijke communicatie  en media psychologie spelen emoties een 
belangrijke rol en vormen een belangrijk onderzoeksveld. Moderne technologieën 
maken het steeds beter mogelijk om op verfijnde wijze emoties te communiceren via 
elektronische apparaten en schermen, tussen mensen onderling én tussen mensen 
en computers (mens-computer interactie)  (Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008). 
Het idee dat mens-computer interacties kunnen worden versterkt door het gebruik 
van emoties wordt versterkt door herhaalde bevindingen dat mensen, zelfs ervaren 
computergebruikers, geneigd zijn hun computers natuurlijk en sociaal te behandelen 
als mensen en dat ze op affectieve wijze met computers communiceren  (Brave & 
Nass, 2002; Reeves & Nass, 1996). Ze voelen zich bijvoorbeeld gevleid door 
complimentjes van hun computer, ook al is het maar een machine. Verder zijn 
mensen beleefd tegen computers zoals ze dat zijn tegen mensen. Aan de andere 
kant kunnen ze zich ook verontwaardigd voelen door een onbeleefde computer, 
bijvoorbeeld een virtueel mens dat van het scherm verdwijnt zonder afscheid te 
nemen. 
Ontwikkelaars van robots staan voor de uitdaging om ECAs te ontwikkelen die 
oprecht affectief gedrag begrijpen en kunnen simuleren. Bestaande ECAs kunnen 
vaak wel affectief vertonen tijdens een gesprek, maar zijn niet emotioneel intelligent. 
Hoewel ik niet geloof dat computers al emotioneel intelligent kunnen zijn, ben ik het 
wel eens met de uitvinder van het onderzoeksveld affective computing  Picard (1997) 
dat computers zich tenminste emotioneel kunnen gedragen. 
Het idee van affective computing is dat computers doen alsof ze emoties hebben 
en emoties van de gebruiker herkennen en begrijpen, zodat ze gepast op de 
gebruiker kunnen reageren. Virtuele mensen die emoties tonen kunnen de 
waardering voor een systeem verhogen. De positieve effecten van het tonen van 
empathische emoties zijn herhaaldelijk gedemonstreerd in mens-mens interactie  
(e.g., Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008). Zulke positieve effecten zouden er ook kunnen zijn 
in communicatie met een virtueel mens. Gebruikers zouden zich emotioneel 
verbonden kunnen voelen met virtuele mensen die emoties tonen en interacteren 
met zulke 'emotionele' computersystemen zou hun percepties van de menselijkheid, 
betrouwbaarheid en geloofwaardigheid van het systeem kunnen verhogen. Een 
studie van Brave et al. (2005) toonde dat virtuele mensen die empathische emoties 
toonden in een blackjack computerspelletje positiever, aardiger en betrouwbaarder  
beoordeeld worden. Verder zou frustratie gereduceerd kunnen worden als computers 
rekening houden met de emoties van de gebruiker (Konijn & Van Vugt, 2008). 
In dit promotietraject heb ik diverse modellen van emotioneel menselijk gedrag 
bekeken. Samen met mijn mede-onderzoekers heb ik deze modellen geformaliseerd, 
zodat computers ze kunnen gebruiken on hun 'eigen emoties' te berekenen en zich 
emotioneel menselijk te gedragen. De bestaande modellen beschrijven elk 
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belangrijke onderdelen van menselijk emotioneel gedrag, maar geen van hen is 
alomvattend. In dit project hebben we gekeken waar de bestaande theorieën elkaar 
aanvullen en hoe ze geïntegreerd kunnen worden. Verder moesten veel 
gedetailleerde ontwerpkeuzes gemaakt worden om een werkend computationeel 
systeem te ontwikkelen, een uitdaging die de originele ontwikkelaars van de 
theorieen nooit aan hebben hoeven gaan. Het toevoegen van precisie en het 
expliceren van verborgen assumpties mag gezien worden als een contributie aan 
emotie theorie. De nieuw ontwikkelde theorie en het formele model kunnen 
geïmplementeerd worden  worden in ECAs en robots om hen emotioneel intelligent 
gedrag te kunnen laten vertonen. Dit kan van pas komen in allerlei toepassingen, 
zoals bijvoorbeeld zelfhulp therapie (zie bijvoorbeeld Hoofdstuk 5). 
 
CoMERG, het Computationele Model van Emotie Regulatie gebaseerd op Gross zijn 
theorie, beschreven in Deel 2 van deze dissertatie, integreert kwantitatieve, 
dynamische aspecten (zoals niveaus van emotionele respons) en kwalitatieve 
aspecten (zoals de beslissing om emotie te reguleren). Het model is adaptief en 
maakt het mogelijk een simpel emotieregulatie proces te simuleren, inclusief effecten 
van therapieën en trauma's, zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2. De patronen die dit 
model produceert bleken consistent met de beschrijvingen van menselijk gedrag door 
Gross (1998, 2001). 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een virtuele omgeving met een aantal ECAs die uitgerust 
waren met CoMERG. Om het gedrag van het model te testen in de prototyping fase 
werden de simulaties gevisualiseerd in een grafische omgeving. De resulterende 
filmpjes toonden een eerste indicatie dat de emotieregulatie strategieën zoals 
beschreven door Gross correct geïmplementeerd waren. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we het gedeelte van CoMERG dat te maken heeft met de 
herbeoordeling van situaties vergeleken met empirische data. Met behulp van 
parameter tuning technieken werden optimale fits van het model gevonden op 
menselijk zweten. De gevonden fouten bleken relatief klein. Bovendien bleken ze in 
een vergelijking substantieel kleiner dan de fouten die geproduceerd werden door 
een primitievere versie van het model, waarbij het adaptieve gedeelte was 
weggehaald. Dit duidt erop dat het toevoegen van het adaptieve gedeelte de 
bestaande theorie verbetert. 
Door het implementeren van Gross zijn theorie, zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2, 
en het te vergelijken met empirische data (zie Hoofdstuk 4) heeft dit 
onderzoeksproject het inzicht dat we hebben in het proces van emotieregulatie 
vergroot. Gross beschreef informeel een aantal emotieregulatie strategieën en hoe 
deze de niveaus van emotie beïnvloeden. Wij hebben deze relaties vertaald in 
wiskundige formules, die de relaties in meer detail beschrijven. Ook hebben we 
variabelen toegevoegd om een werkend computationeel model te maken. Hierdoor 
hebben we de theorie van Gross verfijnd tot een gedetailleerdere versie. Verder 
hebben we adaptiviteit aan het model toegevoegd, aangezien het niet plausibel lijkt 
dat we een set 'ideale' karakteristieken hebben die in alle omstandigheden 
toepasbaar zijn. Experimenten toonden aan dat het model met adaptiviteit beter past 
op empirische data. Hoewel dit duidelijk geen uitvoerig bewijs is dat het model 
correct is, is het een belangrijke indicatie dat herbeoordeling van situaties door 
mensen inderdaad een adaptief proces is, zoals gepostuleerd is in huidige modellen 
van herbeoordeling (Kalisch, 2009). 
Hoewel emotieregulatie uitgebreid onderzocht is (e.g., Gross, 1998, 2001; 
Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1994), wordt de mogelijkheid om een 
computationeel model te ontwikkelen niet vaak beschreven. Tot nu toe worden vooral 
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specifieke aspecten van het proces op een gedetailleerd (neurologisch) niveau 
beschreven (e.g., Thayer and Lane, 2000), of worden emoties in software agenten 
geïmplementeerd, waarbij de nadruk ligt op de elicitatie van emoties (e.g., Armony et 
al., 1997; Bates, 1994; Velasquez, 1997). Deel 2 van deze dissertatie kan gezien 
worden als een eerste stap om een brug te bouwen tussen deze twee richtingen. Het 
formaliseert een bestaande theorie van emotieregulatie op een hoog 
abstractieniveau, maar alsnog gedetailleerd genoeg om bruikbare simulaties te 
kunnen genereren. 
 
Deel 3 van deze dissertatie richt zich op de ontwikkeling van I-PEFiCADM, een 
computioneel model van de perceptie en ervaring van fictionele karakters en hoe 
deze gebruikt worden om beslissingen te maken op basis van zowel rationele als 
affectieve input (Van Vugt et al., 2009). In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt het oorspronkelijk 
informeel beschreven I-PEFiC model geformaliseerd. Hiermee werden twee 
belangrijke resultaten behaald. Ten eerste lieten simulatie experimenten zien dat het 
model adequaat is voor het simuleren van de tradeoff tussen betrokkenheid en 
distantie. Ten tweede werd gevonden dat positieve eigenschappen distantie kunnen 
verhogen en dat negatieve eigenschappen betrokkenheid kunnen verhogen. Hoewel 
deze bevinding tegenintuïtief mag lijken, komt hij overeen met empirische 
bevindingen in bijvoorbeeld Van Vugt, Hoorn et al., (2006); Van Vugt, Konijn et al., 
(2006). 
Met het formaliseren van I-PEFiC hebben we al de informeel beschreven relaties 
in het oorspronkelijke model verfijnd in wiskundige formules. Het feit dat simulaties 
geproduceerd door deze gedetailleerdere theorie overeenkomen met empirische 
bevindingen duidt erop dat deze verfijnde theorie correct is en daarmee de 
bestaande theorie verbetert. Dit geeft aanleiding tot specifiekere hypotheses voor 
toekomstig onderzoek. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt het computationele I-PEFiC model (zie Hoofdstuk 6) 
uitgebreid met doelgerichte oordeelvorming (Hoorn et al., 2007) en het maken van 
affectieve beslissingen, vandaar I-PEFiCADM. Op deze manier worden de nogal 
passieve, verborgen reacties beschreven door de I-PEFiC theorie uitgebreid met 
meer actieve en openlijke acties. Bovendien heeft de ECA hierdoor de beschikking 
over doelen en overtuigingen over hoe deze te bereiken of voorkomen. We hebben 
simulatie experimenten uitgevoerd om het gedrag van dit model te testen. De 
hypothese was dat gebruikers en andere agenten door de ECA als middel gebruikt 
zouden worden om een doel te bereiken. Onze experimenten lieten zien dat dit 
inderdaad het geval was en dat robots rationele overwegingen met affectieve 
overwegingen konden combineren. Tot dusver werden ECAs en software systemen 
slechts als instrument gebruikt voor mensen om menselijke doelen te bereiken, 
zonder dat de robots een eigen 'aard' hebben. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 hebben we het resulterende model van affectief beslissen zo 
uitgebreid dat agenten hun (gesimuleerde) percepties en overtuigingen over andere 
agenten kunnen aanpassen wanneer acties uitgevoerd worden. Verder zorgt de 
uitbreiding ervoor dat specifieke emoties zoals woede gesimuleerd kunnen worden. 
We hebben simulatie experimenten uitgevoerd om te laten zien hoe acties de 
agenten beïnvloeden. Deze resultaten zijn zoals verwacht zou worden op basis van 
de theorie (Hoorn et al., 2007, Van Vugt et al. 2006, Van Vugt 2008). Dit duidt erop 
dat de ontwikkelde uitbreidingen de bestaande theorie verfijnen. In de originele 
theorie werd immers niet gespecificeerd hoe acties percepties, overtuigingen en 
specifieke emoties zoals woede beïnvloeden.  
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Op dit punt hadden we twee logisch consistente modellen, maar deze modellen 
waren nog losse stukjes. De connectie ertussen was nog niet in detail uitgewerkt. 
Bovendien had met name I-PEFiCADM nog een uitgebreidere vorm van validatie 
nodig. Daarom richt Deel 4 van deze dissertatie zich op het integreren van de 
modellen in het uitgewerkte computationele model Silicon Coppélia en de 
ecologische validatie van de  integratie. 
In Hoofdstuk 9 lieten we de connecties passen en waren we in staat een 
implementatie van Silicon Coppélia te presenteren. Silicon is een combinatie van 
CoMERG (zie Deel 2), I-PEFiCADM (zie Deel 3) en een versimpelde vorm van EMA 
(Marsella & Gratch, 2009). In het geïntegreerde model simuleren de agenten 
overtuigingen die aan doelen gerelateerd zijn, die leiden tot emoties. Om meer 
specifiek te zijn: de agenten simuleren overtuigingen over de verantwoordelijk van 
andere agenten voor het al dan niet bereiken van doelen en over hun 
prijswaardigheid op basis van deze verantwoordelijkheid. De agenten simuleren ook 
overtuigingen over de waarschijnlijkheid van het behalen van doelen. Deze 
overtuigingen zijn gebaseerd op de overtuigingen dat bepaalde dingen gelden in de 
situatie en dat deze dingen het al dan niet behalen van een bepaalde staat in de 
wereld beïnvloeden. De overtuigingen beïnvloedden samen met de andere factoren 
in het systeem de zeven emoties in het systeem die 'ervaren' werden door de 
agenten: blijheid, verdriet, hoop, angst, woede, schuld en verrassing. Deze emoties 
werden samengesmolten tot een algemene gemoedstoestand. Verder konden de 
ECAs uitgerust met het systeem emotieregulatie strategieën uitvoeren op basis van 
CoMERG en EMA. 
Simulatie experimenten lieten zien dat Silicon Coppélia rijker gedrag kon 
simuleren dan elk van de oorspronkelijke modellen op zich. CoMERG en I-PEFiCADM 
konden geen veranderingen van overtuigingen over de verantwoordelijkheid van 
andere agents voor het al dan niet behalen van doelen, of de waarschijnlijkheid tot 
het behalen van deze doelen berekenen, terwijl EMA niet in staat is irrationele 
beslissingen te maken. Dit duidt erop dat met het integreren van bestaande theorieën 
een nieuwe theorie hebben ontwikkeld die een completer beeld geeft. 
Hoofdstuk 10 beschrijft een affectieve virtuele agent die boter kaas en eieren 
speelt. Omdat hij uitgerust is met Silicon Coppélia kan hij emotioneel menselijk 
gedrag vertonen. Op basis van of de agent zijn doelen bereikt of niet (winnen of 
verliezen), de waarschijnlijkheid van deze doelen en de verassendheid van het 
gedrag van de gebruiker en de uitkomst van het spel, worden de emoties blijheid, 
verdriet, hoop, angst en verrassing gesimuleerd en getoond door de agent door 
middel van gezichtsuitdrukkingen. We hebben vijf verschillende agenten gemaakt, 
elk met andere parameter instellingen, om het gedrag onder verschillende condities 
te testen. 
In Hoofdstuk 11 hebben we een speed-dating toepassing ontwikkeld waarin een 
menselijke gebruiker met een affectieve agent kon communiceren door multiple-
choice vragen op een website te beantwoorden. Door de emotioneel geladen setting 
van een speed-date is deze toepassing een goed testplatform voor emotiemodellen. 
We rustten de virtuele speed-dating partner, genaamd Tom, uit met Silicon Coppélia. 
Als een geavanceerde, impliciete versie van een Turing Test (Turing, 1964) lieten we 
participanten een speed-dating sessie met Tom uitvoeren (zie Hoofdstuk 12) en 
vroegen we hen hoe ze dachten dat Tom hen ervaarde gedurende de speed-date. 
Wat de participanten niet wisten, was dat in de ene conditie Tom uitgerust was met 
Silicon Coppélia, terwijl in de andere conditie Tom werd bestuurd door een mens. 
Een nieuw element in dit experiment was dat participanten gevraagd werd zich voor 
te stellen hoe Tom over hén dacht. Voor zover ik weet is er geen enkel ander 
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onderzoek waarin participanten gevraagd wordt de percepties van een kunstmatige 
interactiepartner in te schatten. 
 
We hebben gekeken naar eerder onderzoek naar menselijke cognitieve processen, 
zoals menselijke perceptie mechanismen, emotie generatie en emotieregulatie 
mechanismen (e.g., Gross, 2001; Marsella & Gratch, 2009; Van Vugt et al., 2009). 
Hierbij keken we naar hoe de mens 'werkt' als machine met een 'bio-fysische geest' 
en hebben we deze kennis gebruikt om een 'geest van silicium' te fabriceren. Toen 
we deze geest van silicium in ECAs stopten, bleek dit een behoorlijk adequate 
simplificatie van de menselijke bio-fysische geest te zijn. 
 Het speed-dating experiment fungeerde als de eerste ecologische validatie van 
het model. Participanten ervaarden geen verschillen tussen de  agent, of hij nou 
gecontroleerd werd door Silicon Coppélia of door een mens, als het om de 
geïsoleerde effecten van de variabelen gemeten door de vragenlijst ging. Niet dat ze 
geen effect hadden, ze verschilden gewoon niet tussen condities. Dus, binnen de 
grenzen van de gelimiteerde interactie mogelijkheden zagen de participanten Tom 
als even goedhartig, even relevant, even happig op een nieuwe ontmoeting en ga zo 
maar door, of hij nou door een mens of door ons model werd bestuurd. Ook werden 
de emoties en de beslissingsmechanismen van tijdens de speed-date onder beide 
condities vergelijkbaar beoordeeld. Dit is goed nieuws voor de ontwikkelaar die het 
model wil gebruiken om ECAs of robots te maken die met mensen interacteren. Al 
met al zien de participanten geen belangrijke verschillen tussen Tom als bestuurd 
door ons model en door een mens op allerlei verschillende aspecten. 
Je zou kunnen zeggen dat mensen 'ook maar machines' zijn van koolwaterstoffen 
in plaats van silicium. Op basis hiervan kun je je afvragen in hoeverre onze emoties 
en ons emotioneel gedrag 'echt' is en in hoeverre we een 'slaaf' zijn van de bio-
fysische processen die zich afspelen in onze hersenen. Op basis van dit 
onderzoeksproject kunnen we daar weinig over zeggen. We kunnen alleen zeggen 
dat we met behulp van de simplificatie van een mens bekeken als machine, die we 
ontwikkeld hebben tijdens dit project, participanten geen duidelijke verschillen 
herkennen tussen menselijk gedrag en gedrag gesimuleerd door een computer 
tijdens het speed-dating experiment. Op basis hiervan kunnen we concluderen dat 
we 'de mens machine' op dit domein aardig dicht bereiken. 
Echter, wanneer we kijken naar de relaties tussen verschillende variabelen, zien 
we dat participanten wel verschillen in de cognitieve structuur verantwoordelijk voor 
de percepties en emoties te zien tussen Tom gecontroleerd door ons model en door 
een mens. Dit is slecht nieuws voor de cognitieve wetenschapper die menselijk 
affectief functioneren na wil bouwen. Hoewel het niet expliciet herkend wordt door de 
participanten, zien ze impliciet wel verschillen in de cognitieve structuur 
verantwoordelijk voor de percepties van Tom gecontroleerd door mens en machine, 
alhoewel meer bewijs nodig is om hier definitieve uitspraken over te doen. 
 
Met de resultaten die we hierboven hebben beschreven beantwoordt dit promotie-
onderzoek de vraag of virtuele karakters uitgerust met een combinatie van cognitieve 
modellen menselijk gedrag kunnen vertonen. Gebaseerd op het feit dat er geen 
verschillen gevonden worden tussen mens en machine in het besturen van Tom op 
de losse variabelen, maar wel in de cognitieve structuur kunnen we concluderen dat 
we in de buurt zijn van menselijke simulatie van emoties, maar we er nog niet 
helemaal zijn. We hebben theorie ontwikkeld die menselijk gedrag behoorlijk goed 
verklaard. Door het toevoegen van meer detail en het integreren van de 
gedetailleerdere theorieën hebben we een bijdrage geleverd aan de theorie van 
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emotie-psychologie, media psychologie en communicatiewetenschap. De cognitieve 
structuur verantwoordelijk voor het emotionele gedrag behoeft echter nog 
verbetering.  
Door een ECA uit te rusten met Silicon Coppélia en de effecten op gebruikers 
hiervan te vergelijken met dezelfde ECA, maar dan gecontroleerd door een mens, 
hebben we bijgedragen aan een completer en accurater beeld van de 
psychologische processen tijdens gemedieerde interpersoonlijke en mens-computer 
interacties. Daarmee hebben we de mechanismen die succes en falen van virtuele 
mensen bepalen verder onderzocht. Het toepassen van perceptiemechanismen 
principes uit mens-computer interactie bij virtuele mensen heeft ons geholpen de 
reacties van mensen hierop beter te begrijpen. Zo heeft ons speed-dating experiment 
bijvoorbeeld laten zien dat het mogelijk is menselijk gedrag te herkennen in iets 
waarvan verteld wordt dat het een machine is en het impliciet te onderscheiden van 
gedrag   geproduceerd door een mens, ondanks de beperkte interactie 
mogelijkheden. Dit duidt erop dat voor het ontwerpen van een virtueel karakter dat 
emotioneel menselijk is, de interactie mogelijkheden misschien niet zo belangrijk zijn 
als voorheen werd aangenomen. 
 
Door computermodellen te ontwikkelen en ze te integreren in één systeem hebben 
we bestaande emotie theorieën verbeterd. Experimenten hebben aangetoond dat 
deze modellen gebruikt kunnen worden om behoorlijk succesvol menselijk gedrag 
kunnen simuleren. Verder duidt het erop dat het belangrijk is om ECAs emotioneel 
intelligent te laten lijken als je wilt dat ze als menselijk ervaren worden. De nieuwe 
inzichten verworven door dit onderzoek kunnen gebruikt worden om mens-machine 
interactie te verbeteren. Als we dit succesvol doen kunnen we in de toekomst wellicht 
concluderen dat de theorieën waarop Silicon Coppélia gebaseerd is niet alleen 
gebruikt kunnen worden om menselijk gedrag te verklaren, maar om het te 
reproduceren in virtuele mensen.  
 
In verder onderzoek hopen we de toegevoegde waarde van de verschillende 
onderdelen geïntegreerd in Silicon Coppélia te bepalen. We zijn van plan om drie 
versies van Silicon Coppélia te vergelijken: (1) Silicon Coppélia zoals beschreven in 
deze dissertatie, (2) Silicon Coppélia zonder Gross zijn emotieregulatie strategieën 
en (3) Silicon Coppélia zonder deze strategieën én de generatie van specifieke 
emoties zoals gedaan wordt in EMA. Om dit te kunnen doen zullen we een verbeterd 
testplatform ontwikkelen waarin al het mogelijke gedrag van de individuele modellen 
nodig is om emotioneel intelligent gedrag te vertonen. We verwachten dat het 
weghalen van delen van Silicon Coppélia de waardering van de gebruiker voor de 
robot zal doen afnemen. 
 Geïnspireerd door Aernout Mik's AAP, een levensgrote orang oetang robot die 
boter kaas en eieren speelt als hij daar zin in heeft, zijn we van plan om onze ECA 
die ook boter kaas en eieren speelde (zie Hoofdstuk 10) te verbeteren. De ECA zal 
vervangen worden door een robot-chimpansee, uitgerust met Silicon Coppélia. De 
chimpansee zal rationele en affectieve overwegingen kunnen combineren, om 
bijvoorbeeld de gebruiker te laten winnen als hij die aardig vindt. Om dit mogelijk te 
maken wordt de chimpansee uitgerust met verschillende sensors, zodat de 
gebruikers hem kunnen aanraken en aaien, om affectie te tonen. De chimpansee zal 
dit als input gebruiken om op zijn beurt affect voor de gebruiker te tonen. Behalve als 
testplatform zal de chimpansee ook bruikbaar zijn als gezelschapspartner om het 
welzijn van mensen die langdurig in een zorginstelling verblijven te verhogen. 
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Het modelleren van menselijk gedrag in kunstmatige systemen, zoals in de 
chimpansee hierboven beschreven, kan nuttig zijn voor allerlei toepassingen, zoals 
games, educatieve systemen en als virtuele coaches of therapeuten. Ook kan het 
gebruikt worden door systemen om de emoties van hun gebruikers te voorspellen, 
zodat het systeem zijn gedrag hierop kan aanpassen. 
De maatschappij vergrijst en individualiseert. Hierdoor worden mensen emotioneel 
en sociaal meer geïsoleerd (Killeen, 1998). In reactie hierop, ontwikkelen 
wetenschappers ECAs die als vriendjes voor eenzame mensen kunnen fungeren. 
Sommige van deze ECAs kunnen verhaaltjes vertellen, waarin de karakters 
realistisch gedrag vertonen en de gebruiker de verhaallijn kan beïnvloeden. Virtual 
storytelling is een hot topic geworden in verschillende onderzoeksvelden, zoals 
kunstmatige intelligentie, mens-computer interactie en cognitieve wetenschappen. De 
industrie toont ook interesse, met name wat betreft game en scenario design 
(Romano et al., 2007). 
Een van de trends in virtual storytelling is dat men steeds vaker afstapt van vaste 
verhaallijnen naar verhaallijnen die zichzelf ontwikkelen: verhalen waarbij alleen een 
aantal (persoonlijkheids)variabelen worden ingesteld en het script zich vervolgens 
zelf ontwikkelt (Aylett, 1999). Dit vermindert niet alleen het werk voor scriptschrijvers, 
maar maakt het verhaal ook onvoorspelbaar. 
Deze ontwikkeling brengt ook met zich mee dat de persoonlijkheden van de 
karakters minder vlak en complexer worden, bijvoorbeeld door de toevoeging van 
'theory of mind'. Om dit te bewerkstelligen zijn onderzoekers begonnen deze 
karakters uit te rusten met cognitieve modellen. 
Silicon Coppélia kan gezien worden als een volgende stap in deze richting. Het 
maakt het mogelijk voor de karakters om gevoelens van betrokkenheid en distantie te 
ontwikkelen tegenover de andere karakters. De karakters kunnen deze gevoelens 
combineren met de meer rationele intenties om de andere karakters te 'gebruiken' 
om hun doelen te bewerkstelligen, oftewel om hun eigen beslissingen te maken. De 
karakters kunnen emoties simuleren en deze zowel opwaarts als neerwaarts 
reguleren door middel van diverse emotieregulatie strategieën. 
ECAs die verhalen kunnen vertellen zijn niet alleen nuttig om ouderen zich minder 
eenzaam te laten voelen. Virtual storytelling heeft zich ook nuttig bewezen in 
klinische settings, voor de behandeling van gedragsproblemen, gezinstherapie en 
training (e.g., Painter, Cook & Silverman, 1999), het leren van een nieuwe taal 
(Schlosser & Loyd, 1993) en het overtuigen van mensen (e.g., Lee & Leets, 2002). 
De motivatie voor het ontwikkelen van robots die virtuele verhalen vertellen kan 
variëren van pure entertainment (zoals bijvoorbeeld computerspelletjes) tot 
educationele toepassingen (bijvoorbeeld trainingsomgevingen) tot overtuiging 
(bijvoorbeeld gezondheidscommunicatie) of klinische therapieën. 
In het bijzonder kunnen ECAs een belangrijke rol spelen in de interactie tussen 
mens en computer in een internet context. Een van de toepassingsgebieden die we 
voorzien is zelfhulp therapie, waarin mensen met psychologische problemen 
ondersteund worden door toepassingen die beschikbaar zijn op internet en in online 
communities van personen met vergelijkbare problemen. Een ECA die uitgerust is 
met Silicon Coppélia kan empathisch reageren op de gebruiker. Samen met de 
kennis van experts kan de ECA het model gebruiken om zich emotioneel intelligent te 
gedragen en 'de juiste reactie op het juiste moment' te geven, voor zover die bestaat. 
Bovendien kan Silicon Coppélia gebruikt worden om de ECA een model te laten 
hebben van de gebruiker op verschillende momenten, aangezien Silicon Coppélia 
gebaseerd is op menselijke emotieprocessen. Het kan verschillen in percepties 
bijhouden en deze informatie gebruiken in interactie met de gebruiker (bijvoorbeeld 
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het geven van complimentjes, of op andere wijze extra ondersteuning geven op 
momenten dat dat nodig is). 
 
In het SELEMCA project zullen we 'Caredroids' ontwikkelen: menselijke robots om 
het welzijn van gebruikers en zorgverleners te verhogen. Deze Caredroids zullen 
fungeren als coaches en lifestyle adviseurs, assisteren met het invullen van 
formulieren, zorgen voor entertainment en patiënten aan zorgverleners en vrijwilligers 
koppelen die het beste kunnen voorzien in hun behoeften. 
  Deze Caredroids zullen affectief met hen communiceren en een persoonlijke 
band met ze opbouwen. Om dit te kunnen doen zullen de Caredroids gevoel voor 
(ongeschreven) sociale regeltjes, menselijke perceptie en de beoordeling van 
bepaalde situaties moeten hebben. Hiervoor zullen we de Caredroids uitrusten met 
ethische redeneermethoden en expertkennis, zodat ze zich 'ethisch correct' en als 
experts kunnen gedragen. Het gegeven dat de gebruikers vaak door een lastige 
periode heen gaan en emotioneel kwetsbaar kunnen zijn maakt dit extra belangrijk. 
Als de Caredroids een ethisch complexe situatie herkennen moeten ze hun eigen 
vermogens niet overschatten en een zorgverlener waarschuwen om de situatie onder 
handen te nemen. 
Privacy en veiligheid zijn ook belangrijke zaken om rekening mee te houden. De 
Caredroids zullen gebruik maken van gevoelige persoonlijke data over bijvoorbeeld 
hun persoonlijkheid, zodat ze zich aan hun behoeften kunnen aanpassen. Mensen 
denken misschien dat een kunstmatige therapeut hun informatie vertrouwelijk 
behandeld, maar het is gewoon een stuk software, dat net als elke andere gebruikt 
kan worden voor zowel goede als kwade doeleinden. Als ECAs of robots de 
mogelijkheid krijgen om de gevoelens van hun gebruikers te monitoren, zouden ook 
ongeautoriseerde personen geïnteresseerd kunnen zijn in deze informatie. Dit brengt 
de grote en belangrijke verantwoordelijkheid met zich mee de privacy van de 
gebruikers veilig te stellen. In huidige toepassingen worden al een hoeveelheid 
gevoelig liggende persoonlijke informatie in vaak onderling verbonden databases 
opgeslagen die groter is dan menigeen zich kan voorstellen. Dit maakt het nodig dat 
deze gegevens extreem goed beveiligd dienen te worden. Iets wat op dit moment 
eigenlijk nauwelijks gebeurt, gezien de vele datalekken die al dan niet het nieuws 
halen. Behalve een tiptop beveiliging dienen gebruikers ook de mogelijkheid te 
krijgen in te zien welke informatie over hen bewaard wordt en wijzigingen of 
verwijderingen in de database aan te vragen als ze daar behoefte toe hebben. 
De Caredroids die we in het SELEMCA project gaan ontwikkelen zullen natuurlijk 
niet volledig gelijk zijn aan mensen. Het Turing Test experiment (zie Hoofdstuk 12) 
toonde echter al aan dat, binnen een beperkt domein, gedrag van de agent al 
nauwelijks onderscheidbaar was van menselijk gedrag op verscheidene aspecten. In 
de toekomst zal het echter mogelijk zijn om androids te ontwikkelen: robots die niet te 
onderscheiden zijn van echte mensen. Wat als we zo'n robot maken? Zijn we dan 
goed bezig? Verbetert het onze levenskwaliteit?  
Het is belangrijk om je te realiseren dat androids die affectief met mensen 
communiceren, net als elke andere techniek die we ontwikkelen, zowel met goede 
als slechte doeleinden gebruikt kan worden. Als het gebruikt wordt met de verkeerde 
doeleinden, of fouten gemaakt worden in het ontwikkel- of productieproces, kunnen 
negatieve effecten zich voordoen. Technieken die nuttig lijken kunnen grote nadelen 
hebben waar in het enthousiasme makkelijk overheen gekeken kan worden 
(atoombom, anyone?). 
Op dit moment worden er al ECAs en robots ontwikkeld waarvan gezegd kan 
worden dat mensen er persoonlijke relaties mee opbouwen (bijvoorbeeld 
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robothondjes die gebruikt worden om eenzaamheid te voorkomen, zoals in Wada & 
Shibata, 2006). Het ligt in de lijn der verwachting dat deze mens-robot relaties steeds 
persoonlijker worden naarmate de tijd vordert. David Levy (2007) voorspelt zelfs 
partner-robots waar mensen verliefd op worden, seks mee hebben en mee zullen 
trouwen. Als dit gebeurt, wat voor effect zal dit dan hebben op ons als mensheid? 
Zullen mensen minder onderling persoonlijk contact hebben, omdat robots 
geoptimaliseerd zijn om de gebruiker een prettige interactie te laten ervaren? Kun je 
je robot-partner terugbrengen naar de fabriek als het interesse in je verliest? Of, als 
het zijn eigen doelen heeft, zal het dreigen de gebruiker te verlaten of de gebruiker 
op een andere manier manipuleren om deze te bereiken? Androids die affectief met 
mensen communiceren hebben het potentieel om mensen te misleiden. Als ze, al 
dan niet per ongeluk, zo geprogrammeerd worden, kunnen ze perfect liegen, door 
precies de emoties te tonen die ze zouden tonen als de leugen waarheid zou zijn. 
Deel van dit probleem zou opgelost kunnen worden door androids te bouwen die de 
gebruiker onvoorwaardelijk liefhebben. Maar zal de gebruiker de robot dan als slaafje 
gebruiken, of op andere wijze mishandelen? En als dit gebeurt, wat voor gevolgen 
zal dit hebben voor de manier waarop we andere mensen mishandelen? De androids 
zijn immers niet te onderscheiden van 'echte' mensen. En als de robots mishandeld 
worden, zouden ze dan het recht moeten hebben om zichzelf te verdedigen? En zo 
nee, wanneer dan wel? 
De eerste van de bekende drie wetten van Asimov stelt dat een robot nooit een 
mens mag kwetsen, of verzuimen in actie te ondernemen om te voorrkomen dat een 
mens gekwetst wordt (Asimov, 1976). Deze wet wordt echter al lang geschonden. Er 
bestaan zelfs al robots die mensen kunnen vermoorden. Sterker nog, er worden al 
robots ontwikkeld met dit specifieke doel, zoals de MQ-1 Predator drone vliegtuigen, 
bewapend met Hellfire missiles. Deze onbemande vliegtuigen zijn gebruikt door het 
leger van de VS en Israël om zowel militanten als burgers te doden (Galasco et al., 
2009; Grier, 2009). Sommige mensen stellen dat het gebruik van autonome 
vechtrobots oorlog humaner maakt (Arkin, 2009). De drempel om een oorlog te 
beginnen wordt hierdoor echter wel verlaagd, omdat de 'levens' van machines in 
plaats van die van mensen wordt geriskeerd. 
Verder, gegeven dat machines worden ontwikkeld die vormen van bewustzijn 
vertonen (Holland, 2003), wordt de mogelijkheid dat we 'gedomineerd' zullen worden 
door machines, waarvoor gewaarschuwd wordt in diverse boeken en films, een zorg 
om serieus rekening mee te houden. Als we machines ontwikkelen die we zelf maar 
half begrijpen, wie zegt dat ze ons niet tot slaaf maken of uitroeien? Het is belangrijk 
om te reflecteren op ons onderzoek en daarmee zeker te stellen dat de stap die 
genomen wordt echt een stap voorwaarts is, die de levenskwaliteit van mensen 
verbetert en niet een stap in een valkuil blijkt te zijn! 
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